Maybe we'll never know what Rutte said to Trump...

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Over the years, I’ve attended many meetings in which one attendee or another has set out his or her (usually his) views on whatever the issue is and then simply assumed the agreement of everyone else, sometimes even leaving immediately after speaking. ‘The boss (even if he wasn’t the boss in any formal sense) has spoken’ as an approach to ‘consensus’. Perhaps we’ll never know exactly what happened at the meeting between Trump and Rutte yesterday, but it sounds a lot like the same sort of thing: Trump has expounded his views and assumed agreement – in his mind, ‘sorting out the detail’ is all about agreeing the precise terms of his takeover. Certainly, Rutte cannot have agreed to any handover, or even a framework, or even the concept of an idea for a framework (to use the convoluted language which Trump seems to favour), for any handover; he simply doesn’t have the authority. All the indications are that Rutte has done little more than spell out to Trump the terms and detail of existing treaties, all of which His Orangeness will have forgotten by tomorrow.

The threat of using force and imposing extra tariffs has been removed, a statement greeted by a huge sigh of relief all round, but whether that threat has really been removed remains to be seen. After all, until a few days ago, Trump supported the handover of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. In Trumpland, any statement or agreement is valid only until it isn’t. Maybe it’s true, as some have suggested, that Trump has backed down because of the impact of his actions and statements on the stock market. Stock markets are an extremely poor indicator of the success of any economy, and are generally thought to be over-valued anyway, but to Trump, stock markets seem to be his main, or even only, indicator of success. To billionaires whose wealth is measured by the ‘value’ of their stock holdings, there’s a certain logic in that. Maybe one of the wilder stories I’ve seen – that he had ordered the military to prepare plans for a Greenland takeover only for the order to be refused as illegal – is true, although it seems unlikely to me that he could not find at least one general prepared to act on his instructions.

Or perhaps another basic truth has been demonstrated empirically – bullies back down when faced with strong united push-back. Certainly, one of the few tariff battles on which Trump has caved was that with China, which stood up to him resolutely. It would be nice to believe this version of events, with its corollary that Starmer and others have learned that resistance is better than appeasement. The problem with unpredictability is that it’s unpredictable; even if something ‘worked’ once, that doesn’t mean it will ‘work’ again. The biggest takeaway from Davos was surely the speech by Mark Carney of Canada and its message that countries need to stand together rather than be dominated individually. Whether the sort of international agreement and co-ordination which that requires can be achieved in a suitably rapid timescale is an open question, but signs that Starmer and others recognise the need and are working in that direction are sadly lacking at the moment. Carney was talking primarily about ‘middle-sized’ countries, but for those of us living in smaller countries which may not all yet be independent, the Carney approach offers us more hope for the future than any alternative currently on the table.

For Trump, there is no such thing as an 'ally'

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As part of his justification for gaining total control over Greenland, the Guardian reports that Trump “has insisted that Denmark cannot be relied upon to protect Greenland in the case of a confrontation with China or Russia”. He’s right, of course: there is no way that Denmark acting alone can mobilise sufficient resources to defend Greenland against an all-out assault by Russia or China (although the idea of an all-out assault by China seems even more far-fetched than an assault by Russia). I’d go further: there is no way that Denmark could mobilise sufficient resources to defend the territory of Denmark itself from an all-out assault by Russia or China – or even the US. And Denmark is far from being the only country in that position. The Danes might foolishly have thought that that was precisely why they joined the NATO alliance – so that they would not be left alone to face such a threat, never really expecting that it would come from their supposed ally rather than their supposed enemy.

