Wednesday, 12 February 2020

What's the alternative?


I was surprised to see that Plaid are apparently signing up to the campaign to stop HS2 completely, using the hashtag #NoToHS2 on the propaganda which has appeared on social media over the last day or two.  I understand the argument that Wales should receive a Barnett consequential for the expenditure which benefits only England, although the extent to which I agree with that argument depends on whether HS2 is seen as the beginning and end of high speed rail in the UK or as just the next phase of a plan to connect the whole UK.  As presented by the UK Government currently it is a stand-alone project, and as such should unquestionably generate a consequential under the Barnett formula.  But if it were just the first phase, with a subsequent phase being a connection to Wales, then the argument that it is a UK-wide project becomes much stronger.  Arguing for either a consequential budget payment, or else for Wales to be part of the next phase, seem to me to be entirely valid stances for Plaid to pursue – arguing that another country (England) shouldn’t go ahead with the project at all seems a strange position to take.
I’m not entirely convinced by the argument that Wales won’t benefit at all, either.  Certainly, Glamorgan and Gwent won’t benefit (and will even lose out if they remain excluded), and that’s where the majority of the population live, but it isn’t the whole of Wales.  There is no necessary reason why high-speed trains are confined to operating on high-speed lines if the system is designed appropriately (and the whole network electrified) from the outset.  French TGV trains, for instance, travel beyond the high-speed network to a range of destinations on the ‘normal’ network, albeit at lower speeds.  There is no fundamental obstacle to using HS2 trains for direct services from North Wales to London, joining the high-speed network at Crewe.  It might be a benefit at the margins, but it’s still a potential benefit, subject to the big ‘if’ of whether it’s planned that way.  And, in the same way, parts of Wales west of Cardiff could benefit from a future high-speed link to Bristol/Cardiff from London.
There are, of course, sound environmental arguments for opposing the project; there is no doubt that it will do damage along the whole of the route, wherever it’s built and however many phases it comprises.  And I’m completely unimpressed by the argument that shaving time off journeys to and from London is adequate justification for such a project.  The question is, though, whether the project can be looked at in isolation, or whether we need to compare it with the alternatives.  What, in short, happens if it doesn’t go ahead?
The ‘best’ alternative, in environmental terms, is for people to travel less, but I doubt very much that that will happen if it’s left to millions of individual decisions, and I can’t imagine any elected government taking measures to prevent people from making journeys around the UK.  The demand is growing, not falling, and the question is about how to cope with that.  If rail transport is not expanded, then either road traffic will increase or else domestic air traffic will increase, both of which are likely to be more damaging than a high-speed rail network. 
Ultimately, that strikes me as the best argument for developing a high-speed rail network across the UK – fast, reliable surface transport using low carbon energy is a better alternative than continued growth in air traffic.  One of my biggest criticisms of the current plans is the use of a new terminal in London rather than the existing HS1 terminal, a decision which makes it impossible to have an easy interchange onto trains bound for the mainland, let alone have the direct through trains which I’m sure I remember we were promised at the time of the agreement to build the Channel Tunnel.  Reducing the number (or at least halting the growth) of short-haul flights should be a key element of government policy, and that means either restricting the right to travel or else providing a viable alternative.  It’s not the most ringing of endorsements, but high-speed rail appears to me to be the least-worst option available.

Tuesday, 11 February 2020

Making our own rules


A lot of people are being very unkind to Michael Gove following his admission that almost all imports and exports to and from the EU will be subject to border checks from next year, after he and other Brexiteers have spent years arguing that trade will be frictionless.  The critics are missing the point – this is all about taking back control.  From 1st January next year, we will no longer have to follow all those horrid and bureaucratic EU rules which arbitrarily imposed free trade between the UK and the EU.  Instead, we will be entirely free to set our own rules to limit and complicate trade with the EU by putting it on the same footing as trade with non-EU countries.  It may look like bureaucracy and regulation, but it’s British bureaucracy and regulation.  That’s exactly what people voted for, isn’t it?

