Threats work in Trump's mind, even if they really don't

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Reports suggest that Trump is considering using the UK’s possession of the Falklands/Malvinas as a lever to compel the UK government to spend more on armaments. This post isn’t going to get into questions around the legality or morality of the UK’s continued possession of such a remote outpost; that’s a whole other subject. In any event, questions about legality or morality never enter Trump’s mind; everything is about naked power and the ability to apply it. What impact a change of US policy would have is unclear: successive UK governments haven’t exactly demonstrated a willingness to be swayed by international opinion on the question of ownership.

Trump’s end game on the issue seems to be primarily about raising UK spend on armaments, and has little to do with the status of faraway islands about which he knows nothing. Defence spending is already a hot topic in UK politics, although parties are arguing primarily about the timetable for implementing any increase. The concentration on spending as a proportion of GDP is one which I’ve never really understood. Surely, if, or to the extent that, the UK needs to up its defence capacity (another whole other subject), it’s about the nature and scale of that capacity, not about how much it costs in relation to GDP? As the UK has ably(?) demonstrated over many years, increasing defence expenditure is easy – incompetent procurement and project management can add massively to costs for no perceptible increase in capacity.

I do wonder, though, whether Trump really cares whether the relationship between arms spending and GDP makes any sense or not – or even whether he really cares about defence anyway, especially for countries other than the US. I suspect that his real concern is what it’s always been: money and power (mostly his own). He believes (with considerable justification, in the short term at least) that increasing spend on armaments primarily benefits US companies, and that means his billionaire ‘friends’ (whose ‘friendship’, in turn, is more about what they can get out of it than any liking for Trump) and donors. He doesn’t even believe that the Russians (the bogeyman being used in Europe to support preparations for war) are any sort of threat, given what he sees as his own excellent relationship with Putin.

I suspect that the warmongers currently running the UK are going to increase armaments spending anyway, regardless of what Trump says, even if their own blind adherence to wholly arbitrary fiscal rules causes a degree of dithering along the way. And when they do so, even if the Trump threat over the Falklands/Malvinas has had zero impact on the decision, Trump’s simplistic mind will see a cause and effect where there is none, which will reinforce his tendency to resort to threats and blackmail. Trump’s madness and impulsiveness form a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape.

What's so special about 2029? or 2030?

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There seems to be a quiet difference of opinion amongst those who want us all to prepare for war with Russia: will the apparently inevitable Russian attack come in 2029 or in 2030? Either way, the dates postulated by defence ‘experts’ are largely arbitrary, carefully selected to be close enough to provoke action, but far enough in the future for that action to be meaningful. The ‘action’ required, of course, is to divert resources from those things which benefit the population as a whole, such as education, health, and transport, into the development and acquisition of armaments. Two years from now, the difference of opinion over the assumed date of attack will be between 2031 and 2032. It doesn’t matter how much is spent, or what weaponry is ‘required’, the need to add to it, or replace it with even newer versions, will always be there in the minds of the warmongers, to say nothing of the arms manufacturers.

Why, precisely, Russia would want to attack isn’t debated as widely as it should be; after all, if the threat was genuine, we’d know why they might want to attack, wouldn’t we? I simply don’t buy the idea that world domination by force is the motivating factor. But there is just a big hole where that question should be, and a vague assumption that Russia simply wants to expand the territory which it controls. From what Putin has said, we know that he has some strange beliefs, based on his curious understanding of history. In his view, Ukraine is not a nation, and its people are just Russians with an odd dialect. He also seems to believe that countries previously ruled from Moscow are destined by fate to be so, and should be brought back into the fold. Whether those beliefs are the driver of his military ambitions, or just a story told to justify them is another question. Telling stories as justification isn’t a trait unique to Putin.

In reality, it is surely much more likely that he genuinely believed the other story that he has told, which is that NATO and ‘the West’ in general intended to surround and dismember Russia, and he was therefore acting pre-emptively in launching the invasion. The biggest reason for striking first is always likely to be a fear that the other side would otherwise do so, coupled with the belief that striking first confers advantage. All of that, combined with a misunderstanding of the extent to which Ukrainians, particularly in the east, wanted to be Russians, and an underestimation of the likely resistance might have made it all a huge miscalculation. But one doesn’t have to be a Putin supporter or apologist to wonder whether, from the perspective of the Kremlin, the threat might have looked very real. It’s a perspective which continued active preparation for war in three or four years’ time is more likely to reinforce than dispel.

The military build-up is always presented to us as ‘deterrent’; the idea is that being seen to have a greater capability to destroy and kill will ensure that the attack never comes. It could, though, simply provoke it. Whether carrying a big stick to ward off invaders actually works is impossible to know. The fact that the putative invaders don’t invade whilst we’re waving the stick doesn’t prove that it worked – they might never have wanted to invade in the first place. But finding bigger sticks every year might eventually convince those believed to be would-be invaders that they had better act before the stick is used against them anyway. Logically, what looks like a deterrent to one can always look like a threat to the other. Discussion and mutually-agreed de-escalation are always going to be the safer route. They also mean that resources can be used more beneficially - 'defence' is about more than territory, there are other aspects to building a secure future for the population.

Building for peace, not war

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The idea that ‘Russia’ has learnt nothing from its catastrophic losses invading Ukraine, and will shortly be poised to take on the even greater challenge of a direct attack on a part of the European Union seems to be gaining ground almost daily. The Conservative and Labour parties seem equally in thrall to the threat of the Russian menace and equally determined to divert resources from welfare to armaments to prepare to meet the threat. In the process, they and what increasingly seem to be their puppet-masters in the armed forces and the weapons industries seem to be making such a war more, rather than less, likely.

Yesterday, we had a report of a speech from the head of the UK Army, laying out his views of what is needed. Needless to say, the head of the army wants to build up the army, but it was the detail which struck me. “Only armies seize and hold ground”, according to the pre-release of his speech. It’s impossible to argue with that, but the question which needs to be answered is why, exactly, we would want to ‘seize ground’ in the first place. The questions posed by his statement were compounded by his argument that the UK needs to be able to ‘strike deep’ and ‘defend forward’, which seems to mean developing the ability to strike at the enemy’s resources deep inside their own territory before those resources can be used against us. To me, it sounds a lot like an argument that the best defence is attack – and from the Kremlin’s perspective, it will surely sound even more so. What reaction should we expect from a state which feels itself thus threatened, after having watched the UK (and other governments) portray it as an imminent threat to themselves? Do we expect them to just wait, and watch that capability being built for use against them?

