When prevention becomes cause

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The military mind seems quite fond of developing different euphemisms and phrases which do more to obscure what it being said than to elucidate it. ‘Friendly fire’ and ‘collateral damage’ are two of the obvious ones. There was another one this week: ‘expended’. It seems that the military and the defence ministry are a little worried that, in the event of an all-out war, the UK’s entire army would be ‘expended’ in only six months. Whilst the rational response would be to say that, in that case, we’d better make absolutely certain that we don’t ever get into such a war, the military mind seeks instead to explore ways in which the number of people available to be ‘expended’ can be increased rapidly, in order to add a few months to that period. Whether people are going to be as enthusiastic about being ‘expended’ in the twenty-first century as they were at times in the past is another question: the military, as ever, always seem to believe that they’re going to re-fight the last war, and there does seem to be an assumption that attitudes to participating in a war are unchanged.

Their response to the point about avoiding such a war would probably be something along the lines of, ‘Ah yes, but the best way of doing so is to possess such overwhelming military strength that they would never dare attack in the first place’. But here’s a question: if Russia (to choose a putative enemy not-at-all-at-random) were to seek to build up its forces such that they were capable of deploying overwhelming force against ‘the west’, would ‘the west’ see that as a deterrent or a threat? And if the answer is the latter, why would ‘the west’ expect Russia not to see a military build-up by ‘the west’ in the same light? Underpinning the mindset is a belief, on both sides, that ‘the enemy’ is just waiting for a chance to attack ‘us’, in order to seize land and resources, and to subjugate people.

Historically, it’s not an entirely bad assumption. Looking at empires of the past (whether Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, Spanish, Portuguese, French or British, for instance), expansion of territory and control of resources – including the ‘right’ to conscript people from the new territories into the army to further expand the empire’s control – has been a key driving factor. But that was then and this is now: what if that isn’t the main driver any more, and the real danger of war stems from a belief on one side or the other that they are under threat and the best response is to strike first? What is presented as a way to prevent war then becomes the likeliest cause of war. And it isn’t just military personnel who will be ‘expended’ if that happens.

Madness seems to be infectious

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The idea that the government thinks that increasing the country’s ‘lethality’ and willingness to use military force to impose its will on others isn’t exactly something to be welcomed.  And quite what it has to do with Brexit escapes me completely; there is nothing in our treaty commitments to the EU which in any way prevents us sending an aircraft carrier wherever we want (as long as it isn’t to threaten action against other EU member states, of course).  There is a negative Brexit effect in that the inevitable short term hit to Treasury revenues makes it harder to afford post-Brexit, but Theresa can always shake that tree in the garden at Downing Street.

There can be few things that quite underline the delusions of grandeur which have driven the Anglo-British not-nationalist-at-all project called Brexit than the idea that freed of the non-existent EU constraints on the UK we can return to the days of Empire and send our gunboats around the world threatening the unruly natives - like those upstart Chinese for instance.  I mean, who do they think they are with their mere 1.2 billion people to think that they could ever resist the demands of the UK?  And there can be few things which do more to reveal it as the fantasy which it is than the fact that the boat that is being sent isn’t planned to be fully operational until 2021, with only what’s called an “initial operational capacity” due to be available from some time in 2020.  That’ll put the wind up them, no?  When they stop laughing, maybe.  And predicting where the new boat might be needed two years hence is an amazing feat from a government who can’t tell us what’s going to happen next month.

In fairness, though, they really shouldn’t laugh.  Writing in the Guardian, Simon Jenkins says that the defence secretary’s brain has gone absent without leave.  I think he’s being unusually kind; a man who thinks the UK can simply tell Russia to “go away and shut up”, and that a half-operational boat with a few borrowed airplanes can threaten the largest full-time military forces in the world might just be as crazy as his leader, who is busily doing nothing whilst jobs and economic activity leach irreversibly out of the UK in an attempt to convince the world that she really would cause a major recession lasting for several years by leaving the UK without a deal if she can’t get her own way.

The whole concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” might have had the apparently descriptive acronym MAD, but in reality it was always based on the assumption that those in charge would behave rationally when push came to shove.  What happens when a government really can’t be depended on to do that is an untested proposition to date.  I’m wondering, though, for how long that will remain true.

Ready for what?

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During the campaign for the Scottish Independence referendum two years ago, one of the arguments used by opponents of independence was that Scotland would be ‘too small’ to defend itself against any aggressor intent on seizing its territory.  The way it was presented, there were enemies out there (usually assumed to be Russia) who were just waiting for such a sign of weakness in order to invade.  One of the problems with that argument is that almost exactly the same could be said for the UK. 

As a retired general told us at the weekend, the UK’s armed forces “are ill-prepared to defend the UK against a serious military attack”.  But if the test of any defence capability is the ability to withstand an all-out attack from Russia, then the chances of the UK ever being able to afford an adequate level of armed forces are close to, if not actually, zero.  The logic of the general’s argument is surely that the countries of the EU would need to combine their armed forces in to a single organisation (as indeed, some in the EU seem to want).  I somehow doubt, however, that that was what the general had in mind.

The underlying question is about how realistic it is to assume that there are enemies out there just waiting for an opportunity to invade and occupy the UK.  It seems to be axiomatic for the military that such is the case, but is it really?  The point is that any government has to decide on the probability of a particular scenario before deciding how much to invest in preparing for it. 