Wednesday, 5 February 2020

Pluses and minuses abound


Prior to the 2016 EU referendum, the messages from the Brexiteers weren’t exactly consistent, but there were plenty of them willing to state that 'nobody' was talking about leaving the single market and that Brexit was simply about opting out of the political institutions and the ‘ever closer union’ of states.  Remaining in the single market would make a comprehensive trade deal the ‘easiest deal in history’ said one, and that could have been true just as long as the UK accepted the associated rules and standards.
Having won a majority on the basis of a series of mixed messages, it suddenly became obvious to them that such a scenario, often called Norway or even Norway+, was not a ‘real’ Brexit at all, since it involved continued compliance with all the rules to which the UK had previously agreed (and even, in many cases, initiated).  In the interests of ensuring an ever-purer version of Brexit, talk moved on to other scenarios, such as Canada+++, or, in the worst case, no deal at all.  The latest iteration is that the best we can expect from the current government is Canada (with no pluses) or the alternative of Australia (which is the new name for ‘no deal’ since Australia has no trade agreement with the EU, but it sounds a great deal more voter-friendly than no deal).  I find myself wondering how long it will be before some Brexiteers start to propose North Korea---, under which there would be no trade at all with the EU, sanctions on anyone who attempts to trade, and warships in the sea between the UK and the EU to enforce the trade ban.  And I understand that current trading arrangements with Mars allow the UK to set all the rules with no Martian input at all.  I just hope I’m not putting ideas in their heads.
Yesterday, Michael Gove went as far as to say that we don’t need any sort of agreement with the EU.  Strictly speaking, he’s entirely correct – we can trade with the EU with no agreement at all in place as long as we accept tariffs, quotas, rigid border checks, and a huge reduction in trade volume.  The PM himself said that there was no need for the UK to follow EU rules to get a deal, any more than he would expect the EU to follow UK rules.  Not for the first time, it underlines the English nationalists’ absurd belief that the UK and EU somehow enter the talks as equals, and ignores the fact that, on Day 1, the UK and EU will be following a common set of rules anyway – the question is about what happens when one or other decides to change those rules.
All trade agreements involve a degree of compromise around standards and regulations – even the basic WTO rules include provisions against state-subsidised dumping.  And the closer the alignment in regulation, the easier it is to reach agreement on tariffs and quotas for trade.  Or to put it another way, the purer the Brexit, the more barriers to trade with the EU.  What would help to ensure minimum barriers to trade would be some sort of framework for agreeing joint rules and a system for enforcing them.  I wonder why no-one’s ever thought of that before.  Oh, wait...
The basic problem remains that the nationalists driving Brexit are stuck in a mindset which believes that the UK has a right to be treated as an exception and the rest of the world will simply bow down before us.  And the worst part of it is that those who are cheering them on most enthusiastically are the ones most likely to pay the price in the end.

Monday, 3 February 2020

Knee-jerk reaction, not strategy


The tone with which the UK Government seeks to deny the right to hold a further referendum on Scottish independence is becoming increasingly strident; the rhetoric suggests that the current government will never allow one to be held.  Telling the people of Scotland that their votes count for nothing, and that it doesn’t matter how many times they vote for a party committed to holding such a referendum, their votes will simply be ignored anyway doesn’t immediately strike me as the best way of countering the demand and convincing Scots that they are valued partners.  Reminding them regularly that sovereignty lies with the Queen-in-Parliament rather than with the people looks almost like a deliberate attempt to push ever greater numbers into the independence camp. 
There was even a subliminal message in the fact that it was the Foreign Secretary who took the lead on the issue yesterday, although the implicit suggestion that Scotland is now part of the Foreign Office’s brief was, I am sure, entirely unintentional.  I suspect that it hadn’t even occurred to them.  But it did give him an opportunity to add some new reasons for refusing to allow a referendum, in that it might, apparently, encourage similar trends in Italy, France and Spain.  Ah yes, this is the new ‘independent’ British foreign policy at work, now that we don’t need to worry about those Europeans.  At the heart of their stated reasons for refusal, however, remains the way in which they have taken the expression of a personal opinion by Alex Salmond (who thought that the 2014 referendum would be a ‘once-in-a-generation’ opportunity), and turned into a pledge hugely more important and solemn than any suggestions about dying in ditches.
It is the application of double standards on a grand scale: firm pledges by Boris Johnson were just electioneering rhetoric which can be ignored, whilst mere expressions of opinion by the then-leader of the SNP are inviolable commitments; and winning 56% of the seats in the UK on 44% of the vote gives the UK Government an absolute mandate to do whatever it likes, but winning 81% of the seats in Scotland on 45% of the vote gives the SNP no mandate for anything at all except to shut up and do as they are told.  The first is just logically and morally bankrupt, but the second is, of course, constitutionally and legally true.  It is in the nature of devolution that power remains at the centre unless and until the centre decides to share it – and even that sharing can subsequently be revoked at any time.  Power devolved is always and inevitably power retained.
Theoretically, the position in Scotland and Catalonia is very different; in Catalonia, independence is constitutionally illegal, whereas in Scotland (and Wales) there is a legal path to achieving it.  In practice, however, the UK’s constitution leaves the right to choose more theoretical than actual if the English Government (which is what we effectively have) decides to block it.  Many in Scotland have urged the government there to pass legislation to hold a ‘consultative’ referendum on the issue.  Whether that would be legal or not is currently unknown, but we can be certain that it would end up with the Supreme Court having to decide, and even if the courts decided that it was legal, Westminster could easily and quickly change the law to make it illegal before it was actually held.  That leaves the First Minister and her party between a rock and a hard place – undoubtedly the best way to gain recognition for Scottish independence is though a legally organised referendum where opinions are freely expressed through the ballot box.  But such a referendum is entirely in the gift of the English PM, regardless of how many times the Scots vote for a party or parties committed to holding such a vote.
Johnson and his party seem to be pinning their hopes on next year’s Scottish elections.  If they can only spend enough money on propaganda, bypass or weaken the Scottish parliament and implement their own policies directly, and then prevent the SNP from winning a majority next year, perhaps the issue can be made to go away.  It’s not an impossible scenario, but it strikes me as more likely that undermining Scottish institutions will strengthen rather than weaken the support for independence.  And the images of the elected First Minister being repeatedly prevented from holding a referendum for which the Scottish electorate has now voted several times also seems to me to be more likely to strengthen than weaken support. I’m reasonably sure that isn’t Johnson’s intention, but I doubt that he’s thought it through.  He doesn’t seem to do ‘strategy’ – just knee-jerk reaction.