For the military (and, apparently, most UK politicians), the natural instinct is to build ever stronger armed forces to deter an attack by the enemy, but surely the deeper issue is how to avoid an attack. Maybe 'deterrence' has a role in that, but the extent to which that is so in that is arguable: up until the point at which war starts, it is impossible to know whether the lack of war is down to deterrence or simply a lack of rationale for going to war. (For example, whether merging the French and German economies into a single economic jurisdiction prevented the two countries from going to war again (one of the original objectives of the EEC) or whether they would never have gone to war anyway is an academic question, to which there can never be a definitive answer.) What we do know is that one of the most likely reasons for going to war against any potential adversary is the belief that 'they' intend to attack ‘us’ and need to be stopped before they can build the capability to do so successfully. But why are so few able to understand that exactly the same consideration plays out on the ‘other’ side as well?

Where are the political leaders prepared to make the argument that if we want to build for peace we should avoid sending the message that we are building for war? Building for war has, instead, become the default position of the UK establishment. And those who build for war are likely to find themselves, sooner or later, fighting that war.

Principles and virtue-signalling

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Principled stands are all very well, and something for which politicians are generally happy to be credited. Until, that is, the cost of taking such a stand is perceived to outweigh the advantages gained. We saw it in Starmer’s ‘principled stand’ against the US bombing campaign in Iran, which was principled until he decided that allowing the US to use UK bases for ‘purely defensive’ bombing raids (an oxymoron if ever there was one) was a less costly option. And he’s never explained exactly how the purpose and target of each bombing raid was verified to determine whether it met the unspecified criteria for being ‘purely defensive’ – the suspicion remains that the ‘principled stand’ amounted to making a grand statement and then turning a blind eye.

Starmer also took a ‘principled stand’ over Ukraine, backing strong sanctions against unwarranted Russian aggression. Until unwarranted US aggression against Iran caused a potential lack of jet fuel and diesel, at which point the principles got lost. Principles which last only until those espousing them conclude that they are costing themselves too much aren’t really principles at all; they’re more about virtue-signalling.

Whether sanctions actually achieve very much is another question entirely. The theory is that by denying a country access to goods from outside the country and denying that country access to markets for its own goods, then pressure is placed on the economy to such an extent that the government can no longer sustain itself and must collapse/ surrender/ stop a war (delete as applicable). The truth of the proposition depends on three assumptions. The first is that the country being sanctioned cannot sustain itself entirely on the basis of its own resources and productive capacity, the second is the neoliberal economic dogma that the limiting factor on any government’s actions is the amount of money available to it, and the third is that all other countries buy into the sanctions regime.

In the case of Russia, none of those three assumptions are valid. Russia may not have the climate to grow certain crops, which might limit the population’s dietary choices (although after decades of Soviet rule, that might not be as novel as one might think), but the country’s resources are vast and varied, and they have the people and skills to exploit them. As long as they don’t need foreign currency, the idea that the money supply is somehow limited is a myth anyway: the constraint on government action is the availability of real resources, not the means of exchange to buy them. And in any event, there are significant other powers prepared to ignore the sanctions regime. Sanctions have the ring of the old adage, which runs ‘something must be done, this is something, we must do this’.

The conclusion – that sanctions are largely symbolic statements by those applying them, and little more than irritations to those to whom they are applied – is depressing. Failure to recognise that fact is even more so – it simply encourages people to continue to pursue a failed path. There is no quick or easy solution. Universal adherence to agreed international law is our only hope in the long term, but achieving it is another matter entirely. Perhaps we never will, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try. In the meantime, pretend principles achieve little except to divert attention from the real issue.

Protecting citizens doesn't mean impoverishing them

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Whether a US major actually said “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it” in justification of the destruction of Ben Tre during the Vietnam war remains a matter of conjecture. That it describes the more-than-occasional absurdity of the military mindset is less open to question. It’s reflected in Donald Trump’s apparent belief that bombing the whole of Iran back to the Stone Age is a way of freeing Iranians from an oppressive regime: the difference is more a matter of scale than of substance. UK politicians aren’t immune to the same way of thinking, as Tory leader Kemi Badenoch demonstrated a day or two ago. According to her, the way to prepare for war with Russia is to cut benefits, pushing more families into poverty in the process. ‘It is necessary to starve them in order to save them’, apparently.

Politicians and military chiefs seem to delight in telling us that Russia will be ready to attack us in five years’ time, a ‘truth’ which underpins their obsession with increasing military spending at the expense of anything and everything else. Whilst it is true that the loss of soldiers and equipment in Ukraine over the past 4 years means that Russia is hardly ready today to launch a major attack on the rest of Europe, and that it would take time for them to rebuild their forces and replace the losses, the evidence that they will be ready to launch said attack in five years’ time is not exactly obvious. And, in any event, it assumes firstly that the losses in Ukraine stop rather than continue, and secondly that Russia’s leaders will have learnt nothing from the cost of invading a single country which will in any way influence their thinking about attacking an even larger ‘enemy’. It rather looks as though ‘five years’ has been selected as the timeframe of choice by NATO’s political and military leaders because it’s close enough to sound imminent, but far enough away to allow people to believe that a huge redirection of resources into military hardware might make a difference. A betting man might suggest that, five years from now, the alleged threat will still be five years in the future. But the demand for more resources will continue to grow.

But here’s the other side of that five-year coin, as it were: it’s also enough time to pursue an alternative course of action, aimed at preventing a war rather than preparing to fight one. The warmongering politicians and military leaders demanding the impoverishment of the population in order to be ready to fight another major war in Europe may well sincerely believe that the best way of preventing a war is to convince ‘the other side’ that they would lose and lose heavily if they attempted it, but the danger of such an approach is that that ‘other side’ instead sees every improvement in equipment, and every deployment of troops, as a sign that an attack on them is being prepared, and reacts accordingly. Whilst I really don’t believe that NATO’s eastward expansion was an intentional precursor for an invasion of Russia (one of the concerns allegedly underlying the Russian invasion of Ukraine), I can understand that things might look different when viewed from Moscow.

