The idea that ‘Russia’ has learnt nothing from its
catastrophic losses invading Ukraine, and will shortly be poised to take on the
even greater challenge of a direct attack on a part of the European Union seems to
be gaining ground almost daily. The Conservative and Labour parties seem
equally in thrall to the threat of the Russian menace and equally determined to
divert resources from welfare to armaments to prepare to meet the threat. In
the process, they and what increasingly seem to be their puppet-masters in the
armed forces and the weapons industries seem to be making such a war more, rather
than less, likely.
Yesterday, we had a report
of a speech from the head of the UK Army, laying out his views of what is
needed. Needless to say, the head of the army wants to build up the army, but
it was the detail which struck me. “Only armies seize and hold ground”, according
to the pre-release of his speech. It’s impossible to argue with that, but the
question which needs to be answered is why, exactly, we would want to ‘seize
ground’ in the first place. The questions posed by his statement were
compounded by his argument that the UK needs to be able to ‘strike deep’ and ‘defend
forward’, which seems to mean developing the ability to strike at the enemy’s
resources deep inside their own territory before those resources can be used
against us. To me, it sounds a lot like an argument that the best defence is
attack – and from the Kremlin’s perspective, it will surely sound even more so.
What reaction should we expect from a state which feels itself thus threatened,
after having watched the UK (and other governments) portray it as an imminent
threat to themselves? Do we expect them to just wait, and watch that capability
being built for use against them?
For the military (and, apparently, most UK
politicians), the natural instinct is to build ever stronger armed forces to
deter an attack by the enemy, but surely the deeper issue is how to avoid an
attack. Maybe 'deterrence' has a role in that, but the extent to which that is so in that is arguable: up
until the point at which war starts, it is impossible to know whether the lack
of war is down to deterrence or simply a lack of rationale for going to war. (For
example, whether merging the French and German economies into a single economic
jurisdiction prevented the two countries from going to war again (one of the
original objectives of the EEC) or whether they would never have gone to war
anyway is an academic question, to which there can never be a definitive
answer.) What we do know is that one of the most likely reasons for going to
war against any potential adversary is the belief that 'they' intend to attack ‘us’
and need to be stopped before they can build the capability to do so
successfully. But why are so few able to understand that exactly the same consideration
plays out on the ‘other’ side as well?
Where are the political leaders prepared to make the
argument that if we want to build for peace we should avoid sending the message
that we are building for war? Building for war has, instead, become the default
position of the UK establishment. And those who build for war are likely to find
themselves, sooner or later, fighting that war.
Posts
3 comments:
Some thoughts in response
"Defend forward"= an ancient doctrine if you live in the UK. It means you fight somewhere else, not in the Home Counties. Hence the British Army on the Rhine and all those wars in the the Low Countries.
"Best defence is attack" - yes, well attested eg "My center is giving way, my right is in retreat; situation excellent. I shall attack!" Marechal Foch.
Building for war leads to war - not always. The nuclear deterrent to the Soviet Union worked. Trump would claim that even messy wins in Iran have the benefit of making China think twice about Taiwan.
No one said this stuff is easy or pleasant to think about. But even a 2026 Labour party and other beneficiaries of the peace dividend have to re-visit reality at some point.
Wales needs a policy for all this. Just being part of NATO was a no-brainer. Being part of a European Defence body with much less reliance on Americans is also a no-brainer in 2026-7. Poland is right, you need a defence budget of at least 2% of gdp - which Wales meets - but really 5%. I don't think war would inevitably follow, at least not a big war. This should be a cross-party issue. This done, I would listen to Russia when they say they want to join a new NATO.
There are some statements there which are contentious, to say the least.
“Building for war leads to war - not always.” Maybe not always, but the history of arms build-ups (in Europe, at least), is that sooner or later those weapons tend to be used. One of the reasons for that is the fear of each side that the other will build up an unassailable advantage, allowing them to attack first, provoking a ‘use it or lose it’ attitude in response.
“The nuclear deterrent to the Soviet Union worked.” Not proven, I fear. It’s true that there was no all-out war between the Soviet Union and the West and that both sides possessed a massive nuclear capability, but that’s correlation rather than proven causation. Would the Soviet Union really have launched an all-out land attack on the west of Europe if it were not for the existence of nuclear weapons? To ‘prove’ such a proposition, we’d need to re-run history in a version where everything, except the possession of nuclear weapons, stayed the same; without that, this statement is opinion presented as fact. What we do know is that the world came close to the brink a couple of times, such as when the US stationed missiles in Turkey and the Soviet Union responded by stationing its missiles in Cuba. The ‘potential cause’ of war in that case was the fear of the military on both sides, once again, that the other side was building a first strike capability. And I would argue that the possession of nuclear weapons made that fear greater rather than smaller.
“Wales needs a policy for all this. Just being part of NATO was a no-brainer.” Not really a no-brainer at all. One of my main objections to NATO is that it is an alliance based on the possession of, and willingness to use, nuclear weapons. It is hypocritical to oppose nuclear weapons and claim to be a nuclear weapon-free state whilst also being part of an alliance whose core philosophy depends on those very weapons.
“Being part of a European Defence body with much less reliance on Americans is also a no-brainer in 2026-7.” Replace ‘much less reliance’ with ‘zero reliance’, and scrap the nuclear weapons of France and the UK, and I might get closer to agreeing with you. Collective security is better (and cheaper) than the expectation that any country should be able to meet any and every external threat by itself. It’s still better, though, to reach agreements with other countries such that there is no threat to counter, even if that’s a longer term project.
“Poland is right, you need a defence budget of at least 2% of gdp - which Wales meets - but really 5%.” I’ve never understood the obsession with the amount of money as a proportion of GDP. UK Defence Procurement have adequately demonstrated, time and again, that it’s perfectly possible to spend more to get less: what matters is the capability being procured not its cost.
“I don't think war would inevitably follow, at least not a big war.” Maybe, maybe not. The question is whether building up armaments makes war more likely or less likely. My understanding of European history suggests the former.
“This done, I would listen to Russia when they say they want to join a new NATO.” I’d certainly be open in principle to Russian participation in some sort of pan-European security arrangement based strictly on defensive capabilities rather than offensive ones, but I think we need to see a commitment to the common good of all participants. And, yes, I’m aware that some current members of both NATO and the EU might not exactly pass that test with flying colours. It’s pie in the sky, though. The militaristic mindset currently in control needs an enemy.
Just to put in the thought that around 1950 many voices both in America and outside (including Churchill, unsurprisingly, and Bertrand Russell, perhaps more surprisingly) were calling out for a "preventative" nuclear war against the Soviet Union. It's arguable, but as you say cannot be provable, that it was only the latter's earlier than expected development of their own nuclear bombs that put the brakes on this.
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