Brexit realities - summary

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In drawing the threads of this week’s posts together, let me just restate briefly the premises on which my argument is based:

1.    Brexit was never about controlling immigration – but it is now.

2.    The real drivers for Brexit were ideology and British exceptionalism.

3.    There is no such thing as a ‘soft’ Brexit.

4.    Welsh independence becomes less attractive and less likely in a post Brexit scenario.

5.    Democracy isn’t a once-and-for-ever event.

Where does that leave Welsh nationalists?  To date, most ‘nationalist’ politicians have restricted themselves to agreeing with Welsh Labour and demanding a non-existent ‘soft’ Brexit and an opportunity for the National Assembly to ‘scrutinise’ (but not veto) the final terms of any deal.  To me, this looks like playing the British/Brexit game, and arguing about the detail rather than the principle of a change which kicks the core aim of nationalists into the far-distant future.  And arguing for something which it has already been decided is not available is dishonest and misleading.  Ultimately it’s an approach which supports the core aim and narrative of the Brexiteers and assists them to achieve it.

There is no possibility of evidence-based argument with those who are now driving events.  They are absolutely convinced of the rightness of their cause, see only supporting evidence, and ignore any evidence which in any way undermines their case.  They're not really very far away from the Trump approach of presenting 'alternative facts'; they demand that people believe them, and brand them as traitors or worse if they don't.  Mitigating or influencing what they are doing is probably impossible, and even attempting to do so, rather than opposing them, concedes their core position, which is that Brexit is going to happen.

The alternative is to express honestly to the people of Wales the opinion that the decision which a narrow majority of those who voted made was a mistake.  It’s a mistake which works against our best interests in terms of short term economics and against our best interests in terms of the long term prospects for Wales as a nation.  But it’s not an irreversible mistake – yet.

Putting that argument demands a context, and for any nationalist that context can only be a vision of Wales as an independent member state of the EU, given the point from which we start.  It’s a vision which people have been afraid of expressing for too long.  Perhaps it’s already too late, but anything else looks to me, at this point, to be a (possibly final) surrender of our nationhood.  Faced with a choice between making that nationhood central to our politics in Wales, and largely abandoning it, which are we going to choose?

Brexit realities - 4

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Welsh independence becomes less attractive and less likely in the most probable post-Brexit scenario.

I’ve posted on this one before.  Under what currently seems to be the likeliest post-Brexit scenario (the EU continuing as a group of 27, the UK outside both the single market and the customs union), and with Wales a decade or two behind Scotland in the independence stakes, Welsh independence will look very unattractive to many.  Changes to UK legislation and regulation mean that a move directly from being part of the UK to being a member state of the EU is no longer an option (as it currently could be for Scotland, for example).  Our economy would have become even more integrated with that of the only single market of which we would remain a part (i.e. whatever is left of the UK) and our regulatory framework different from that of the EU.  That means a post-independence negotiation to re-join, and an inevitable period outside both unions.

Whilst the debate about independence (like the debate about the EU) has never been for me primarily an economic one, economic factors will inevitably be a factor in gaining a majority for independence.  It's not so much that there is a killer economic argument for independence; more that economic uncertainty will be the main argument against, and Brexit strengthens that argument. Whilst a logical analysis might suggest that there is no more certainty about our future as part of the UK than there is as an independent nation, human assessments do not work in that way.  'What is' always feels more certain than 'what could be'.  Independence will ‘feel’ less secure for a Wales seeking independence under this scenario, with no obvious exemplars to follow.  Within the EU, we would, hopefully, have at least two examples (Scotland and Catalunya) of countries which have made the break and are thriving.  Outside, we would have none.  The task of persuading people to follow the path to independence becomes many times more difficult – perhaps even impossible.

In short, whilst nothing is entirely impossible in political terms, I see Welsh independence as being off the agenda for the foreseeable future if Brexit actually happens.