Friday, 31 January 2020

At the eleventh hour...


With a matter of hours to go before the UK formally leaves the EU, the PM has finally admitted something which most of us have known all along, but which he and his fellow Brexiteers have spent more than three years denying – leaving the single market and the customs union means border checks on goods passing between the UK and the EU.  He isn’t quite putting it in those terms (he wouldn’t be Boris if he did) but is stating rather that the UK ‘is willing to accept’ border checks, as though we ever had any choice in the matter.  His stated reason for this latest climbdown is that it’s the only way that he can deliver on the promises made about this strange thing called ‘sovereignty’.  Reuters puts it more bluntly, reporting that he will also say that ‘sovereignty is more important than frictionless trade’.
The admission that there is – and was always going to be – a trade-off between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘free trade’ is hardly a revelation.  It’s a simple fact that all trade deals between countries involve such a trade-off; the question is always about how much sovereignty a country agrees to share in order to reach joint decisions (and ‘share’ rather then ‘cede’ is the correct term, despite what the Brexiteers have consistently argued), and in return for what economic or other benefits.  Had the Brexiteers been willing to debate it in such terms at the time of the referendum and since, I would have had more respect for their position, but they have, right up until the eleventh hour (almost literally), repeated ad nauseam that we could have frictionless trade without having to agree to any joint rules or regulations.  They might still have won the referendum, of course, because trade and economics were only part of the debate.  It was probably the part, however, on which their argument was shakiest, so they chose instead to lie repeatedly.
To some extent, that is now water under the bridge; the UK will formally leave later today, and accepting that there is a cost in terms of trade attached to the sort of future relationship which the UK will have with the EU is simply a necessary precondition to any sort of negotiation on the detail.  What they have yet to admit (but it will surely come when reality can no longer be denied) is that the same issue will arise in relation to any and every other trade deal that they attempt to negotiate – the closeness of the deal and the degree of friction in terms of tariffs, checks and bureaucracy are directly related to the willingness or otherwise of the UK government to agree to share sovereignty and agree some rules and process (and their enforcement) jointly with other countries and trading blocs.
It’s an issue of which most Welsh independentistas are more aware than the Anglo-British nationalists driving Brexit and is part of the reason why so many of us preferred to avoid the term ‘independence’ for so many years.  In a modern, globally connected world, no country can really ‘stand alone’ and exercise total sovereignty over all aspects of its own affairs.  To even attempt to do so requires either great size or almost complete isolation.  The question facing any state is always ‘how much, and in what areas, and in what institutions are we prepared to share sovereignty and make joint decisions?’.  The EU was never the perfect answer to that question but attempting to pretend that there isn’t even a need to ask the question isn’t a sensible response.  I’ve long hoped that, if there were to be a positive side to Brexit it would be in helping those who run the UK to realise, at last, that the UK is, as the Irish Taoiseach put it last week, a “small country”.  It looks like being a long process though.

