Building for peace, not war

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The idea that ‘Russia’ has learnt nothing from its catastrophic losses invading Ukraine, and will shortly be poised to take on the even greater challenge of a direct attack on a part of the European Union seems to be gaining ground almost daily. The Conservative and Labour parties seem equally in thrall to the threat of the Russian menace and equally determined to divert resources from welfare to armaments to prepare to meet the threat. In the process, they and what increasingly seem to be their puppet-masters in the armed forces and the weapons industries seem to be making such a war more, rather than less, likely.

Yesterday, we had a report of a speech from the head of the UK Army, laying out his views of what is needed. Needless to say, the head of the army wants to build up the army, but it was the detail which struck me. “Only armies seize and hold ground”, according to the pre-release of his speech. It’s impossible to argue with that, but the question which needs to be answered is why, exactly, we would want to ‘seize ground’ in the first place. The questions posed by his statement were compounded by his argument that the UK needs to be able to ‘strike deep’ and ‘defend forward’, which seems to mean developing the ability to strike at the enemy’s resources deep inside their own territory before those resources can be used against us. To me, it sounds a lot like an argument that the best defence is attack – and from the Kremlin’s perspective, it will surely sound even more so. What reaction should we expect from a state which feels itself thus threatened, after having watched the UK (and other governments) portray it as an imminent threat to themselves? Do we expect them to just wait, and watch that capability being built for use against them?

For the military (and, apparently, most UK politicians), the natural instinct is to build ever stronger armed forces to deter an attack by the enemy, but surely the deeper issue is how to avoid an attack. Maybe 'deterrence' has a role in that, but the extent to which that is so in that is arguable: up until the point at which war starts, it is impossible to know whether the lack of war is down to deterrence or simply a lack of rationale for going to war. (For example, whether merging the French and German economies into a single economic jurisdiction prevented the two countries from going to war again (one of the original objectives of the EEC) or whether they would never have gone to war anyway is an academic question, to which there can never be a definitive answer.) What we do know is that one of the most likely reasons for going to war against any potential adversary is the belief that 'they' intend to attack ‘us’ and need to be stopped before they can build the capability to do so successfully. But why are so few able to understand that exactly the same consideration plays out on the ‘other’ side as well?

Where are the political leaders prepared to make the argument that if we want to build for peace we should avoid sending the message that we are building for war? Building for war has, instead, become the default position of the UK establishment. And those who build for war are likely to find themselves, sooner or later, fighting that war.