With a major war raging on European soil, and with the White House and the Kremlin both occupied by madmen, seeking to de-escalate and build trust instead of planning a war isn’t going to be easy, but it’s the only rational approach for Europe to follow. Those who would lead us into war are fond of telling us that the first duty of any government is the protection of its citizens, but there’s an unspoken addendum: ‘even if it means impoverishing them’. I wouldn’t phrase the ‘first duty’ like that. It takes a very narrow view of the meaning of ‘protection’. If we rephrase it to say that the first duty of any government is to maintain and improve the wellbeing, welfare, and living standards of the population, priorities start to look very different. And they don’t include pushing people into poverty in order to fight a war.

Who's checking what the US are doing from UK bases?

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A few hours before Trump’s deadline for Iran to surrender, it was reported that heavily-laden B52 bombers were taking off (or at least attempting to) from RAF Fairford, presumably en route to Iran. Whether they were armed with conventional weapons or nuclear weapons we may never know, but we can only assume that the jets were turned back in flight after Trump agreed, instead, to negotiate the terms of his own surrender, based on an Iranian document which Trump described as “a workable basis on which to negotiate”, and which would require, amongst other things, the payment of reparations to Iran and the removal of US bases from the region. Trump clearly blinked first, although under what pressures from within his own administration remains uncertain.

Whether it’s really a sound basis for a lasting peace is another unknown at this stage, but the use of a UK base for launching those B52s is an issue which shouldn’t be allowed to go away. Starmer has taken what appears to be a very principled and legalistic stance in demanding that UK bases only be used for ‘defensive’ actions to protect British and allied lives in the Persian Gulf, and he has banned their use for offensive bombing campaigns against Iran. But here’s the question: does anyone really believe that those B52’s, whose take-off was timed so that they would arrive over Iran at about the time that Trump said he wanted to destroy an entire civilisation, were in any way involved in a ‘defensive’ mission rather than part of his planned attacks on civilian infrastructure?

When a bomb falls on an Iranian hospital, school, bridge, or power plant, who in the UK government knows whether it came from a plane flying from a UK base or not? Is anyone checking the mission details and flight logs of all US military aircraft departing from the UK to see whether the US is abiding by Starmer’s rules or not? Starmer has banked a certain, albeit limited, quantity of kudos for setting strict rules, but if adherence is not being monitored (even Starmer, surely, couldn’t be stupid enough to take Trump’s word about what he is doing), then those rules are meaningless. Accepting the word of the US president and then turning a blind eye to what happens in practice would not be the principled stance as which it is being presented.

Laser-focused complacency might not help

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In Blazing Saddles, Cleavon Little’s Sheriff holds a gun to his own head and gets out of a sticky situation by telling the townsfolk that “The next man makes a move, the n***** gets it”. In the real world, Trump’s approach to Iran seems to involve telling them that he’s going to bomb them for another two to three weeks, and if they then agree to his terms, he’ll walk away and reserve the right to bomb them again whenever he feels like it, but if they don’t agree to his terms, he’ll walk away anyway and reserve the right to bomb them again whenever he feels like it. He doesn’t quite seem to realise that he isn’t creating as much fear as he thinks, merely telling them that they just have to hold on for another two or three weeks. When Boris Johnson kept threatening to walk away from EU talks unless they gave the UK everything he wanted, the EU’s response was along the lines of “bye!”. That sheriff had no real power to compel anyone to do anything, but it was a comedy, and in fiction, characters will do whatever the scriptwriter tells them to do. While there are undeniable comic aspects to both Trump and Johnson, their lack of control of the script meant that neither could compel their interlocutors to do what they wanted – and those interlocutors weren’t playing it for laughs either. Trump, in business as in politics, has always over-stated the strength of his own hand and depended on bullying, violence and threats to obtain compliance; Johnson was just a typical English exceptionalist.

Talk of English exceptionalists brings us to the current PM, Keir Starmer, who tried to tell us yesterday that the UK is somehow uniquely well-placed to weather the current economic storms resulting from an ill-thought-out war. He has a plan, he told us, although detail on the content of said plan was remarkably short. From what little he did say, it seems to consist mostly of being laser-focused on waiting to see what happens and then being resolutely determined to do as little as he can get away with. The picture of the UK being painted by some others, i.e. as being perhaps more vulnerable than others to some shortages, seems not to have penetrated his laser-focused complacency. Maybe things won’t turn out as bad as some of the doom and gloom merchants are prophesying; maybe Trump's expressed admiration for Charlie Windsor will lead him to moderate his behaviour rather than add a king to the list of those publicly humiliated by him, but neither seem to be the soundest of foundations on which to build any sort of strategy. As a work colleague of mine once observed, ‘if you can keep your head while all around are losing theirs, you probably don’t know what’s going on’. A message intended to reassure, from someone who seems not to know what’s going on, doesn’t exactly hit the target. Even if the target is laser-focused.

War and its beneficiaries

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The dire warnings about the impact of the war in the Middle East on the global economy are mostly valid, and the fault lies squarely at the feet of Trump for failing to foresee the obvious consequences of his actions. The longer it continues, the more we will all suffer. In strictly economic terms (a very important caveat), however, it isn’t all bad news. Capitalism thrives on destruction – using up all those munitions generates orders for replacements; every aeroplane lost requires a new one to take its place; violent demolition creates opportunities for redevelopment. I’m not suggesting that any of this is a good thing for humanity, it’s just that there have always been some who benefit from war, and current wars are no different. The euphemistically-named ‘defence’ industries and their owners will be amongst the beneficiaries, obviously.

For the rest of us, though, it underlines the folly of looking at anything in ‘strictly economic terms’. Production of munitions will certainly generate employment and economic growth, as will the rebuilding programs which will be needed after any war. But pure economics ignores the human and moral aspects. There’s a lesson there as well which goes much wider than a specific military conflict, or even war in general. Government and politicians who bang on about growth and jobs invariably ignore other aspects in pursuit of increased total material wealth (which inevitably accumulates in the hands of the few). Mechanistic economics pays too little attention to questions about the non-monetary value of activity, let alone the morality of it, and whether it really serves the needs of humanity.

