Showing posts with label PFI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PFI. Show all posts

Tuesday, 13 August 2024

Pretending to have a policy

 

Workers in the old Soviet Union used to say that “we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us”. It was a cutting summary of the state of the economy at the time. But ‘pretending’, when it comes to matters economic, wasn’t (and never has been) limited to the totalitarian state of the Soviet Union. It has also been practiced here, by Labour and Conservative governments alike – and it looks as though the new Chancellor is determined to restore pretence to a position of centrality in her handling of the economy. I refer, of course, to the idea of what was variously labelled the Private Finance Initiative, or Public Private Partnerships; a system in which the government pretends not to be borrowing any money to build schools, roads, hospitals or whatever, and the private partner pretends not to be charging any interest on the money it pretends not to have loaned to the government, recovering its costs instead by issuing extortionate bills for changing lightbulbs.

It was the Major government which came up with the scheme, although Blair and Brown adopted it with gusto after replacing Major. And it was Cameron/Osborne who ended the practice, when it became clear just how bad a deal it really was over the long term. It did, though, achieve its main stated aim, which was to hide the extent of government borrowing by pretending it wasn’t happening. Instead of loans, debts and interest payments, the government’s accounts showed only ongoing maintenance and rental costs.

The FT reported yesterday that the Chancellor is considering reviving some version of the scheme to build a new Thames crossing in London at a cost of around £9 billion. No doubt the details will be tweaked in the light of past experience, but the underlying truths will remain, whatever those details might suggest, and the development cost will miraculously not appear as a loan in the government’s accounts whilst, over the long term, those pretending not to be lending the money will make a killing.

It's dishonest, of course, but probably the inevitable conclusion of a government which thinks that being seen to adhere to an arbitrary and inflexible fiscal rule is more important than the underlying financial reality. The issue isn’t just about that dishonesty though, nor the resulting inflated costs compared with a more straightforward approach to borrowing the money; it’s about the way priorities are determined. Schemes prioritised for progress using such an approach will be those which produce the best return for those not lending the money to the government; it is they who will, effectively, decide the priorities. Maybe the two things sometimes align – perhaps Reeves really believes that, if the government were to find a spare £9 billion down the back of the sofa, a new Thames crossing would be its top priority. There is, though, no obvious evidence that any thought has been given to the best way of spending such a large windfall. The thinking seems, instead, to have started from asking which schemes will be most likely to attract the finance sector to pretend not to lend the government money. It’s not only the construction which is potentially being outsourced, it’s the determination of policy as well.

Wednesday, 27 September 2017

When is a loan not a loan?

The reaction from some quarters to Labour’s proposal to bring PFI deals back ‘in-house’ has been to claim that this would be very expensive, and would require a Labour Government to borrow money in order to buy out the PFI contracts.  The problem with that line of attack is that it assumes that the money involved in PFI deals wasn’t borrowed in the first place, and that is a contentious argument to say the least.
What is the difference between the government directly borrowing money to build a hospital and paying it back over, say, 40 years, and the private sector borrowing money to build that same hospital while the government pay a service charge over the same period and then take ownership of the hospital at the end of that period?  The difference is just a question of accountancy or ‘financial engineering’; effectively the government is borrowing in both cases but treating one type of loan as an ‘off-balance-sheet’ arrangement.  When private companies use off-balance-sheet arrangements, they are often accused of hiding the true state of their indebtedness.  That seems like fair comment to me, and it is equally true when it comes to the government.
The point is that the government already owes the money to pay for PFI deals; it merely pretends that it doesn’t so that it doesn’t have to count the total amount due in its debts.  Any proper due diligence exercise on HM Government’s accounts would, as a result, conclude that it owes a great deal more than its accounts show.  The question therefore, when it comes to terminating PFI contracts early, is not whether the government needs to borrow new money to buy them out, it’s whether borrowing from a different lender at a better rate might be a cheaper (and more honest) way of financing the same debt.  And given the exorbitant effective interest rates being charged on some PFI contracts, and the record low level of interest on new government debt, it’s hard to believe than buying out PFI deals at a fair rate based on normal accounting treatment of the value of future payments won’t be far cheaper than letting them run.
The real question to Corbyn and McDonnell is not ‘how will you pay for this?’, but ‘why did it take you so long to figure this out?’  The latter question gives me far more concerns about their financial acuity than the former; but it puts them way ahead of the Tories who still haven’t been able to figure it out.

Saturday, 20 August 2011

Getting there eventually

It took a while, but the real cost of PFI has finally been recognised by an all-Party committee in the House of Commons.  It is, as many of us were saying all along, an expensive way of borrowing money, became little more than a device for keeping debt off the balance sheet, and should be scrapped.  And some of those who were egging the Welsh government on to not spurn this source of investment capital should feel more than a little egg on their own faces.
No surprise that the CBI want to keep the system; after all, the organisation’s members benefited from it by making greater returns on investment than would otherwise have been the case.  It’s a little misleading to suggest though that this was the only way of attracting private finance to invest in infrastructure.  After all, much of what the government borrows to invest directly comes from private finance – it just doesn’t pay as well.
The other argument for PFI was that it enabled the government to reduce its financial risk.  There is, indeed, an argument – in principle at any rate – for paying a higher effective rate of interest if the project is lower risk, or even risk-free.  It’s a calculation which is complex, but a transfer of financial risk to someone else can justify paying a greater return to them.
The problem with PFI though was that there was little or no transfer of real risk.  The customer – us – remained exposed to most if not all of the risk, and at an often increased level of risk due to the higher cost.  The suppliers of capital, meanwhile, found themselves with a fairly low risk cash cow.  Why wouldn’t they want to keep that system going?
The question now is what happens next.  Will the government do as it has been advised, and buy its way out of these contracts, or will they remain a financial milestone for years to come?

Friday, 19 November 2010

Nice little earner

PFI has been a nice little earner for those companies who’ve been able to take advantage of it.  The theory is that it’s some sort of partnership between the public and the private sector; the reality is that one part of that ‘partnership’ has benefited, whilst the other has lost out.
Those cash-strapped public bodies who found themselves pushed into using the approach have found that they have got shiny new hospitals and schools which they could not otherwise have afforded, but are faced with huge ongoing annual costs about which they can do little.  And that, in turn, has constrained their ability for further investment in other facilities until the end of the contract period.
The companies, on the other hand, have found themselves with a guaranteed source of long-term income, whilst all the risk remains with their customers.  It’s a completely unequal partnership, and has been from the outset.
No real surprise then that the CBI – which represents the sort of companies which have benefited – is again pressing for Wales to use PFI.  From their perspective, it’s a neat way of transferring resources from the public sector into the private one.  But over the long term, it also means that the public sector gets less for a given amount of expenditure – the opposite, in effect, of what the CBI and other organisations have long been urging on government.
The Welsh Government is absolutely right to rule out PFI – and I hope that they will continue to do so.