The problem is the way we measure

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The UK Government’s proposal to extend the use of selection in the process of allocating spaces in secondary schools doesn’t apply to Wales of course.  I guess that means that it will be classified as an ‘England-only’ measure in the House of Commons meaning that Welsh MPs – including Owen Smith – will not have an input to the decision, no matter how much they huff and puff with indignation.  The Conservatives in Wales and their ideological chums in UKIP will, no doubt, renew their demands that Wales should follow suit, and open selective schools here.

To listen to the opponents in Labour’s ranks, one would think that they are totally opposed to selection in education.  But that simply isn’t true – we have selection now, including here in Wales, but it’s selection based on wealth rather than ability.  Whilst it’s true that there are fewer private schools in Wales than in England, and their role in the education system here has always been more peripheral, they do still exist, and in any event, parents can always send their children over the border to an English school if they wish.  It’s an aspect of the education system which Labour has, at the very least, tolerated for generations, and they still show no sign of wanting to end that selectivity.

Over and above that, sending children to private schools isn’t the only way in which wealth can help secure a ‘better’ education.  Again, this is less common in Wales than in England, but the use of private tutors and the ability to move into the catchment area of the ‘best’ schools are options which are simply not open to all parents.

On the Tory side, whilst the argument that it is better to select on ability than on wealth has a certain ring to it, there’s a lot left unsaid by such a simplistic formulation.  The first and most obvious questions are how we define ‘ability’ - and then how we measure it.  Plus – where is the evidence justifying the choice of 11 as the magic age when children’s ability and potential can definitively be judged?  Even if there were clear evidence that it is even possible to assess the long term academic potential of children from one simple test, given that children develop at different rates, how has the catch-all age of 11 been set as the basis for making a determination?

It strikes me that a lot of those arguing for selection are really pining for the past; a golden age (in their memory at least) when the old certainties held sway.  It was a time when the middle class sheep were largely separated from the working class goats (although a small number of the latter were allowed in as long as they showed the potential to become middle-class sheep in time).  But effectively it wrote off the potential of a lot of children at the age of 11.  Some overcame that with time, but a lot did not.

One of the great failures of the comprehensive system in the UK has been that, for all the well-meaning words, we have still not succeeded in giving equal value to different types of ability and success.  Schools and pupils are judged as being successes or failures overwhelmingly on the basis of exam scores, rather then on the contribution they make to society as a whole.  In that sense, at least, it’s true that comprehensive education has not lived up to its promise - but is that the fault of the approach or of those making judgements on such a narrow basis?

The start of a process?

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Dr Sulien Morgan, at Cambria Nostra has some interesting thoughts on where we go from here and some pretty blunt things to say about the political expression of nationalism in Wales today.  For me, some very similar thoughts were crystalized by the differing reactions of the nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland.

We are in a position where the Conservative Party is in chaos; those who found themselves unexpected victors of the campaign don’t even have a Plan A let alone a Plan B; and the Labour Party’s MPs have responded to Tory chaos by pushing their own party into meltdown.  In Scotland, the SNP seizes the opportunity, and looks likely to achieve its aim of independence.  In Wales, Plaid Cymru’s initial response seemed to be an offer to help Labour out by going into coalition.  It would be hard to find a better example of the difference between the situation in Wales and that in Scotland.

However, things are still moving rapidly, and the later response from Plaid that it is now time to campaign for independence is a step in the right direction.  I haven’t a clue what a “new union of independent nations” is, and I suspect that Plaid don’t either, as yet – it’s clearly something that needs a bit more work if it’s to be more than a slogan.  But it’s a better response than the initial one.

It will be an uphill task to convince people that a party which said that Wales couldn’t afford to become an independent country when we were receiving large amounts of EU structural funding is seriously arguing that we can do exactly that once that funding is taken away.  At the very least, it would seem to me to require some serious backtracking on much of what has been said in recent years.