There’s nothing mystical or divine about an economy – it’s a human construct, designed by humans and operating in accordance with rules laid down by humans. It’s our collective choice whether we design economies to facilitate the accumulation of wealth by a few, or to meet the needs of all. It’s our choice whether decisions are made on purely economic grounds or whether they’re made after considering whether humanity as a whole benefits. It’s a mark of the extent to which a social, human construct has been captured and placed at the service of a tiny minority that we live in the world we do. And it’s a measure of the success of the ideology underpinning it that so few understand that it is not the natural order of things, but the outcome of that capture.

Taming the markets

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It is a given that Trump’s statement about talks with Iran is a lie. Working out which part of his rant is the lie is much harder – maybe there are no talks at all; maybe there are some sort of indirect talks taking place through an intermediary; maybe (as Trump himself has hinted) the talks are taking place with someone who has no authority to hold them (and therefore to implement any agreement), and whose life is under threat if the regime currently in power find out he’s talking to Trump; perhaps he’s even talking to the late Shah’s son in the mistaken belief that he can put him back on the throne. With Trump, any or all of these are possibilities: the nearest thing to a certainty is that the statements coming from the regime in Iran are more likely to be true than anything Trump says. Only time will tell which lie he is telling.

Meanwhile, one of the apparent certainties is that the words emanating from Trump’s phone fingers can and do move markets. As a direct result of Trump’s claim about talks, conveniently issued shortly before markets opened, oil prices fell and stock market prices rose – two of the outcomes most highly valued by a man who measures the success or failure of everything in terms of increasing the wealth of himself and his billionaire friends. Superficially, it’s a puzzle as to why this happens. After all, those involved in the markets know as well as I do that the truth is a stranger to Trump’s lips, and that whatever he says now will probably be reversed in days, if not hours. What makes them place such trust in his words?

The answer to that lies not in what any of those involved in speculative buying and selling themselves believe might or might not be true, but in what they think that other speculative traders might or might not believe. If you believe that everyone else is going to be selling oil (pushing the price down) or buying stock (pushing the price up), then it becomes a race to sell or buy before everyone else does so in order to turn a quick profit. (And if you can get hold of some advance information, speculation – or even simple betting – becomes easier. It’s an obvious hazard when dealing with a ‘leader’ who sees personal and family enrichment as an entirely legitimate goal.)

That brings us to the problem with markets. As a mechanism for matching genuine sellers with genuine buyers, markets are an extremely effective process. They have, though, been largely hijacked by people who have no interest whatsoever in the ‘things’ they are buying and selling; it is the process of buying and selling in itself, with the prospect of turning a quick profit, which attracts them. Commentators describe volatile markets as a ‘problem’, but that’s only true for those genuine buyers and sellers. For speculators, volatility equals opportunity. The consequences of that volatility are felt in the ‘real’ economy by all of us, whilst a minority redirect wealth to themselves. For as long as legislatures allow this situation to continue, markets and the economy they support end up controlling us, when they should be serving society as a whole. Where are the politicians willing to tackle this scourge?

Lack of money isn't the problem

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It has long been understood that the one thing that governments can always find money for is war. War is undoubtedly costly, as the US is currently finding out. It is not really, though, a financial problem. As Professor Richard Murphy points out today, the real constraint isn’t financial, it’s about the availability of bombs and missiles and the ability of even the US economy to replace them at a fast enough rate. The US will run out of Tomahawk missiles because it can’t manufacture them with sufficient speed, not because it can’t pay for them. Similar considerations apply to Iran, of course – although an economy using lower cost, easier-to-produce weaponry can to some extent compensate for its relatively smaller size.

There is another corollary to this as well. There is talk that reducing the level of sanctions enforcement on Russian oil and gas to mitigate the economic impact of the war in Iran will enable Russia to prolong its own war in Ukraine by increasing the flow of money into Moscow’s Treasury. It’s true in only one important respect: to the extent that Russia needs materials, components etc from outside its own economy, increasing its flow of foreign exchange will assist it, but to the extent that it can meet those needs internally, then, just like the US, it won’t be a lack of money which constrains it.

Russia is vast; it has a huge range of raw materials available to it. It’s also a dictatorship: switching the use of its natural and human resources from peace time activities to war time ones is a lot easier than it is in a supposed democracy. Much of the response from ‘the West’ to the war in Ukraine has been based on the assumption that economic sanctions will reduce the sums available to the Russian government to spend on armaments and eventually force it to stop its aggression. But if those sanctions only impact Putin’s ability to make purchases outside the Russian economy, and Russia can meet most of its own needs within that economy, then the assumption is invalid. Russia can never run out of money, and can continue its war as long as it has the resources to do so available within its economy.

That’s not to argue that sanctions should not be applied, even if we know that they are widely being broken by back door transactions. It does, though, suggest that merely cutting off economic contact with a country with access to such vast resources of materials and labour will not bring that country to its knees any time soon. It’s more tokenistic than effective. It’s not a new lesson – Iran, for example, has been subject to severe sanctions for decades, and is still able to produce drones not only for its own use but also for export. The mistaken belief that money (or lack thereof) is a constraint on action by sovereign governments running their own currency has a lot to answer for.

Raising money for war

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As the warmongering rhetoric of the UK’s traditional parties (Tory, Lib Dems and Labour), along with newcomer Reform Ltd, ramps up, suggestions have been floated that the UK should start issuing war bonds, a method of borrowing from the public which was used to fund both World Wars. One of those floating the idea is Lib Dem leader, Ed Davey, and the call is also being supported by an alliance of defence industry bosses. The keenness of the armaments industry for the government to raise more money to divert into their pockets is understandable – arms manufacturers are the only consistent winners from warfare. Surprise, surprise – arms manufacturers support a plan to transfer other people’s money to themselves!

Even if we assume, for the purposes of argument, that spending more on armaments is a good thing, there is a big question over whether the government actually needs to borrow money to achieve that aim. The constraint isn’t about money – the government can always create money to fund whatever it wishes – it is about real resources in the economy. Are the raw materials, labour, energy etc to produce more armaments actually available, or do they need to be redirected from other economic uses? The way in which they are financed is a separate question entirely. On the scale on which our politicians apparently wish to manufacture armaments, it is likely that diversion of resources from other activities will be required – and which economic activities are selected to suffer the effects of that diversion is a far more important question, even if not one that any of them are in any great rush to answer.