Thursday, 30 January 2020

Exporting a problem isn't the same as 'solving' it


One of the problems with referendums is that, in reducing complex questions to very simple ones, they can lead to a situation where there may well be a majority for a particular proposition, but the reasons why that majority voted as they did are many and varied (and, of course, the same applies to the other side).  I don’t doubt that immigration and xenophobia were factors in the EU referendum, but even if most of those opposed to immigration voted to leave, it doesn’t follow that all of those who voted for leave are opposed to immigration.  The government, though, has chosen to behave as though they were, and instead of promoting a reasoned debate around immigration and the reasons for it, has opted to try and implement schemes which appear to be aimed at cutting the numbers.  I say ‘appear’; for all their bluster, I don’t think that people like Johnson are actually convinced that immigration is a problem, nor do I entirely believe that the proposed schemes themselves will reduce numbers – they just want to look as though they are doing something to appeal to that particular group of voters. 
It’s not an enormous surprise to be told this week not only that the EU has never prevented the UK from operating a ‘points-based’ system but also that the UK has actually been operating such a system for years.  Saying it out loud got the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee sacked, but hey, ‘taking back control’.  It’s possible, however, that simply making potential migrants think twice before seeking to come to the UK by increasing the number of bureaucratic hoops which need to be jumped through and tanking the economy will act as deterrents, but that isn’t quite the way that the policy is allegedly intended to work – and those things are likely to deter precisely those that the government says that it wants to attract.  Little will deter those who are simply desperate from trying all means.
I start from the position that, in principle, people should be free to travel, live and work wherever they wish and that it’s for governments to justify why that should exceptionally not be allowed.  (However, it’s clear that many others start from the principle that no-one should be allowed that freedom, and that it is for the individuals themselves to justify why they should be excepted.  The result is that many of those who supported Brexit are not just supporting, but actively demanding, the removal of their own rights.)   But support for the principle isn’t the same thing as arguing either for mass migration or for actively going out and seeking inward migrants.  If, given the freedom, people seek to migrate en masse, we should be looking at why that is the case, and the most usual causes are war, famine, persecution, and economic inequality.  It’s strange, but not really surprising, that most of those opposing mass migration also oppose doing anything about those causes.  Real freedom of movement depends on real equality of opportunity, and there is quite a large overlap between opponents of freedom of movement and opponents of equality.
I’m opposed to the way in which the government is seeking to recruit immigrants selectively to come to the UK, which they do for two reasons.  The first is that we need certain skills in larger numbers than we possess them – doctors, nurses, engineers, and so forth.  And the second is that, with an ageing population, we need more young workers to be paying taxes to support the older members of society.  But both of these point to failures of the economic system under which we live, and my real objection to filling the gap by recruiting migrants is nothing to do with the migrants themselves, it is that we are simply exporting the problem, often to countries which are already poorer than ourselves.  Taking the best-educated, the highest-paid, and the most productive in terms of their working age may solve some of our problems – in the short term at least – but it simply makes other countries’ problems worse.  And that is not good world citizenship.  It is, as Simon Jenkins argued this week, not ethical.
A rich economy which cannot develop the skills it needs amongst its own citizens, and which cannot support its own citizens without continued population growth (either from organic growth or from immigration) is an economy built on sand.  It is not sustainable in the long term, and we need to rethink the way we do things rather than seek to move the problem around.  It was disappointing this week to see the Scottish Government arguing for its own visa system, not on the basis of wanting to be fairer and to implement a different approach, but on the basis of addressing the perceived ‘problem’ of the falling Scottish birth rate.  That’s a ‘problem’ that we need more of, not one to be ‘solved’.  In a world where over-population is a serious and growing problem, a country with a low population density and a falling birth rate has major potential advantages – the question is how to adjust the economy to exploit that opportunity, not see it as a 'problem' to be fixed by moving it somewhere else.

Wednesday, 29 January 2020

It's really very simple, isn't it?


Many people might think that building peace between implacable enemies is a long and difficult task, but as Trump showed yesterday, it’s incredibly easy for a ‘stable genius’.  All you need to do is sit down with one side to the dispute, ask them what they want, write it all down, call it a peace plan, present it to the other side, and tell them that they must agree to it or else.  What could possibly go wrong?  It’s so simple that I simply can’t imagine why no-one has thought of it before...