It’s true though that Thursday’s vote is a game-changer, and opens out opportunities as well as problems.  Sadly, given that Wales followed England in voting for Brexit, we’re not in the same position as Scotland in being able to argue that the people voted to stay in.  However, 42.5% of the electorate did vote to remain, and the other 52.5% voted to “take back control” – there has to be a nationalist message which can bring together elements of both of those camps to create at least a basis for an independent Wales to seek membership of the EU anew at some future date.

The real change, though, is that what people thought they were voting for – a UK outside the EU – may no longer be an option.  It would be dangerous to assume that Scotland will definitely become an independent nation; it’s far too soon for that, and there is much that could still change.  I’m sure that I’m not alone in thinking that events have pushed Nicola Sturgeon into putting a second referendum on the table sooner than she would have preferred given the choice; and those who have changed their opinion following Brexit may yet have a further change of heart as events unfold.  The situation in Ireland is also fluid.  Whilst Sinn Fein have called for a border poll, it doesn’t look to me as though the conditions of the Good Friday agreement that would permit that – in essence, evidence that opinion on the border issue has changed – have yet been met.  On the other hand, it is possible that the North of Ireland will yet seek a change in its status as the implications of Thursday’s vote become clearer.

Uncertainty reigns, but at some point, it’s entirely possible that Wales will have to face a choice between joining the world and remaining as a small appendage on the west of England, which is not at all the choice which was on the ballot paper last week.

That is a real opportunity for a nationalist movement to make the case which has not been made for so long, and to start shifting opinion in Wales on the question of independence.  The key word there, though, is ‘start’.  We’re starting a long way behind Scotland, and whilst it looks possible that Scotland will be able to arrive at an answer in time to salvage its position within the EU, it has to be at least probable that Wales will be a decade or more behind.  At a time when events are moving quickly, I’d love to be proved wrong; but we have been left with a lot of time to make up.

Losing a sense of direction

Tweet To say that I don’t always agree with what Simon Brooks has to say would be unsurprising, but on this occasion, I think he makes a very valid point.  It’s not entirely dissimilar to points made on this blog in the past.  It is easy enough for someone looking out from within Plaid simply to dismiss what he has said, of course.  Not so many years ago, I would almost certainly have done the same.  Being part of that which is being critiqued makes it far too easy to fall into the comfort zone of groupthink and simply reject the criticism.  But the perspective from outside can often look very different, and not always be easy for those inside to comprehend.

His core point, it seems to me, is that in the recent election, Plaid sounded more like the Welsh arm of a British campaign than like a specifically Welsh campaign.  I agree.  He’s a bit dismissive about the ‘group hugs’ at the end of debates, but I thought it a welcome change, demonstrating that a different approach to politics is possible.  And there’s nothing at all wrong, in my view, with parties making alliances where appropriate.  The question, though, is whether a convenient alliance around a few core points should supplement or supplant the member parties’ individual narratives.  In Scotland, I thought it clearly supplemented – and therefore strengthened - the SNP’s message; in Wales it looked more like a case of supplanting – and therefore weakening – Plaid’s narrative.

Now, as always needs to be said, Wales isn’t Scotland; we are at very different stages of development.  So we shouldn’t expect a direct replication in Wales of what is happening at a given point in time; we might instead need to look backwards to the Scotland of a decade or two ago for a comparison with today’s Wales.  But, even if we do that, we see one point with absolute clarity – at no point in the path which has led Scotland to where it is today were the SNP ever afraid of arguing for their core policy of Scottish independence. 

Many factors have led Scotland to where it is today, and not all of those could be replicated in Wales even if the political will were there.  But one of those factors must surely be the consistency with which the case has been put.  And that is a key difference between Scotland and Wales, and is one which, unlike many of the other factors, is entirely in our own hands.

I’m not convinced, though, that Simon has identified the right reason for the lack of a distinctive Welsh dimension.  He seems to think that it’s down to an obsessive desire to win the admiration and approval of the British (i.e. English, in this context) ‘left’.  Whilst I wouldn’t deny that there are some who seem to suffer from that, and others who rationalise their position by appealing to the idea that they are the heirs of Lloyd George or Bevan, I think it’s too simplistic an analysis.  The problem isn’t about the direction from which approval is sought; it’s the underlying psychological need for approval in the first place.