Those advocating war bonds as a means of raising finance seem to think of it as an opportunity for ordinary people to come together and loan their pennies to the government in a great patriotic outpouring, as happened in the two world wars. Except it didn’t happen; it’s a false memory of events seen through biased lenses. And that little dampener eliminates the need to even consider whether the UK’s population would suddenly be overcome by the jingoistic fervour which the proposal presupposes.

In both world wars, the bonds were overwhelmingly sold not to ordinary individuals in the street but to a small number of wealthy individuals and to companies and institutions, unsurprisingly concentrated in London and south east England. The scheme launched in the first world war was actually a spectacular failure, with the Bank of England being forced to buy many of the bonds itself (an early example of what would probably be called quantitative easing today), hide the assets in its accounts, and then lie about having done so. As the government increased the interest rate in an increasingly vain attempt to attract more money, many of the new bonds were purchased by holders of the existing bonds converting them into the new higher interest bonds instead. As might be expected by any rational observer, the motivation of capitalists was more about making money than saving the country.

That highlights one of the issues with governments issuing bonds – they benefit mostly the wealthiest in society. By treating tax and ‘borrowing’ as alternatives, the rich end up keeping their capital and earning interest on it rather than paying tax. It’s also a double whammy – when the government spends the money into the economy, it overwhelmingly flows upwards into the hands of the wealthiest, through profits and dividends. To the extent that even a small number of ordinary people respond to the call, they end up reducing their own spending power as the flow of capital increases social inequality. It's not quite the wizard wheeze as which its advocates seem to see it. Unless you're an arms manufacturer.

The ultimate unwinnable wager

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There was a report a few days ago about the possibility that there had been some insider trading on a web betting – sorry, ‘prediction’ – site where some individuals may have made a killing by correctly ‘predicting’ either the attack on Iran or the death of the Ayatollah. It may, of course, be the case that the involvement of a Trump in the company hosting the ‘prediction’ market is a complete coincidence and/or that one Trump knew nothing about what another Trump was about to do. Perhaps there should be a market in predicting whether Trumps will gain financially from US government actions.

It is, apparently, possible to put money on a ‘prediction’ of almost anything. It seems that the same company hosting the bets on those ‘predictions’ also briefly ran a market in predictions of nuclear Armageddon. That market has subsequently been pulled, apparently because some felt that an attempt to make a bit of money betting on the deaths of millions of humans might be considered a little distasteful. To a compulsive gambler – sorry, ‘predictor’ – there is nothing that’s off limits when it comes to placing a bet, but the company running the market probably considered that whatever it had by way of a reputation would probably not be helped.

I found myself wondering, though, what sort of person would bet money on such an event. If the event happens, then the chances of the gambler being alive to claim his winnings are slim, to put it mildly. The chances of the company still being in existence to take the money from the losers and pay it to the winners are even lower. And what would the winners do with the money if there was no longer a functioning economy in which to spend it? Maybe those betting on nuclear destruction believe that nuclear Armageddon would not be so bad after all. The individual might survive a nuclear war, the company might still be able to organise the pay out, and the money would still be useful. But in those circumstances, the company would be able to argue, justifiably, that what just happened wasn’t nuclear Armageddon after all; and if the event didn’t happen, then those ‘predicting’ that it would happen would neither win nor receive any payout. It’s an essentially unwinnable bet for those predicting that outcome. There were some, apparently, willing to make the bet anyway. Even if they had advance knowledge that someone intended to start the nuclear war, it’s still a pretty stupid bet. As well as being tasteless.

Dealing with rogue states

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As an approach to winning the Nobel Peace Prize, starting an illegal war is certainly a novel one. Maybe Trump has abandoned all hope of ever winning the prize, or maybe he thinks that by starting a war which he can end at any time he chooses, he will shortly have another war to add to the list of the ones he’s personally ended. He certainly talks and behaves as though he assumes that no-one will remember what he did or said yesterday, never mind last year, so by the time he ends it, no-one – in his mind – will ever believe that he started it.

There is a huge difference between the world views of the late Ayatollah and Trump. On the one hand, the Ayatollah believed that he was god’s servant, doing god’s will by imposing his version of religion on the people of Iran and the wider world whereas, on the other hand, Trump believes that he was sent by (the same) god to impose divine will by the use of whatever force is necessary. The main lesson from that is that people in a position of power who believe that they have a unique ability to interpret god’s will, and a duty to impose that will on others by whatever means necessary, are inherently dangerous to the world. It’s not a particularly new lesson, sadly.

Trump’s actual motives are as clear as mud, and seem to change every time he opens his mouth. Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon by destroying facilities which Trump told us had already been completely obliterated last year; revenge for terrorist acts (allegedly) carried out by or at the behest of the Iranian government; pre-empting an attack by Iran for which there was no credible evidence; ‘justice’ for the thousands of protestors killed on the streets of Iran and preventing the regime from carrying out further such killings; revenge for Iran being named in some utterly incredible conspiracy theory as being in cahoots with Venezuela to steal the 2020 election. Take your pick – any, all, or none of the above. But, to consider just one of those: killing hundreds of civilians to stop the Iranian authorities from killing civilians is a strange proposition to many of us, although as Stalin may or may not have said, “a single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic”. As Trump’s rather offhand dismissal of the deaths of US service personnel to date demonstrated, for someone so lacking in human empathy as him even a single death (as long as it isn’t his own) is merely a statistic.

Underlying it all, though, there is a very serious point, which an arbitrary attack on Iran does more to disguise than to reveal. There are regimes in the world which are a danger to their own citizens and the citizens of other (mostly neighbouring) countries, and it is a mark of failure for the international order that humanity has no effective way of dealing with them. Having international laws and rules is the easy part; enforcing them is quite another matter. It’s easy enough to identify Iran, North Korea and Russia as dangerous states, but dealing only with the one which does not currently possess nuclear weapons is about the best incentive I can think of for further nuclear proliferation. And then, there’s the even bigger question – who decides what is or is not a rogue state where regime change is required for the good of humanity? I named three above, because they’re reasonably uncontroversial. But what about Israel, for instance, with its creeping annexation of the West Bank and the tens of thousands of civilians killed in Gaza? What, indeed, about the USA under its current administration? Kidnapping people off the streets, disappearing them, ‘repatriating’ them without due process to places they’ve never visited, interfering in the affairs of other states both politically and militarily, blowing up boats in international waters, threatening to seize territory by force, kidnapping one national leader and assassinating another? Which characteristic of a rogue state has the US failed to meet?

