It has long been understood that the one thing that
governments can always find money for is war. War is undoubtedly costly, as the
US is currently finding out. It is not really, though, a financial problem. As Professor
Richard Murphy points out today,
the real constraint isn’t financial, it’s about the availability of bombs and
missiles and the ability of even the US economy to replace them at a fast
enough rate. The US will run out of Tomahawk missiles because it can’t
manufacture them with sufficient speed, not because it can’t pay for them.
Similar considerations apply to Iran, of course – although an economy using
lower cost, easier-to-produce weaponry can to some extent compensate for its relatively
smaller size.
There is another corollary to this as well.
There is talk that reducing the level of sanctions enforcement on Russian oil
and gas to mitigate the economic impact of the war in Iran will enable Russia
to prolong its own war in Ukraine by increasing the flow of money into Moscow’s
Treasury. It’s true in only one important respect: to the extent that Russia
needs materials, components etc from outside its own economy, increasing its
flow of foreign exchange will assist it, but to the extent that it can meet
those needs internally, then, just like the US, it won’t be a lack of money
which constrains it.
Russia is vast; it has a huge range of raw materials
available to it. It’s also a dictatorship: switching the use of its natural and
human resources from peace time activities to war time ones is a lot easier
than it is in a supposed democracy. Much of the response from ‘the West’ to the
war in Ukraine has been based on the assumption that economic sanctions will reduce
the sums available to the Russian government to spend on armaments and
eventually force it to stop its aggression. But if those sanctions only impact Putin’s
ability to make purchases outside the Russian economy, and Russia can meet most
of its own needs within that economy, then the assumption is invalid. Russia
can never run out of money, and can continue its war as long as it has the
resources to do so available within its economy.
That’s not to argue that sanctions should not be
applied, even if we know that they are widely being broken by back door
transactions. It does, though, suggest that merely cutting off economic contact
with a country with access to such vast resources of materials and labour will
not bring that country to its knees any time soon. It’s more tokenistic than effective.
It’s not a new lesson – Iran, for example, has been subject to severe sanctions
for decades, and is still able to produce drones not only for its own use but
also for export. The mistaken belief that money (or lack thereof) is a
constraint on action by sovereign governments running their own currency has a
lot to answer for.
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