Monday, 27 January 2020

Playing the federal card


Over the weekend, Labour’s remaining leadership candidates have been competing to see who can come up with the best way of strengthening ‘our precious union’ although none of them managed to articulate what’s so precious about it or why they want to maintain it.  And, as seems inevitable when Labour’s thoughts turn to devolution, one of them has played the federal card.  In this case, it’s Starmer, who has at least recognised that a federal UK with real power for the nations and regions means breaking up England into smaller units.  He didn’t put it that way, of course – but that can only be the outcome of setting up regional parliaments with full powers over all devolved areas.  A federation which leaves England untouched can never be a federation of equals.  In truth, what sounds like a radical plan is little more than an attempt to kick the can down the road by setting up a long-term process which will lead to a written constitution at some unspecified future date after listening to people's opinions (and guess what the reaction in England will be?).  Too little, too late.
Long-Bailey took a trip into an imaginary past where the Scottish Parliament and the Senedd “were meant to be on an equal footing” with Westminster.  (Spoiler: No, they weren’t.  That was never the intention of any part of the Labour Government which set them up.)  She went on to argue that she wants “our Scottish parliament and our Welsh parliament to feel as completely autonomous and independent as they possibly can whilst having that collaborative relationship with Westminster”.  If the relationship with Westminster is collaborative rather than hierarchical, I can see nothing much wrong with that, although it sounds a lot like what I’d call independence.  I hope that an independent Wales would always be willing to collaborate with our neighbours in these islands and beyond.  I rather suspect that “as completely autonomous and independent” as possible has a rather more limited meaning for her than for me, and that her idea of "collaborative" is rather more of a straitjacket.  And the one thing that comes through very clearly is that she somehow thinks that strengthening devolution will regain Scotland for Labour; and I suspect that party political objective is the real aim for all of them.
Nandy doesn’t seem to have had much of import to say in the eyes of whoever wrote this piece, merely talking vaguely about handing power back to the nations and regions.  It’s another version of alternative history, because the regions never had the powers (whatever they are) which she says she wants to give them back.
Thornberry sounds much more like the authentic voice of Labour which we know so well, and whilst she seems to be on course to be knocked out of the contest soon, I rather suspect that her traditional approach is the one that will actually be followed by Labour, whoever wins, after a decent period has elapsed in which to bury all talk of federalism.  Bash the SNP, label them as tartan Tories, and wait for the voters to return sheepishly to the Labour fold.  It’s not exactly been a successful strategy to date, but it does at least show that she understands the problem she’s trying to solve – it’s nothing to do with devolution, independence or the best interests of Wales or Scotland, it’s all about how Labour can win the seats it needs to form a government in London.  The problem isn’t a constitutional one, it’s about those contrary Scots refusing to vote the way they’re told to vote.

Friday, 24 January 2020

What does freedom look like?


According to the Brexiteers, there’s just one week left under the oppressive yoke of Brussels rule, after which the UK will, at last, be free to set its own course in the world.  We will be free to set our own standards and rules in a whole host of areas, constrained only by the minor inconvenience of trying to sell our wares into markets which insist on imposing different standards and refuse to accept anything which does not comply.  That will be their problem, though, not ours – if they don’t accept our new standards, we can refuse to sell them our goods and services.  Let’s see how they like that!
We’ll also be free to set our own external tariffs, which means we can abolish all tariffs on incoming goods if we wish.  That will give us the advantage of buying whatever we like, from wherever we like, at the cheapest prices available on the world market.  If the rest of the world doesn’t follow suit and abolish their tariffs on our goods, that too will be their problem.  We can stop making the things that they want and force them to look elsewhere.  Let’s see how they like that!
We’ll be free to control immigration, and stop foreigners coming here to take advantage of our economic strength.  We won’t even need to pay the cost of introducing a points-based system: the economic result of using our freedom to set our own standards and abolish tariffs means that they won’t even want to come here in future.  How’s that for killing two birds with one stone!
Above all, we’ll be free of the evil and iniquitous requirement of EU membership that the state must abide by the rule of law.  Our government will at last be free to trample on democracy and human rights and treat people however they want.  Brexit means Brexit; the people have spoken; the government must give them what they voted for.  That’ll show the EU that we mean business!
As Fintan O'Toole suggests, the big problem with imaginary oppression is that getting rid of it leads only to imaginary freedom.

Thursday, 23 January 2020

Chancellor achieves new heights


Last week, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did his best to sabotage any hope of retaining good access to EU markets by insisting that the UK will deliberately diverge from EU standards and regulations; this week he went to Davos and came close to starting a tariff war with the USA.  It certainly honours the government’s commitment to run talks with the EU and the USA in parallel rather than in series, but I hadn’t realised that the objective of doing that was to wreck both.  But, wait a moment – what was the Chancellor even doing in Davos?  It’s only a month since the PM banned all cabinet ministers from attending the gathering saying that they were going to be far too busy at home.  It was, of course, a ‘Boris Johnson pledge’, and therefore not meant to be taken seriously, but it’s a pretty blatant U-turn even by his standards.  Perhaps the PM thought that, after attempting to sabotage the EU talks last week, the Chancellor could do less damage in Davos than he could if he stayed in London.  If he did, the PM may have, to use a Bushism, seriously misunderestimated Javid’s capacity for following his own example.