Some of Trump’s acolytes have taken the analogy even further by arguing, in effect, that any country unable to defend itself, acting alone, from an assault by one of the big powers has no right to exist – and that any power which is able to overcome another country by dint of superior force has the right to do exactly that. But when the mightiest military power the world has ever seen is run by people who believe that they have the right to take whatever they can take, it is time for the rest of the world to recognise that the US can no longer be regarded as any sort of ally, let alone a reliable one. No agreement can be taken as being worth anything from the day it is signed; the bully is always likely to come back for more. Trump himself seems to see the world as divided into three great powers each with its own sphere of influence, with all other countries being either supplicants or enemies. There is no other status in between supplicant and enemy. Pretending that the UK somehow has some special influence or relationship with this version of the US is turning a blind eye to reality. Yet that is where Starmer has placed the UK.

Options are limited, and not instant. If we assume that we want to avoid getting into a shooting war with the US – a reasonable, not to say wise, assumption – then any defence against the fascist state into which the US is descending has to be primarily economic, and it has to involve collective action. Part of Starmer’s reluctance to go down that route is probably that agreeing collective action takes time, and economic action is in any event slow-acting: sanctions against Iran, North Korea, Russia etc. aren’t exactly notable for their success. Needing the agreement of no-one, and protected from any restraining action from Congress or the courts, Trumpism is, on the other hand, fast-acting, as well as arbitrary, capricious, and unpredictable. I rather suspect that part of the calculus of Starmer and others is that Trump will be gone in three years, and the US will return to ‘normal’: still the world’s bully, but a little less blunt and obvious about it. That, though, depends on some key assumptions: that Trump will not carry on past the end of his term; that any successor won’t be as bad or even worse; and that elections will actually take place at all. None of these seem to be worth betting the farm on, yet that’s where Europe, and especially the UK, seem to be.

Is there any alternative to spluttering from the sidelines?

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For a while, it looked as though Trump’s designs on Greenland had been placed on a back burner somewhere, but in need of a diversion from other stories, he’s returned to the issue today, and appointed a special envoy to Greenland, who sees his job – presumably briefed to that effect by Trump – as being “to serve you in this volunteer position to make Greenland a part of the US”. Maybe people shouldn’t read too much into it beyond diverting attention from Epstein, and the ‘volunteer’ nature of the post suggests that the governor of Louisiana – almost as far as one can get from Greenland, other than Hawaii, and still be in the US – might not be spending a lot of his time on the issue.

The government of the kingdom of Denmark is upset, or at least pretending to be to the extent that they can do so without angering His Orangeness, and has quite rightly made it clear that the future of Greenland is a matter, first and foremost for Greenlanders. Their argument that “National borders and the sovereignty of states are rooted in international law”, and “You cannot annex another country” is more than a little weak though. After all, hasn’t Putin proved, fairly conclusively, that you can indeed annex another country or part thereof, and if you have so much military might that no-one is prepared to stop you, then you can get away with it. And if you can get the leader of the biggest and most powerful country on side with what you are doing, it’s even easier.

If Trump were to decide that his need for a diversion had become so great that it was time to invade Greenland, then who or what is going to stop him? Not Denmark for sure, and even if Trump is turning against NATO, it doesn’t mean that NATO would use force to resist him. And not Russia, for whom a US annexation of Greenland would echo Putin's own rationale for invading Ukraine. We like to believe that we live in some sort of rules-based international order, but we don’t. Putin and Trump have already ripped up the rules. The question is how the rest of the world reacts to that. Denmark seems determined to join the UK in spluttering helplessly from the sidelines.

Greenland might be a useful diversion

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Long-described as the world’s second-oldest profession, spying is something which most states above a certain, albeit undefined, size undertake on a regular basis. Understanding the thinking of other states seen as potential adversaries is something which many rulers over the centuries have found useful. Spying on ‘friends’ is also common – who knows when friends might turn into enemies or what they might be holding back? There’s something more than a little disingenuous in the Danish Foreign Minister’s claim this week that “we don’t spy between friends”, given that the Danish intelligence services actively assisted the US to spy on Germany’s former Chancellor, Angela Merkel.