That need stems, it seems to me, from a lack of confidence which is one of the less attractive characteristics of the Welsh in general, and our political leadership in particular.  There is a lack of confidence in the arguments for independence and a lack of confidence in the ability to express and defend those arguments.  And often, even a lack of confidence and certainty about whether it’s what they really want.

But whether Simon or I is right or wrong in the analysis is secondary to the outcome which we saw, which was that Plaid ended up fighting the election on a very ‘British’ platform which failed to present a clear alternative future for Wales, and of which one of the main planks seemed to be “vote for us to keep Labour honest”. 

And looking forward, one of the biggest problems with that line is that even if people could be convinced that a party with 3 – 6 seats could really keep a Labour party with 300 in check (an argument which only made any sense at all because of the rise of the SNP), they may well take a different view if a Corbyn-led Labour* no longer seems to need to be “kept honest” and is saying essentially the same thing as Plaid on all the pan-British issues.  Why not just vote for the real thing, in order to try and ensure a Labour victory rather than risk a failure?  It's a dangerous place to be.

(*No, I’m not really arguing that Corbyn is actually that different to the rest of Labour, but for their own reasons, various interests have effectively conspired together to create a strong perception that he is, and it is perception which drives voting, not fact.)

Man or mouse?

Tweet I know that I really shouldn’t be surprised or shocked by anything our politicians do or say, but I was still taken aback by this report in Saturday’s Western Mail.

In essence, the outgoing MP for Neath has told us that, from the outset, he was convinced that the best person to lead Welsh Labour and become First Minister in 1999 was Rhodri Morgan and that nothing that happened in the following 16 years was enough to change his mind.  But in fact, he actively organized the campaign for Alun Michael instead … because Alistair Campbell told him to.

A key element of Labour’s pitch in Wales is that the party will “stand up for Wales”.  Yet here we have a man who claimed to be representing Wales at the highest level in the cabinet happily admitting that he did what he thought was the wrong thing for Wales, and did it with enthusiasm and energy, because a spin doctor told him to.

How to undermine a party’s campaign in one easy book launch.

Mathematics and politics

Tweet I’m not over-impressed by the response of either Carwyn Jones or Kirsty Williams to Plaid’s claim that Wales would have £1.2bn extra per year if funded on the same basis of Scotland.  Calling it a bizarre figure and claiming not to understand where it has come from are not exactly grow-up responses.  Comparing it with the figure of £300m arrived at by the Holtham Commission is simply not comparing like for like; the figures are the result of calculating two very different things.

The Holtham Commission set out to calculate by how much Wales was losing out as a result of the inbuilt unfairness of the Barnett formula, and came up with a figure of around £300m a year.  There’s a sense in which it’s a ‘snapshot’ figure, and of course, it can change over time.  It’s the result of calculations based on a range of factors which are not themselves constant, but it’s a figure which is widely-accepted, and an entirely reasonable basis for debating change to the underlying formula to come up with a needs-based distribution.

The figure of £1.2bn, however, is something very different.  Scotland is, it is generally accepted, over-funded compared to what the situation would be under a needs-based formula, but there is nothing inherently unreasonable about estimating how much better off Wales would be if we were over-funded in the same way as Scotland.  As a mathematical exercise, it’s an interesting and novel way of highlighting the extent of the unfairness built into the system. 

I’m rather less sure about the politics than the mathematics, though.  On what basis is it reasonable for any politician to argue that Wales should be over-funded just because Scotland is?  Asking for a sum in excess of a needs-based share is a huge jump from a wholly reasonable demand for fairness.  And whilst the facts that Scotland gets more than it should while Wales gets less might, in mathematical terms, be just two different variables in the same equation, giving attention to the Scottish part rather than the Welsh part seems a strange approach, more likely to persuade people of the need for a downward revision in Scotland than an upward one here.

