Last week, the IWA website ran a series of
five articles by Glyndwr Cennydd Jones on his proposal for a “League-Union
of the Isles”, which he also describes as “A sovereign Wales in an
isle-wide confederation”. The first part is available here,
and it contains links onwards to the other parts. He’s obviously given the
question a great deal of thought, and attempted to fill at least some of the
gaps in federalist/ confederalist thinking, and he makes a number of points
which independentistas should consider carefully. I can’t help but conclude,
however, that the series fails to completely overcome what many of us consider
to be the fundamental flaws of the federalist/ confederalist approach. This post
looks at one of those, and the blog will return to another tomorrow.
The first is that federalists often seem
to be starting from an assumption that there is an inherent and necessary need
for something at a UK level, and much of their thinking then revolves around
what that is and how it can be achieved. In the fifth and final part, Jones
asks the question, “If we were offered a hypothetical opportunity to
constitute Britain from ‘scratch’ once more today, would we consciously choose
the model of a centralised unitary state that we have inherited?” It’s a
good question, and most independentistas, at least, would reply in the
negative. It doesn’t follow, though, that we would therefore look for some
other model which retained a semi-unity based on the existing elements which compose
the UK, complete with an international border across that big island off to the
west of Wales. For independentistas, the question isn’t what sort of UK,
but whether there should even be one. And if there weren’t all that wet stuff
between the east of England and the European mainland, would we even think of
the British Isles as being separate and apart from the rest of Europe, or would
we see it as just another part of the European landmass?
In practice, of course, we cannot start
with a blank sheet of paper, we have to start from where we are, and our
starting point is defined by a combination of history and geography. It is a
truism that most European borders simply mark the points at which different
armies were stationed the last time the fighting stopped, and the composition
of the UK owes a great deal to the same factor. Nobody drew lines around ‘nations’,
‘countries’, or ‘states’; the entities which are most often referred to by
those terms today largely evolved to fit the borders which military action
defined, albeit leaving pockets of peoples within, and even across, borders who
failed to identify with the emergent ‘nation-states’ and have clung to their
own identities over centuries.
Wales didn’t choose to share a common
history with the other parts of the British Isles, any more than the British
Isles chose to share a history with the rest of Europe, but geography, rivalry
and the pursuit of land, power, and wealth made it inevitable that we have
ended up with shared elements of history whether we like it or not.
Independence wouldn’t change the former any more than Brexit changes the
latter, whatever the adherents of other proposition might wish. By the
standards of today, parts of that shared history appear good, and other parts
appear bad; but past generations would have different views – as will the
generations to come.
History and geography, in themselves, are
neither good nor bad, they just are what they are. Neither history nor geography
dictate how people should choose to self-identify or to govern themselves, what
the borders should be nor what we might decide to do acting in consort with
others rather than independently. But that is not to say that our interpretation
of history, the way we internalise and relate to those bits that we know and
understand (which is both a major part of ‘identity’ and also different for every
one of us) doesn’t affect our attitude towards the question of structures and
borders, and I understand how an internalised folk memory of what the UK is
leads many to want to perpetuate it in some form. It might even be fair to characterise
that as the essence of ‘Britishness’. Whether federalists are responding to
their own feelings of being ‘British’, or simply recognising that others feel
that way is an open question. I suspect that there are elements of both
involved. Both seem to be looking for a solution which combines greatly
increased Welsh autonomy with a way of retaining that sense of Britishness. It’s
an irrelevant question though. Whilst both are entirely honourable positions to
hold, they still leave federalism, of any flavour, as a concept which first and
foremost is attempting to address that problem of identity rather than the problem
of two or three nations being dominated by a third. And it is that latter issue
to which we shall return tomorrow.
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