There is no easy or simple solution to the problem; humanity has some way to go before we recognise that we are one species sharing one planet and need to co-operate, share, and live by a common basic set of rules. It’s much easier to say what the solution isn’t than identify what it is – but it definitely isn’t allowing the biggest and most powerful to take whatever arbitrary decisions suit its own selfish interests, or those of its rulers. Trump is taking the world backwards – and the UK’s Labour government now seems set on enabling and supporting him in that endeavour.

What are we proposing to defend?

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Labour’s warmongers are at it again. On the basis of absolutely no evidence that they are willing to share, they have declared that “the threat of a Russian attack on the UK grows”, and that the UK therefore needs to spend vastly more on new weapons in order to repulse such an attack. I don’t know whether Putin is really planning to launch an attack on the UK, but – despite his obvious desire to reinstate what he regards as being the right of Russia to control certain territories – he isn’t obviously a stupid man. He is, for instance, perfectly capable of extrapolating from his difficulties in conquering Ukraine to the likely consequences of attacking any of the major NATO states, and concluding that it is probably not a battle Russia would be likely to win. He also understands at least a little about geography: Ukraine is close to Russia and shares a long and eminently invadable land border, whilst the UK is further away and any attack beyond an aerial assault would require the use of air and sea transport for a large number of forces.

The military clearly want more weapons, but then the military always do, regardless of the assessed scale of any threat. The real beneficiaries of the proposed increase in military expenditure are the arms companies (and their shareholders), companies which are already profitable and seem to have a knack of ending up invariably charging much more than the price initially quoted. The losers – in a situation where Labour are hemmed in by their own blind commitment to neoliberal economics and wholly arbitrary fiscal rules – will be the population of the UK, and especially those most dependent on the state finances and services which will be cut to pay for weaponry.

The first question we need to be asking is what exactly is it we are proposing to defend? And that raises the question of what sort of society we want to be. If the only way to ‘defend’ citizens is to impoverish and marginalise ever more of them, and prepare them to give their lives in order to do so, there is a danger that the ‘cure’ is worse than the disease. Defending the interests and wealth of the wealthy isn’t serving the population as a whole. The interests of most of us have more in common with those of the ordinary citizens of the 'enemy' state than with the interests of the elites who run the states on either side.

The second – and even more important – question is about how we prevent war in the first place, rather than merely setting out to ‘win’ it. War only becomes inevitable when government on both sides becomes captured by people who think it to be so, and much of what looks to be defence preparation to one side will look to be threat of an attack to the other. The most likely cause of any further attack by Russia is a belief that ‘we’ are preparing to attack them. Building up military forces, with more weapons and more powerful weapons, especially when more of them are stationed close to their borders, isn’t exactly the best way of dispelling that belief.

For Trump, there is no such thing as an 'ally'

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As part of his justification for gaining total control over Greenland, the Guardian reports that Trump “has insisted that Denmark cannot be relied upon to protect Greenland in the case of a confrontation with China or Russia”. He’s right, of course: there is no way that Denmark acting alone can mobilise sufficient resources to defend Greenland against an all-out assault by Russia or China (although the idea of an all-out assault by China seems even more far-fetched than an assault by Russia). I’d go further: there is no way that Denmark could mobilise sufficient resources to defend the territory of Denmark itself from an all-out assault by Russia or China – or even the US. And Denmark is far from being the only country in that position. The Danes might foolishly have thought that that was precisely why they joined the NATO alliance – so that they would not be left alone to face such a threat, never really expecting that it would come from their supposed ally rather than their supposed enemy.

Some of Trump’s acolytes have taken the analogy even further by arguing, in effect, that any country unable to defend itself, acting alone, from an assault by one of the big powers has no right to exist – and that any power which is able to overcome another country by dint of superior force has the right to do exactly that. But when the mightiest military power the world has ever seen is run by people who believe that they have the right to take whatever they can take, it is time for the rest of the world to recognise that the US can no longer be regarded as any sort of ally, let alone a reliable one. No agreement can be taken as being worth anything from the day it is signed; the bully is always likely to come back for more. Trump himself seems to see the world as divided into three great powers each with its own sphere of influence, with all other countries being either supplicants or enemies. There is no other status in between supplicant and enemy. Pretending that the UK somehow has some special influence or relationship with this version of the US is turning a blind eye to reality. Yet that is where Starmer has placed the UK.

Options are limited, and not instant. If we assume that we want to avoid getting into a shooting war with the US – a reasonable, not to say wise, assumption – then any defence against the fascist state into which the US is descending has to be primarily economic, and it has to involve collective action. Part of Starmer’s reluctance to go down that route is probably that agreeing collective action takes time, and economic action is in any event slow-acting: sanctions against Iran, North Korea, Russia etc. aren’t exactly notable for their success. Needing the agreement of no-one, and protected from any restraining action from Congress or the courts, Trumpism is, on the other hand, fast-acting, as well as arbitrary, capricious, and unpredictable. I rather suspect that part of the calculus of Starmer and others is that Trump will be gone in three years, and the US will return to ‘normal’: still the world’s bully, but a little less blunt and obvious about it. That, though, depends on some key assumptions: that Trump will not carry on past the end of his term; that any successor won’t be as bad or even worse; and that elections will actually take place at all. None of these seem to be worth betting the farm on, yet that’s where Europe, and especially the UK, seem to be.

Is NATO nailed to the perch?

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Whether NATO is merely slumbering while it waits for the end of Trumpism in the US, or whether it has been nailed to its perch to give a misleading impression of life is an academic question, since in neither case can it be relied on (in the short term at least) to meet its stated objective of providing a collective system of defence. The Prime Minister of Denmark told us this week that it would be dead if the US launched a military attempt to take over Greenland. That sounds logical, although NATO ‘allies’ behaving aggressively towards each other isn’t exactly new. Think of the Cod Wars between NATO members Iceland and the UK in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, or the recurrent near-wars between Greece and Türkiye, occasionally involving the firing of real bullets. Threats by right-wing UK politicians against France or Spain were perhaps never really a practical proposition, but the mere fact that they were expressed shows that not everyone takes the alliance very seriously.