It's still more than a little strange, however, that Trump should have decided that a major priority for the US intelligence services should be Greenland. It’s not as though the country actually poses any immediate danger to the US – a country of 56,000 inhabitants is hardly likely to invade New York. And a dispassionate observer might well believe that there are one or two rather more significant potential threats to the US.

The focus of espionage activity is apparently to be twofold: intelligence gathering on the independence movement and identifying individuals likely to welcome a US takeover. In theory, it should be an easy task to resource. The three US intelligence agencies (CIA: 21,500; DIA: 16,500; NSA: 30-40,000) employ more than 68,000 people between them (unless Elon Musk has fired most of them by now); allocating a few thousand to monitor 56,000 Greenlanders shouldn’t be too much of an ask. How many of those are Greenland specialists, though, might be more of a problem. Some 70% of the population speak only Greenlandic, and I’d be surprised if as many as 1 of those 68,000 ‘spies’ could understand what they are saying. And when it comes to intelligence ‘on the ground’ (as opposed to remote electronic monitoring), someone unable to communicate in the language might just stand out a little.

A country planning a takeover might well find it useful to identify in advance a sufficiently large cohort of people who would welcome the invasion (and perhaps fill posts in the new government) in order to give it a gloss of respectability, but previous attempts at going door-to-door to find someone who would welcome the Vice-President and his wife were less than entirely successful. They found no-one. On another occasion they had to resort to handing out MAGA hats to homeless people as a reward for eating a Trump(Jr)-provided meal. Even the CIA, with its renowned ability to destabilise and topple governments, will find it a challenge to make a coup look like some sort of popular uprising.

Trump’s obsession with Greenland is an odd one, especially given that he could get most of what he really wants (which is about US corporations getting access to valuable mineral rights – and maybe building a hotel and a few golf courses?) by friendly negotiation, but that, it seems, is not the way that the ‘art of the deal’ works. Still, whilst sympathising with Greenlanders, there’s something mildly reassuring about seeing him give so much of his limited attention span to the question.

Minds don't need to be particularly great to think alike

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Apologists for Britain’s colonial past invariably point to what they see as the ‘good’ outcomes of imperial conquest for the conquered, usually expressed in terms of systems of government, the rule of law, Christianity, cricket, and the English language. Whether these are actually ‘good’ things or not depends on perspective; the assumption that they are is itself a product of the imperialist mindset, revolving as it does around some concept of cultural superiority. Leaving that aside and assuming, for the sake of argument, that these are indeed good things, none of them actually formed any part of the original intention of conquest. That was always about access to resources, and the opportunity to use the power of the imperial state to extract wealth which could be accumulated by individuals, and much of which was repatriated to the shores of the imperial power. That wealth, taken by force from the conquered peoples, was the basis of the great wealth of the cities of the imperial powers, including, of course, Britain. In return, the natives got Shakespeare, a bargain for which they should, apparently, be eternally grateful.

Sometimes, people confuse imperialism with colonialism; but not every country added to the empire was actually heavily colonised. Some were, of course – the territories currently known as the USA being one of them. From a British point of view, the other territories most heavily colonised were places such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. They’re not known as the ‘white commonwealth’ without reason. The USA (a former colony in the true sense of the word) and its constitution were founded on a number of ideas, one of which was the rejection of colonialism and imperialism, and the idea of ‘freedom’ (a word which has many different meanings). Watching that former colony lapse into its own form of imperialism ought to be surprising but is somehow not.

The methods are different in the twenty-first century; although Trump hasn’t ruled out direct military conquest, he has a clear preference for economic domination, even if his grasp of economics leaves more than a little to be desired. But his motivation – control of resources, and the transfer of wealth from other countries to the US – is a direct match for the motivation which led to the empires of the past. And blatantly so. Having got Ukraine to agree to allow half of its mineral wealth to be expropriated on the basis of a lie that aid provided was a loan rather than a gift, he has done as all bullies do when the bullied bow down before them. His conclusion from the willingness of Ukraine to give up 50% is that he didn’t ask for enough, so he’s doubled his demand. He now wants control of all of it. Along with a veto on Ukrainian policy.