Perhaps that’s the intention.  It is natural for those getting a bigger share of the cake than an assessment of needs would determine to seek to protect their special treatment; and there is always scope for considerable debate about how need is defined and measured.  And those are the two big problems which need to be addressed in any reform of Barnett.  But they do need to be tackled, and any revision to the formula will inevitably mean a reduction in Scottish over-funding, which is precisely why the parties at Westminster are avoiding the question.  From a Welsh perspective, however, and for as long as the devolved administrations are funded through block grants, I really can’t see any basis on which we can reasonably demand more than our fair share.

Half full or half empty?

Tweet Glyn Morris draws attention to the story about Plaid arguing that Wales isn’t ready, in economic terms, for independence.  It’s not a new statement of course; it repeats a statement which Plaid made about 18 months ago.  I didn’t agree then, and I don’t agree now – not because I think that there would not be problems, but because I don’t see the existing problems being resolved within existing structures and processes.  Quite the opposite, in fact – I’d argue that the problems that we face are a result of existing structures and policies, and a pre-condition that they be solved first is a recipe for indefinite delay of any discussion of independence.

But how poor is Wales, in reality?  One of the things that the Yes campaign did quite effectively in Scotland was to argue that Scotland’s GDP per head put the country amongst the league of the wealthiest, not the poorest.  Where would Wales sit in that table?

There are plenty of different rankings of countries to be found, and they show slightly different rankings for countries.  This Wikipedia page for instance shows several different ways of calculating relative wealth.  If we want an absolute measure, then which one we select becomes an important decision; but if we’re only after a relative measure, it really doesn’t matter a great deal which we choose.

Wales isn’t listed, naturally enough – it’s a list of sovereign states – but if we use as a rule of thumb the claim that Wales’ output per head is about 70% of that of the whole UK, it’s easy enough to work out where Wales would come on any one of the rankings here if we were listed separately.  The answer, depending on which list we choose, is around 30^th. 

Yes, on a simplistic measure of GDP per head, Wales would be one of the 30 or so most prosperous countries in the world – with another 150 or more which are poorer than us, including such outposts of unsustainable independence as Russia.  Even within the EU, there are a basket of countries which are worse off than Wales would be – and, as far as I’m aware, no-one is arguing that they’re “too poor” to be independent member states.

We have, perhaps, become too accustomed to seeing the glass as half empty; comparing ourselves to the richest areas and finding ourselves wanting.  It’s an inevitable result of an approach which simply demands that we get our fair share, and given that we’re not getting our fair share now, it’s not a wholly unreasonable tactic.  It needs to be tempered though with a more positive message about what we can do, and about what Wales could be if we assumed responsibility ourselves.  And that’s the message which has been lacking for too long.

There’s more to economics than GDP, of course.  And the transition from where we are to where we could be will neither be quick nor easy.  But continuing to see ourselves as poverty-stricken victims is not the right starting place, when, for most of the world’s countries and population we look like a very wealthy country.  The question is about how we take control of the wealth we have and build on it by taking responsibility for our own future.  Arguing that we’re not ready to do that is simply perpetuating what we are.  We can do better than that.

From the past

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Yesterday’s Western Mail, like many other papers, contained a lot of coverage about the start of the First World War 100 years ago.  Part of the coverage included a reprint of the paper’s editorial from 4^th August 1914, justifying, and supporting the decision to go to war.

But it was the final sentence which caught my eye.  It read:

“In times to come, if Russia does become a menace to us in the East, well, England, allied with Japan, can deal with that situation.”

I suppose that it was a long time ago – I don’t think they would have dreamed of calling the Western Mail the ‘National Newspaper of Wales’ in those days. 

It wasn’t just the Western Mail, though; another story on the same theme in yesterday’s paper referred to an obelisk at St Symphorien dedicated to the “German and English” soldiers who died in the Battle of Mons.  Much of what was said and written at the time portrayed it as a war between England and Germany with a few supporting characters from elsewhere.  England, Britain, and the UK were more interchangeable then than now, to the extent that the second and third were used at all.  History is always changing.