Invading and seizing part of the internationally-recognised territory of a fellow member state is on a different level, though. And when the invading force belongs to the largest and most powerful member of the alliance – the one which has been seen as the ultimate backstop since the founding of the alliance – that puts a more serious perspective on the question. Perhaps Trump will hold back from the military option. There are other approaches to getting what he wants (which seems – just like in Venezuela – to be more about oil and natural resources than about national security) although his love of macho action suggests he’d sooner deploy the military whether he needs to or not. Whether bullying, intimidation, and threats are any less of a danger to the NATO alliance than an actual military intervention is an interesting question; but one rather suspects that most of the members would prefer to keep their mouths shut and put the alliance on some sort of life support than pronounce it dead in such circumstances.

The wider question, though, is whether the alliance is already dead, de facto if not de jure. Trump has already made it clear that he will not come to the aid of any European country which hasn’t spent as much money as he declares necessary on buying US military hardware defence, and it's not at all clear that he would aid even those that do. In fairness to Trump – not a phrase which trips easily off the keyboard – I’ve long held doubts about the reliability of the US as a backstop under previous administrations, as well as about the role of the alliance itself. The difference between Trump and his predecessors is that he can’t help blurting things out where others preferred to maintain a more ambiguous silence. The bottom line is that an alliance dominated by one member and unable to operate effectively without that member ceases to be of any value if that one member goes rogue. Waiting for Trump to invade a fellow NATO member before declaring the organisation dead is pretending that the decaying corpse in front of us still shows signs of life. The question which European leaders should be debating is about building a new international order, starting in Europe, which does not depend on the dubious commitment of the military might of the US, and which is oriented towards avoiding wars rather than fighting them.

Stumbling onto a big question by accident

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Tory leader Kemi Badenoch talked on Thursday of her concern that young people will not fight for the UK if all it can offer them is unemployment. It’s a statement which is wrong on so many levels. Firstly, it isn’t just young people who are likely to be reluctant to get involved in a war; whilst young people have historically done most of the fighting (sometimes as a result of warmongering propaganda, sometimes merely out of a preference for taking their chances of being shot by the ‘enemy’ rather than the certainty of being shot by their own side, but mostly by being conscripted and obeying authority), all out war of the sort for which she and others are trying to prepare us depends on a much wider response than that. There is no evidence that older people are any more willing to face the sort of catastrophe which she and so many others seem to desire. Secondly, the word ‘fight’ is something of a euphemism in the way she uses it: what she really means is being prepared to kill complete strangers or be killed by those same strangers, a proposition which people are increasingly less likely to embrace. Even if much of the ‘information’ to which we are exposed is dubious, the availability of alternative views and perspectives is greater now than at any time in history: blind loyalty is correspondingly less common. We are no longer living in jingoistic imperial times, although many of our political leaders seem not to understand that.

Badenoch is also utterly wrong on the question of unemployment deterring volunteering for the military: for decades unemployment has been one of the main drivers of military recruitment. It’s no accident that military recruiters target their school and community visits on those areas with the most deprivation and highest levels of unemployment. For many of those being targeted, it is precisely the lack of any better opportunity which makes armed service an attractive option. The elimination of unemployment would actually make military recruitment harder, not easier, because we can be certain that the ‘young people’ she wants to do the killing and dying aren’t the ones from her social class, who land well-paid jobs though their connections and families, and buy homes using the bank of mam and dad.

And yet. We’ve had almost five decades of being told, under governments of both parties, that it’s not the job of the state to provide housing or employment, that individuals must do more for themselves, and that anyone not working is a burden on everyone else. The state, which was never an impartial observer or neutral referee, has facilitated, by deliberate choice, a huge growth in inequality in which the benefits of economic growth have trickled upwards from the many to the few. Living standards have been deliberately constrained for most of us, whilst a tiny minority has accumulated ever more wealth. Whole communities have been abandoned and left behind. In such a context, why would anyone feel loyalty to, and volunteer to be killed for, a state which primarily serves the interests of those who have benefited from that situation?

That is the underlying question which Badenoch is raising, and it’s a hugely significant question. I’m sure that she doesn’t realise what she is really asking – and would probably be horrified if she did, because it challenges everything she and her party have been saying for the last half century. It’s a neat demonstration of how it is possible to be completely wrong on the detail, yet somehow stumble by accident upon one of the biggest and most important questions facing us. The chances of her accidentally stumbling on any sort of answer are zero – she’s certainly not going to propose a reversal of the policies pursued over the last five decades. There’s a rather different challenge for the rest of us though – whatever it is which is deterring people from signing up for military service, do we really want a return to the days of ‘my country, right or wrong’ anyway?

War is a choice, not an inevitability

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One of the policies which seems to be increasingly common ground between the Tories and Reform Ltd is opposition to the target of becoming carbon neutral, or reaching net zero in terms of carbon emissions. It’s a policy platform which seems to be implicitly underpinned by two very curious beliefs.

The first is that expenditure on achieving neutrality is in some way consuming wealth whilst continued exploitation of fossil fuels is generating wealth. It is, of course, complete and utter piffle. If we measure wealth in terms of GDP (or GVA), what money is spent on is irrelevant. It is the act of spending it which adds to GDP; money spent in insulating properties adds as much to GDP as the same amount of money spent on drilling for oil – and that’s true whether the spending is in the public sector or the private sector. There might be an argument that multiplier effects mean that spending on X rather than Y ultimately generates more GDP per £ spent. I actually don’t know the answer in this specific case, but it’s interesting to note that it’s not an argument they are trying to make. I rather suspect that they are conflating two different kinds of wealth – national wealth as represented by GDP and private wealth as reflected in the bank balances of individuals and companies. I’m sure, though, that this conflation has nothing to do with the fact that both parties rely heavily on donations from established players in established sectors, such as oil and gas. Not.

The second curious belief is that if nothing gets spent on achieving net zero, the whole amount of any projected expenditure becomes a net saving, and makes money available for other things. Their favourite other things are tax cuts for the wealthy and/or channelling expenditure into donor companies, such as those in the armaments industry. Badenoch’s statement today is a classic of the genre. I suppose that, if they really believe that climate change is not happening at all, then it would be a reasonable belief, although that would be flying in the face of overwhelming scientific opinion. I’m not sure that they really do believe that, though; reading some of what they say, it seems more likely that they believe that we can and will somehow adapt to climate change. The costs of that, they simply ignore – a problem for another day.