His motivation for taking Greenland, although presented in terms of ‘security’ is much the same. He wants access to its resources, and his promise that Greenlanders will become rich if they allow it is as valid as his promise that US citizens would become richer by electing him; it’s a promise which is only ever intended to apply to a tiny minority. Yesterday, Putin declared that he thinks Trump is serious about taking Greenland, but thinks that it's what he described as “an issue that concerns two states and has nothing to do with us”. It’s an open invitation to Trump to view Russia’s intentions in relation to Ukraine in the same terms. The two presidents are clearly thinking along similar lines. And the opinions of others count for nothing, with either of them.

Uninvited guests

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Relative to the size of its population, Greenland must surely be about to become the most-visited country by US dignitaries in the period since Trump was elected for the second time. His son, Donald Junior, undertook an entirely ‘private’ visit before his father was even installed in the White House, turning up in a discreet fashion giant Trump-branded jet and spending the day there, during which homeless people were invited in off the street to enjoy a free lunch wearing MAGA hats (which the ‘tourists’ had coincidentally brought with them) for the benefit of the photographers (who had also conveniently tagged along for this ‘private’ visit).

Next up, originally scheduled for Thursday to Saturday, was another ‘private’ visit by the Vice President’s wife to ‘watch a dog-sled competition’, which the VP himself rather impulsively decided to join. After all, what sort of VP is so busy that he can’t suddenly drop his semi-public planning of bombing raids to take a three-day trip to the Arctic to watch a few dog sleds racing? Coincidentally, the National Security Advisor (assuming he’s still in post tomorrow) and the Energy Secretary are also joining the group in order to visit the US base on the island before they were planning for themselves to become part of the assembled audience for the dog sledding. Until, that is, there was some pushback, as a result of which the dog watching has been cancelled, and the group will confine themselves to a one-day visit to the US base, whilst the armoured cars which had already been delivered to transport them around the island were sent back to the US. Pity that – it rather spoiled the punch line about half the US government literally going to the dogs.

According to Trump (a form of words which is enough in itself to tells us that whatever follows will be a lie), the delegation on this ‘private’ visit had been ‘invited’ by unnamed Greenlandic officials, although no-one in the Greenlandic government seems to know anything about any invitation. It was probably issued by the new officials whose appointment to run the island Trump has not yet announced. It’s certainly in line with Trump’s equally specious claim that Greenlanders ‘want’ to become part of the USA despite (presumably ‘fake’) opinion poll findings to the contrary. It’s not a Trump original playbook, of course: Putin also ‘knew’ that Crimeans were aching to become part of Russia before he seized the territory in 2014. Even longer ago, a certain European dictator ‘knew’ that Austrians wanted to be German deep down, even if they didn’t know it themselves. As both that dictator and Putin knew, it’s far better to hold a referendum on the issue after taking control, when the voting and the counting of the votes can be ‘properly supervised’ than to accept the verdict of polls taken in advance.

But, to continue the parallel with Crimea, how long will it be before the US equivalent of ‘little green men’ start mysteriously appearing on the streets of Nuuk?

What about the inhabitants?

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Failing to rule something out isn’t the same as ruling it in, and it’s perfectly possible that Trump thinks that leaving the threat of military action hanging over Greenland and Panama will ‘encourage’ Denmark and Panama to cave in without any need to resort to actual use of force.

