Revisiting the predictions

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A little over two years ago, I noted some comments on the Commission set up by the Welsh Government to consider the constitutional future of Wales, predicting the likely outcome. In the light of the report which the Commission has now produced, it’s worth reflecting how accurate or fair those predictions were. Some have stood the test of time rather better than others, and, on the whole, the report is rather better than I expected. Of the six points I noted at the time, points c, d, and e have been broadly reflected in the report. It’s (pleasantly) surprising to see such a clear rejection of the federal option, contrary to my expectation in point f. Federalism has always been a very silly idea, depending as it does on a completely absent desire for change within England, but it’s a dead horse that has been so well and truly flogged by some in the Labour Party that I assumed that a commission set up by Labour would give it more credibility than it ever deserved. Whilst the data presented certainly does reflect my prediction a, it’s impossible to argue with the data, and it isn’t used as an obstacle to independence in principle. Indeed, in declaring that independence is a viable option (depending on one’s values and priorities) the commission went much further than I expected it to. It is, though, point b of my original predictions (“Wales is, in any event, not strong enough economically to be an independent country”) on which I will concentrate.

It's definitely not what they said, although it’s strongly implied in the idea that there are more risks associated with independence than with other options. But the extent to which that is true is highly debateable. If Wales were to vote for independence tomorrow and become independent on Wednesday, then it is absolutely correct to argue that the risks would be very much higher than the risk of remaining in the status quo – and that would probably be true for some years to come. That isn’t, though, a realistic scenario. There will be no referendum on independence at least until there is a majority in the Senedd in favour of holding such a referendum – and that, sadly, is not looking at all likely for a minimum of two Senedd elections, taking us to an earliest date of 2031. There would probably be another year at least before holding a vote, giving us eight years for parties favouring independence to spell out more clearly the implications as they see them before we get to vote. Given the need to negotiate the details and set up a whole range of institutions and processes in Wales, the full transfer of powers wouldn’t happen for some time after the vote; to achieve a smooth transfer my own expectation would be a period of three to five years, making independence day sometime between 2035 and 2037 at the earliest. None of that does away with the risks of independence – of course there are risks – but it does mean that we need to compare those risks not with the status quo as it is today, but with wherever the status quo leaves us 11 or more years from today.

There is a natural human tendency to believe that the status quo will carry on for ever. It’s an implicit assumption that we all make on a daily basis in deciding what we’re going to do and when, even for planning some years ahead. But Newton’s First Law of Motion tells us that things will only stay the same for as long as no force acts on events, and that is a wholly unrealistic assumption. It’s not just pandemics and wars that change things; even on a more mundane level, who would seriously have predicted that government in the UK would degenerate into utter chaos and incompetence as quickly as it has since 2015, a mere eight years ago? Economic forecasts, like weather forecasts, are rarely correct very far in advance. My basic point is that the undoubted uncertainties and risks associated with independence may not be so quantitatively different from those associated with sticking to the status quo, even if they’re apparently easier to identify. I don’t doubt that opponents of independence will use the commission’s words about risks and uncertainties to justify their stance, but independentistas should not be afraid of highlighting the uncertainties and risks associated with not seeking independence. As the commission points out, ultimately it boils down to a question of values and priorities. And that’s a battlefield on which independentistas should feel very confident in fighting.