Badenoch would clearly prefer war to addressing climate change, which I suppose puts her on the same page as Farage and Starmer. There is, though, more to the cost of war than diverting the finite resources of planet Earth into weapons of destruction. There is the obvious cost of loss of human lives (although they would probably all prefer to see that as a loss of a productive labour force). There’s also the lost opportunities which such diversion of resources would entail – the opportunity to provide a decent standard of living for all, for instance. Badenoch is making it clear that she thinks that austerity (obviously not for her section of society) is a price worth paying in order to prepare for all out war with Russia. And then there’s probably the biggest cost of all: in the event of surviving such a war, the cost of reconstruction would be enormous.

There is one point about which she is right. Governments face choices. Whether the constraint on what governments can do is the availability of money (as she, Starmer and Farage all insist that they believe) or the availability of physical resources (as economic reality dictates), governments still have to choose between options for using that money or those resources. Badenoch is making her choice clear – war. And she’s being aided and abetted by politicians and military types urging the same choice on an almost daily basis. There is an alternative, though: we really don’t have to allow them to make that choice.

Is Russia the only enemy?

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The politicians and generals keep telling us that we must prepare for war with Russia – some are even claiming that we are already at war, in the light of Russia launching a variety of provocations including the use of drones for surveillance and cyber attacks on Western organisations. In order to justify diverting ever more resources into the profits of companies in the defence sector the purchase of armaments, some play up the danger of an actual physical attack, using armour and troops. It is, though, hard to believe that Putin doesn’t realise that such an attack would be certain to lead to a much wider war which, without resorting to nuclear weapons - in which case, everyone else also loses - he would be likely to lose.

That’s not to say that Putin doesn’t have malicious intent; just that the conquest, occupation, and Russification of countries with 500 million inhabitants by a country with only 145 million inhabitants is never going to be achievable, and Putin isn’t stupid enough to believe otherwise. He does, after all, have the experience of years of fighting over a much smaller country and all the losses Russia has incurred. It’s pretty clear, though, what his aims for any conflict would be – the breakup of NATO and the EU, regime change across Europe, replacing what pass for liberal democracies with authoritarian governments, and freedom for Russian oligarchs and kleptocrats to further enrich themselves. He doesn’t need to invade anyone to achieve that; indeed, invasion would destroy a lot of the resources which he and his pals covet. Misinformation, election interference, dirty money, cyber crime – all these are more effective weapons at his disposal. And no amount of expenditure on tanks, guns or conscription of the sort which the politicians and generals are demanding across Europe will prevent that.

By a curious coincidence, Putin isn’t the only one who seeks the destruction of the EU, wholesale European regime change, and more freedom for oligarchs and kleptocrats. The Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy, published last week, is remarkably explicit in calling for much the same thing, with direct interference in elections in favour of Trumpian policies and Trump-aligned parties now an official and public part of US strategy. Those who think that we are already at war with Russia because of Russian interference in European politics seem incapable of recognising that, applying similar criteria, the US could also be considered to be at war with us. European countries are caught in a pincer movement, with larger neighbours to both the east and the west intent on ripping out liberal, tolerant democracies (or semi-democracies, such as the UK) and replacing them with authoritarian white nationalist regimes which persecute and harass minorities and opponents and pay homage to Moscow / Washington.

That doesn’t mean to suggest that Russia and the US are in cahoots (although they may well be moving that way), merely that their rulers’ perceptions of their own geopolitical interests in Europe increasingly coincide in a way which is much broader than a mutual desire to carve up Ukraine. A response which consists of diverting ever more resources into armaments not only does nothing to address the problem (would we really get into a shooting war with either Russia or the US, let alone both of them at the same time?), it actively makes it worse by holding down living standards in a way which creates the discontent on which politicians pursuing the Putin-Trump agenda feed. Improving the welfare and living standards of the population would be a much better way of demonstrating European values and keeping the barbarians at bay, but our politicians seem keener on facilitating barbarianism than protecting values and civilisation.

Keeping us safe from threats

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Last week, a retired general told us that the UK is 10 years away from being ready for a war with Russia, a war which the political and military leaders of the UK seem increasingly determined to fight. The general’s views were inevitably reported as though it was a bad thing to be so unready for a war which would in the best case destroy much of Europe and in the worst case end human civilization. The military mind always sees an unreadiness to fight a war as being a bad thing, but what if that unreadiness is actually a good thing?

An attempt by Russia to conquer and subdue the entire continent of Europe (which is what a pre-meditated attack on a Nato country implies) would be madness, even if Russia hadn’t already proved how incapable it is of subduing one country right on its borders. It is possible, of course, that Putin really is mad, but his actions to date appear to be due more to miscalculation than insanity. He will surely have learnt something from his misadventures in Ukraine. The only anywhere near rational reason for a decision to attack the whole of NATO would be if he became completely convinced that it was necessary to pre-empt an attack by NATO on Russia. Getting his retaliation in first, in other words.

Now I don’t actually believe that NATO countries want to start a war with Russia (which isn’t the same thing as saying that there are no individual military men or politicians who do), but I’m not sitting in the Kremlin looking at the world through Russian eyes with an intense awareness of Russian history. He might be wrong to conclude that NATO is preparing to attack his country but, listening to the generals and war-mongers, it’s not an entirely unreasonable conclusion for him to reach. So if the biggest danger for us lies in reinforcing his fears, which keeps us safer: stepping up preparedness for war or being so unready that he feels no immediate need to act?

One of the lessons of history is that militarisation and arms races almost invariably lead to war, and can even do so almost by accident. Deliberately choosing not to prepare for all-out war with Russia stands traditional policy on its head, but it also allows us to make policy choices which improve the living standards of people in the UK rather than diverting resources into essentially wasteful weapons of destruction; policy choices which the politicians tell us are impossible. The warmongers tell us that the first duty of any government is to keep its citizens safe, but they don’t encourage debate about the question of ‘safe from what?’ Cutting lives short through war is an obvious danger, but lives are also shortened by poverty, ill health, and poor education. The former is a future danger (the remoteness of which is hard to judge), the latter is happening here and now. There’s a lot more nuance to ‘keeping citizens safe’ than preparing to kill Russians.