The old saying that “Generals are always preparing to fight the last war” seems relevant here; although in this case, the general’s view seems to overlook the last half dozen or so military adventures which have been of an altogether different type.  Perhaps they just don’t count as ‘real’ wars between proper armies, of the sort that the military mind can more easily comprehend.  But it’s a strange world indeed where stating that “Counter-terrorism is the limit of up-to-date plans and preparations to secure our airspace, waters and territory" is seen as a criticism that the government is unprepared, when for most of us it might look as though there is actually a degree of refocussing on what are the greater current threats.

Insofar as there is a logic to the demand that we should always be prepared for another major European war, it is based on an assumption that some or all other states are inherently aggressive and seeking to expand their territories, and an assumption that the best way to avoid such a war is to be always prepared to fight it.  That’s one reading of history; but there is an alternative reading which is that when enough states prepare for war against each other for long enough, such a war is ultimately more likely to happen.

My bigger concern is not that the UK is not ready to engage in a defensive conventional war against largely imagined enemies; it is that the UK is far too ready to engage in offensive wars, and too unwilling to engage in sensible disarmament processes.  

Messages, big sticks, and accidents

Tweet In an ideal world – for me at least – no single state would be too big or powerful to be pulled back into line when it violates international law (just like banks shouldn’t be too big to fail).  But the world in which we live isn’t ideal, and there are some states which can, as a result, get away with a great deal.

The most obvious is the US, whose willingness – often aided and abetted by the UK – to ignore any international agreements or institutions which stand in its way makes it very much harder to insist that other countries should obey the rules which it rejects.  Another is Russia, and having watched what the US has done in recent decades, it shouldn’t really be any surprise that Putin thinks it appropriate to behave in similar fashion.

This week, a former head of the army called for the deployment of more UK troops than currently planned on the European mainland to “send a message” – one of my least favourite political clichés – to Putin that he “should think twice before he considers any further expeditions and expansion”.  And perhaps we should send a gunboat or two as well, because this sounds like something from the imperial era.

Using the presence of troops to warn another state not to take a certain action is credible only to the extent that that other state believes that those troops will be sent into battle against them.  And given the difficulty that the UK Government has had in identifying even a few minor little sanctions which make it look tough without actually achieving very much, waving a big stick in the air doesn’t look terribly credible to me.  And I have more than a sneaking suspicion that it won’t look very credible to Putin either.

History should teach us that threatening military action is a course of action which can develop a momentum and a ‘logic’ of its own.  “Messages” can get misunderstood all too easily (particularly if the quality of intelligence available to those making the decisions is as poor as the example I referred to yesterday).  The challenge is to de-escalate the tension which is building, not escalate it further in response.  The idea that negotiation isn’t possible unless backed up by big sticks and threats of military action belongs to the past, but still seems rife in military circles.

International security depends on creating and strengthening international institutions and agreements, not on flouting them.

Is it really just about jobs?

Tweet Wales has long been a testing ground for the flying of drones.  Although a few brave individual politicians have consistently raised their voices against using our country in this way, far too many have swallowed the convenient excuse that they might also have civilian uses as a fig leaf to defend the jobs which the programme supports.

A fortnight ago, a new drone was unveiled.  This one will fly faster and higher than anything which has gone before, and is also built using ‘stealth’ technology.  It is apparently “the most advanced air system” yet, and is able to “deliver its weapons deep behind enemy lines” (military speak for killing people, although why anyone believes that there are ‘enemy lines’ any more is something of a mystery to me.)

They’re calling it the “future of warfare”; a future based on more effective killing machines with less risk to those who actually order them to kill.  Not exactly part of any future that I’d choose.  They’ve also given it a nice Celtic name, ‘Taranis’. 

One thing is perfectly clear; even if it were true that there might be some limited applications for existing drones in the civilian world, there is no requirement outside the military for stealth technology.  This is a machine which has one, and only one, use – making war.  I’d like to think that any suggestion that it should be flown from the drone testing base in Wales would be rejected out of hand, and that, just for once, the interests of peace would be placed above any possible economic benefit.  It isn’t something I’d put a bet on though.

The problem isn't with one man

Tweet Harry Windsor came in for some criticism last week for the terms in which he described his role in hunting down and killing members of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  He made it all sound like a bit of a game.  I’m not normally one for defending members of that wealthy and privileged family, but it did seem to me that personalising the criticism in this way was more than a little unfair.

Is his attitude really any different from that of the rest of the military?  I doubt it – it’s simply that, because of his family background, he’s the one who got interviewed.  Much of the terminology used is in widespread use in the military; euphemisms such as “taking out” are the norm not the exception.  Why pick on one man for that?

Use of euphemism isn’t really surprising anyway.  Seeing the whole war thing as some sort of game – with its red team, its blue team, and its green team – is simply a way of translating theory into practice.  It makes the actual killing more similar to the exercises and war games.  And depersonalising it – dehumanising it even – makes it easier for people to kill each other without too much moralising or hesitation.

The problem is not that one individual – whoever he may be – displays that attitude openly or honestly, nor even that it is widespread in the military.  The problem is that “we”, as a society, allow, and acquiesce in, a world order which makes the training of young men to kill or be killed “normal”.  As long as we allow that, then the military will inevitably seek out ways of making the task an easier one to perform – an army whose members stopped to moralise before pulling the trigger would hardly be an effective one.

For sure there are “bad guys” out there, but the one lesson of human history that we seem unable as a species to learn is that war rarely solves anything.  Short-term victories merely sow the seeds of subsequent conflicts, and until we collectively break the cycle, we are merely perpetuating the behaviour of the past.  If we are seriously concerned – and we should be – about what Mister Windsor said last week, we need to address the causes, not attack the individual.