Yesterday’s
post considered the question of why people might be looking for a federal or
confederal structure for the UK. Today’s returns to a consistent theme of this
blog, which is that any such solution cannot overcome some fundamental
problems. Let me start by saying that I believe the UK in its current form to
be doomed. Not, primarily, because of the Scottish question, but because of the
Irish one. A combination of demographic change in Northern Ireland (the Irish-identifying
population is going to exceed the British-identifying population by a clear margin in the foreseeable future) and the fact
that whilst, in pre-EU times, the Republic looked like a very socially
conservative place but, post-Brexit, it is the North which looks like the more
socially conservative, a factor which will affect the younger generations
particularly. That’s not to say that reunification is as imminent as some
believe, merely that it will not be indefinitely delayed. That means that any
federal system is inevitably concerned only with England, Wales, and Scotland.
How can they effectively operate as a federation or confederation?
Yesterday’s
post referred to the series of articles by Glyndwr Cennydd Jones on the IWA
website. It is clear that Jones has given a lot of thought to the question of
how such a confederation can work without England necessarily dominating. And
his starting point – that sovereignty lies in the individual nations, not in
the centre, and that those individual nations delegate authority over certain
shared matters to the ‘Council of the Isles’ which exercises them jointly is a
reasonable one in principle (although it’s notable that all proposals for any sort
of federal or confederal approach always end up suggesting that Wales and
Scotland should directly exercise less control over their own futures than the Republic
of Ireland, Malta, or any other member state of the EU). I’m not sure that it
solves the problem though, and I’ll illustrate that with three practical and
relevant examples, two relating to defence and the third to currency, all of
which would be delegated to the centre in the proposed model. I assume that,
based on current polling trends, there is a Conservative government in England,
a Labour government in Wales and an SNP government in Scotland.
1.
Replacement of
Trident. Under the scenario set out above, the governments of England definitely, and Wales
probably, would wish to proceed. Does Scotland have a veto? If no, does that
mean that Scotland has both to contribute to the cost and host the facility?
2.
The US wants to
invade a country in the Middle East and wants the UK to join in. England says
yes, Wales probably says no (after a bit of prevarication) and Scotland says
no. Are Wales and Scotland bound to contribute both money and young people’s
lives to the pursuit of US imperialism?
3.
There is a large
deficit as a result of paying for a pandemic, and a programme of austerity is
suggested. The English government is wildly enthusiastic, and both Wales and
Scotland are deeply opposed, but with a single currency and single central bank,
only one side can win the argument.
In all three
cases, the issue comes down to the same thing: does England, with 85% of the
population and wealth, get to outvote the other two, or can the other two
either singly or acting in consort block what England wants? The problem is, in
essence, this:
·
If the English
majority gets to decide all these issues, on what basis would such a structure
ever be attractive to the likely governing party in Scotland? (Wales is
different – I can see ‘Welsh’ Labour going along with this in the naïve belief
that Labour might one day win a majority in England and the even more naïve
belief that an English Labour government would be significantly different from
an English Conservative government.) Whilst the range of powers delegated to
the centre is more limited than at present, it still replicates precisely one
problematic element of the current situation.
·
If, on the other
hand, England’s actions can be constrained either by Scotland alone exercising
some sort of veto, or else by some sort of weighted voting under which combined
Scottish and Welsh votes outweigh England’s voice, why would that ever be
attractive to either of the parties likely to be able to form a government in
England, without whose agreement such a proposal is dead in the water?
The underlying
issue with any sort of confederal system proposed for the UK is that it depends
on the governments and/or electorates of all three countries being ready to
accept it. Once the principle of sovereignty belonging to the parts not the
whole is accepted, a simple overall majority of the UK electorate to ‘delegate’
powers to the central Council is no longer enough. Whilst the proposal put
forward in the five articles is a valiant effort, I really don’t see how it
addresses the inherent problems. It might, conceivably, have headed off the Scottish
independence movement three decades ago, but it’s now far too late.