It’s too easy to see this conflation of England and the UK as being some sort of slight to Wales; but it was the accepted norm at the time – even in Wales.  Sometimes, it feels as though we are not making much progress, but stories like these help to underline how far we’ve come in building the confidence and identity of a nation which was all but invisible a century ago.  There’s still some way to go, though.

Union jackery

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The Sunday Times reported at the weekend that the UK Coalition Government is proposing to change the basis of the citizenship guidance and test for new immigrants.  Amongst other things, they’re proposing that new immigrants should demonstrate that they know the words of the first verse of the UK’s National anthem.  The ability to sing it in tune is presumably optional, as is any knowledge of anything beyond the first verse, particularly, one suspects, any unfortunate references to crushing rebellious Scots.

The government’s definition of the vital elements which new immigrants require to know will also include Shakespeare, Brunel, Elgar and the publication of the King James Bible.  Excised from the previous government’s version of the same document will be any references to benefits, human rights, and Thatcher as a ‘divisive’ figure.

(As an aside, the fact that a change of government can lead to such a change of emphasis also tells us that the identity being portrayed does not perhaps have the timeless and unchanging character which one might think, listening to the way some politicians talk.  It’s not something objective and apolitical at all.)

We’ve also seen something of an outbreak of what some have called ‘union jackery’ recently, what with the Royal Jubilee and the procession of the Olympic flame around the kingdom, and it’s easy to see some sort of conspiracy to impose a particular straightjacket of identity, in the context of growing national sentiment in Wales, and even more so in Scotland.  That seems to be an over-simplistic response, however; I'm not convinced that the 'establishment' is sufficiently organised or cohesive to run such a conspiracy.

In any event, I'm not sure that it would worry me over-much if they were.  After all, there’s nothing at all unusual about any state seeking to reinforce a sense of belonging and loyalty amongst its populace.  It helps to legitimise the status quo.  As far as I can see, it’s something that every country does in one way or another, and I don’t for a moment doubt that Wales and Scotland, were they to become independent, would do much the same, even if the official identity being promulgated were to be rather different.  States use symbols, institutions, events, and history to attempt to reinforce a sense of identification which then legitimises the state.

What’s more interesting for me is which symbols etc. they choose.  The anthem is an obvious symbol.  (I wonder, though, what the reaction would be to a suggestion that anyone moving to Wales should demonstrate that they know Hen Wlad fy Nhadau.  On second thoughts, I don’t really wonder at all – I think I have a fairly good idea how that suggestion would be greeted…).  Celebrating the achievements of individuals who are outstanding in their field is another obvious one.  And what’s wrong with celebrating national history?

But once we go beyond such (comparatively!) uncontroversial symbols as flags and songs, people start to make choices about what to stress and what to gloss over, and those choices tell us something about the ‘establishment’ view of what identity is.  One feature which immediately strikes me is the overwhelmingly 'English' feel around the selections made.  Inevitable, probably, given that England makes up 85% of the population.  And almost certainly not conscious or deliberate - but obvious anyway.  But what it means is that the symbols etcetera used to express 'British' identity today could, by and large, simply be relabelled and used to express 'English' identity were Wales and Scotland to become independent.  It's part of the reason why 'English' and 'British' are interchangeable for many in England.

Another feature is the strongly militaristic element to the UK establishment’s view of identity, which we see not only in a selective view of history which often concentrates on wars and battles, but also in the prominent role of the military when it comes to ‘national’ ceremonies and events.  The comparatively recent introduction of Armed Forces Day is a case in point.

Perhaps that militaristic element is part of what makes me react against the establishment view of Britishness.  It’s not a particularly nationalist perspective, but for those of us opposed to militarism, it’s easy to feel excluded from, and alienated from, an identity which seems to insist on emphasising past military glory to such a significant degree.

