The Trump
administration has been roundly criticized for the approach which it is
adopting to ending the war in Ukraine. But there are two things which Trump says
which are surely uncontroversial in themselves. The first is that the war needs
to end, on which most will surely agree. The second is that some boundary
adjustments will need to be a part of that, which is much more contentious, but nevertheless a statement of an obvious truth.
Those boundary
adjustments, whether permanent or temporary, will inevitably involve Ukraine ceding
territory to Russia because, realistically, the only way of returning to 2014
borders is for other countries to commit large numbers of troops and resources
to the war alongside Ukraine. A third Europe-wide war doesn’t necessarily have
to involve nuclear oblivion, but that’s an obvious risk. And there's surely some doubt about whether the youth of Europe in the twenty-first century are willing to be conscripted and sent to Ukraine to die. Asking, let alone
instructing, Ukraine to concede territory is neither fair nor just, and Trump’s
rationale – which appears to be that Putin has lost a lot of soldiers to gain
the territory so deserves to keep what he’s paid for in blood – is an appalling
basis for making a concession to aggression. It’s also very one-sided, ignoring
the cost that Ukraine has paid to resist the aggression as though Ukrainian
lives don’t matter. It is, though, hardly surprising coming from a man who sees
everything in terms of transactions, who believes that the strong should
dominate the weak, and who has already made it very clear that he rather likes
the idea of emulating Putin’s land grab himself.
Even so, for a man whose
self-image is that of a master dealmaker to concede much of what the other
party wants in advance of any detailed talks is incongruous, to say the least. He
surely realises that any process of negotiation will only involve further
concessions, and that far from being a mutual process he has to date extracted
precisely nothing from Putin in return. He’s also agreed that Ukraine will not
be joining NATO for the foreseeable future. At least that one is within his
authority. Since new members can only be accepted by unanimous decision, he can
block membership although, again, conceding that publicly in advance of any
serious talks doesn’t look like a masterstroke of bargaining. Nor does it
suggest that he has thought further ahead than the next news cycle.
Personally, I’ve
never been a fan of NATO anyway; the idea that dividing the world into hostile
military blocks armed to the teeth is a rational long-term way of preventing
war has always struck me as being a curious one. Trump has exposed the
essential weakness of the alliance: if the most powerful member goes rogue, the
alliance becomes meaningless. By declaring in advance that any peacekeeping
forces deployed to Ukraine will not be acting on behalf of NATO, and that no
attack on them by Russia will trigger the clause decreeing that an attack on
one is an attack on all, he has rendered the alliance in its current form
largely pointless and toothless, giving Putin the green light to attack the peacekeepers whenever he wishes. However, in the long term, if we can navigate our
way through the period of danger which he has created, he might even be doing
us a favour, albeit unintentionally.
The question is
about how to respond. Whilst it would have been better to have approached the
question in calmer times and with more time to work things through, challenging
the whole basis of the alliance is not in itself a bad thing. European nations –
including Ukraine – need to think about how best to bring about a secure and
peaceful Europe which can co-exist with Russia to the east as well as with the
US to the west, rather than simply depending on the military power of the US
for the first and subservience to the US for the second. It’s potentially an opportunity
to negotiate a mutual downsizing of military forces and to remove actual or
perceived threats on both sides by re-establishing a degree of trust and
co-operation, alongside a commitment to resolve disputes by negotiation within
the framework of international law. It’s unclear whether Russia under Putin (or
his successors – he won’t be around for ever, and we’re talking about long term
solutions here) is ready to even begin such a process. Maybe it’s naïve to
expect it to happen rapidly, but European states are hardly sending positive signals
about their own willingness to engage in such a process either. The default
position increasingly looks like some sort of attempt to build a replacement
for NATO which excludes the US, and continue the armed stand-off, with Starmer's Labour in the vanguard, determined to look tough. That would be
a huge missed opportunity to seek to find a long term positive in the short
term chaos being unleashed by the madman in the White House.
2 comments:
I do not thing that NATO needs to be replaced , but what is happening in front of our very eyes is the collapse in what has been called ‘ the European liberal consensus.’ I will not shed any tears over this ,but as we have seen, some have.
Russia’s case, as I have said before has been understated in our media , as they could not print the long story of the Wests disastrous handling of the issues since the Clinton administration.
Your last paragraph is to be commended in that action is needed and I would add- not another 1938 Munich Agreement. As after eighteen months of peace the Russian Army will have rebuilt and much stronger after its experience and the scenario is that Russia will move west and take Belarus and we will not go to war over that ,and after that they will play the Kaliningrad card.
The Russian case about encroachment has also fallen down ,as Turkey always had rockets on its boarder and now that Finland has joined NATO, missile flight time to St Petersburg and Moscow is under sixty seconds and there is no defence from that.
I believe the real issue is the Russian mindset ,which sees Ukraine as part of its territory. When Soviet Russia created a Soviet Ukraine, it did not really matter – sure like Ireland and England it was troublesome ,but they were the same kind of people, in that they spoke your language and were part of a joint history going back centuries. What Ukraine did after the USSR fell was to come down with a heavy hand and try and obliterate the Russian people and heritage within its borders, with the same fervour as the English did in creating ‘England and Wales.’ Putin is a man that will never forgive that as it is an insult that threatens his very identity as a Russian.
What the actual motivation of Putin for the invasion was is not entirely clear-cut, although that doesn't prevent many from claiming to know. Putin himself has given several different reasons, including: the point you make about Ukrainian attitudes towards the Russian minority; NATO's growing proximity to Russian borders; the alleged nazi nationalists running Ukraine; the alleged illegitimacy of the government in Ukraine; and the claimed historic unity of Russia and Ukraine. It's hard to be certain exactly what his motivation really was, and the relevant importance of the various factors. About the only thing he hasn't mentioned is his desire to get hold of Ukrainian mineral resources - Trump has been rather more honest in explicitly noting that as part of his objective in dismembering Ukraine. Personally, I suspect that Putin's fear of a NATO attempt to destroy Russia may have been a major part: although citizens in NATO states accept NATO claims to be a purely 'defensive' force, I can see why it might not look that way from Moscow. Just as Russia's claims to be focussed on its own 'defence' look rather more aggressive from a western viewpoint. Either way, replacing a security structure based on armaments and threats/deterrents (the difference between those looks to be more a matter of perspective than objective analysis) with one based on better understanding, fewer armaments and mutual trust (accepting the difficulty in building that) would be a more secure future for all, to say nothing of a better way of using resources.
"What Ukraine did after the USSR fell was to come down with a heavy hand and try and obliterate the Russian people and heritage within its borders" A little exaggerated, methinks, but not entirely unfair. But Kyiv ignoring the Minsk agreements still doesn't provide a justification for invasion. It's exactly what Russia is now trying to do itself in the conquered parts of Ukraine. And, as your comparison with the situation in England and Wales suggests, it's pretty much the 'normal' approach of an imperial power towards conquered people and territories. That doesn't make it right, though - and one of the things which the best part of a millenium of history in these islands shows us is that it isn't always entirely effective either.
There is a tendency (from which I also suffer at times) to over-personalise things by treating Putin as some sort of madman intent on world domination. That's not entirely fair, but the risk it runs is assuming that things will be different when he's gone. It's equally possible that his successor could be worse. (And that last paragraph could equally have been written with Trump replacing Putin!)
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