He is probably serious about wanting to take control of Greenland, but that doesn’t make him unique in US history. Other presidents have also had designs on the territory and various land swaps have been envisaged in the past, including his own suggestion of giving Puerto Rico to Denmark as well as the 1940’s suggestion of swapping it for land in Alaska and the 1910 proposal to exchange it for some islands in the Philippines (so that Denmark could, in turn, swap them for a chunk of what is now Germany). The UK doesn’t exactly have clean hands on the issue either, having once sought to be given first refusal should Denmark decide to sell, with a view to it becoming part of Canada in order to keep it out of the hands of the US. He’s also probably at least semi-serious about annexing Canada, and he’s not the first to think that either: the US actually invaded Canada during the 1812-1815 war with the UK, expecting (rather like Putin in Ukraine) to over-run the country in days. Buying territory along with the people who live there is hardly a new concept either, especially for the US, which bought Alaska from Russia in 1867 and a huge chunk of the mid-west from France in 1803. Describing the purchase of Greenland over the heads of its residents as ‘decolonisation’ is perverting the meaning of words somewhat, but the process itself is hardly historically novel.

People tend to forget that most – maybe all – of the world’s political boundaries between states are the result of war, or treaties agreed between nominally equal parties (even though, in reality, many of those treaties were effectively imposed on the weak by the strong). The boundary between Canada and the US, like Danish ownership of Greenland, are both accidents of history. Trump’s mindset in this context isn’t radically different from that of Putin – both think that the boundaries of the states which they govern should be drawn differently to include more territory, and both are willing to consider, at least, the use of force to bring about those changes. It is, unfortunately, far from inconceivable that an early meeting between Trump and Putin – which both want, apparently: Putin because he thinks he can outwit Trump, and Trump because he believes his own hype about his abilities as a dealmaker and his friendship with Putin – will lead to something akin to the Yalta conference after the second world war, in which the so-called great powers (now reduced to two, in the eyes of both of those involved) carve up Europe and the Americas between them.

As for the people of Greenland themselves, such evidence as exists suggests that their preferred status is independence. In a world where invading the territory of the EU is not ruled out, and an invasion of the UK is floated as an option, the chance that the Greenlanders’ voice will be heard seems slim.

Changing the arguments

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The former Cabinet Secretary has today challenged the idea that the UK could effectively negotiate its way out of the EU and into a series of new treaties and agreements within the two years noted in the EU treaties for the departure of a member state.  The points he makes seem reasonable to me, although the suggestion that it could take as long as 10 years seems a bit excessive.  Given that no member state has ever left in the past, there is no precedent on which to base a judgement as to where within that range of 2 to 10 years the actual timescale would lie.

In any case, and regardless of the context in which the comments have been placed, it doesn’t look like an argument either for or against exit to me.  Whilst in general terms ending any period of certainty as soon as possible by a rapid series of negotiations would be in the best interests of all concerned, there can be little doubt that the negotiations would be complex and lengthy in practice as all concerned sought to get them ‘right’ from their perspective.

What also struck me in the piece, though, was the comparison with Greenland.  The situation of Greenland as a small country was a good deal more straightforward, but it still took some three years between a vote to leave and the actual departure. 

The situation of Greenland, in this context, is interesting from another aspect as well.  It actually voted to leave the EU and still it took three years to negotiate its way to the exit.

Contrast that with, for instance, the position of Scotland or Catalonia.  In both cases, we are told by opponents of independence that any decision to become independent would instantly leave them outside the EU even if they specifically indicated as part of the independence referendum that they wanted to remain, and that they would have to spend many years negotiating re-admission. 

It’s not an exact parallel of course; Greenland remains formally part of Denmark despite being on a trajectory to an increasing degree of home rule, whereas in Scotland or Catalonia the people would be voting to leave an existing member state.  But there’s enough of a parallel to ask why a country voting for more home rule which asks to leave the EU gets three years to negotiate an orderly exit whereas a country voting for independence which wants to remain would, apparently, be booted out immediately.

The ‘explanation’ for this inconsistency lies in political messaging and scaremongering, not in the cool hard assessment of reality which is what would actually happen.  The ‘arguments’ put forward depend more on the point that the politicians are trying to ‘prove’ at the time than on hard fact.