Identity is a complex business, based on a whole range of factors, and with more movement and migration, it’s becoming more complex, not less so.  Allowing politicians to seek to define it in ways which suit their purposes or reflect their perspectives inevitably leads to over-simplification, and that’s reflected in the Sunday Times’ headline, which read “God Save the Queen test for migrants”.

But there’s a second reason for being relaxed about the whole thing.  The idea that identity can be imposed on anyone is very much in the past.  People have more exposure to a range of influences than they did when the UK’s anthem was written.  Loyalty to queen and country is no longer as automatic as it was, nor does failure to demonstrate such loyalty have the dire consequences which it held in the distant past.  Identity can still be reinforced to some extent, but you can only 'reinforce' what already exists to at least a degree.  I suspect that attempting to promulgate and impose a particular view of a particular identity is now more likely to be counter-productive than effective.

One small example of that was the question raised when the Olympic torch passed through this neck of the words as to why the organisers were giving out Union Jacks but not y Ddraig Goch for people to wave.  It doesn’t mean that everyone's gone nationalist, merely that attitudes have changed.  The days when such a question wouldn’t even have been asked are long gone.

National identity these days is much more bottom-up than top-down; people can and do choose their identity (or even identities – there’s nothing odd to me about having more than one).  The attempt, by both the last and the present UK Government, to define identity in a very narrow fashion is backward-looking.  It makes those who promote it look rather Canute-like, except without the wisdom to know that failure is certain.

Terms of the divorce

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Whilst the laws and unwritten constitution of the UK clearly support the view that Scottish (and the same applies to Wales) Independence is a matter which the UK Parliament would have to ‘allow’, I’ve never been in any doubt that the decision belongs to – and will be taken by – the people of Scotland.  Ultimately, ‘sovereignty’ can never be withheld from a people who wish to reclaim it, no matter what any law may say.  (I suppose that the use of military force might provide an exception to that, in the short term at least; but it’s not a realistic option in the UK context.)

Some have tried to compare independence to a divorce, arguing that that makes it a matter for both (or even all) parties.  It’s not a wholly unfair comparison; but those using that argument should bear in mind that whilst the terms of any divorce are indeed a matter for negotiation – or even acrimonious argument – the fact of the divorce can be decided by one partner acting alone.

Clearly, those opposed to independence have every right to seek to persuade the people of Scotland that divorce is a bad idea.  They even have a right to be awkward and petty about the terms of the divorce, although I’m not sure that it would be the wisest thing for them to do.  But arguing about the right to a divorce is an irrelevance; it’s missing the point.

If we start from the premise – as I do – that ‘sovereignty’ belongs to all of us, individually and collectively, rather then being bestowed miraculously on the head of state, then it follows that we can change the way that we choose to exercise that sovereignty.  We can choose how much to share or pool at community level, at national level, or at international level; and we can change those decisions as and when we like. 

It’s a very different model from that under which the laws and constitution – and those who enjoy power under them – currently operate; but those laws and constitution only operate as they do with the consent of the governed, even if we don’t always realise that.  (Perhaps if we did realise it more often, the governed might withhold consent more often as well.)

Thus far, I suspect that most nationalists would agree with what I’ve said, even if ‘unionists’ (perhaps ‘constitutionalists’ would be a better term here) might disagree.  How far do we take it though – because I’d go a lot further.

Part of my difficulty is that I find it hard to define a ‘nation’ in terms that are not, in the final analysis, based on subjective self-identity, which also means that I reject the idea that people can have one and only one ‘nationality’ in an exclusive and neatly packaged way.  For me, Wales is a nation because sufficiently large numbers of Welsh people believe it to be so.  For sure, place of birth, history, territory, descent, community, family and language all come into the process of arriving at that self-identity, but nobody can have that self-identity forced upon them.

It follows from that that I’d challenge the idea that ‘sovereignty’ is something which can only be exercised at a ‘national’ level.  What if the people of Ynys Môn (I pick on them because of their neat island status – I could equally have picked on the ‘down-belows’ of Pembrokeshire, or even the inhabitants of Upper Cwmsgwt) were to decide that they wanted to exercise full sovereignty – independence for Ynys Môn?

I can think of lots of reasons why it might not be the brightest idea ever, but I cannot think of any reason why anyone else should be able to refuse it, if it was what the people wanted.  And that has surely to be the driver for what power we individually and collectively cede to which institutions at the different levels – the will of the people.  If sovereignty truly belongs to the people, there can be no argument against them exercising it at whatever level they choose.

There is another side to sovereignty though, and that’s about accepting the consequences.  The relationships between sovereign states can only be decided bilaterally or multilaterally; not unilaterally.  It’s back to the question about the terms of the divorce.  Scotland, Wales – even Ynys Môn – can become independent if they wish, but there are consequences to that.

To date, those consequences have often been discussed in axiomatic terms.  For as long as it was little more than a theoretical possibility, it’s been possible to make sweeping statements about the economic consequences with little solid basis in fact.  The developing situation in Scotland will inevitably shed more light on the detail, and lead to more rigorous challenge of some of the underlying assumptions and high level numbers which have been thrown around – on both sides.

That can only be a good thing.  I remain as convinced that ‘small is beautiful’, and that the advantages of exercising more power locally outweigh the disadvantages, as I was in the 1970s.  The trend to increasing globalisation since then has only served to reinforce that view.  Welsh self determination is a step along that route rather than an end in itself, but it has often felt as though devolution has diverted attention from consideration of that step.  The debate in Scotland brings it very much back into focus; we need to have the courage to follow where they lead, not continue to hold back.

Can opener Morgan

Tweet When it comes to the question of Independence for Wales, it can often feel to nationalists that we're damned if we mention it, and damned if we don't. When we talk about Independence as a long term aspiration for Wales, our political opponents are quick to draw attention to the fact that the idea enjoys only minority support in Wales. And if we don't, then we are accused of hiding our true aims.

I've said before that it's not an easy path to walk; but I remain absolutely convinced that openness about our long term aspirations, coupled with pragmatism about what's achievable in the short term is the only honest position to adopt. Creating short term political programmes without trying to place them clearly in the context of our longer term aspirations would, in my view, be dishonest.

If it means that some of the people who might support our short term programmes don't do so because they disagree with our longer term goals - well, that's a choice that they are free to make, and is the price of having a long term view. And if they do support us, it's not on the basis of any ignorance about our goals.

From reading Jonathan Morgan's comments this week, it seems that the Tories have dealt with a little dilemma of their own in a much less honest fashion. I thought the most revealing part of his comments was the statement that "We have also been guilty of not standing up for what we really believe in because we were more afraid of voter hostility". It's an open admission that the Tories' real agenda will attract hostility in Wales, and that they've tried to get round it by pretending to be something that they're not.

It begs the question - what exactly are the Tories for in Wales? Insofar as they have any coherent alternative to offer, it's one that they're afraid to articulate, and one which could not survive their participation in any conceivable coalition arrangement.

They're really caught between a rock and a hard place. Their potential support in Wales is divided between those with a very 'British' perspective and those with a more Welsh perspective. If they come down clearly on one side of that divide, they are likely to lose the support of the other.

And their grass roots membership (in this part of Wales for certain, and I suspect the same is true across Wales as a whole) is overwhelmingly hostile to any attempt to become more distinctively Welsh, whatever some of their AMs might say. (Change of Personnel describes it as them being Conservatives in Wales rather than Welsh Conservatives - it's a neat way of putting it, although I'd have used 'almost all' rather than 'many'.) Their MPs' views are much more representative of what their grass roots members in Wales actually believe.

Unless and until their AMs persuade their own party membership of the need to become more autonomous from the London party and embrace the new Wales – or alternatively, their AMs become more representative of the membership and openly articulate the anti-Assembly views of the majority - they seem doomed to exist in a sort of limbo. Able to be neither one thing nor the other, with their AMs attacking each other in coded messages, they are unable to provide even a half-decent opposition.

Jonathan Morgan has prised a very large can a little further open, I suspect.