Pre-conditions for referendums

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There has been some confusion about UKIP's policy in relation to the National Assembly.  Actually, I could have written that sentence without the words "in relation to the National Assembly", and on everything except their core policy of Brexit, it would still have made sense.  Yesterday, the party's UK leader half backed the suggestion from the Welsh leader that the Assembly should be abolished, by calling for a referendum.  This is hardly a surprise; it's not so very long since UKIP were claiming that the very existence of the Assembly was all part of a vile plot by those dastardly Europeans to regionalise the UK, completely ignoring decades of agitation for a national legislature for Wales.

There is nothing at all wrong with making such a call - they have as much democratic right to call for such a referendum as I do to call for a referendum on abolishing Westminster's control over Wales (which is the effect of a referendum on independence).  The fact that we have had referendums in the past is not - and should not be - any bar to having another one if it appears that opinions have changed.  It would be nice, though, if they'd recognise that a similar rule should apply to Brexit - if one decision brought about  by referendum can be changed by a further referendum, there is no logical justification for saying that the same isn't true for another decision taken by referendum.  I don't really expect them to understand that, mind: logic and UKIP are not words generally used in the same sentence.

There is, though, a condition which they need to meet first, and it's the same condition which we independentistas also need to meet.  To hold a referendum on either proposition requires there to be a majority of AMs in the Assembly committed to that proposition by manifesto commitment.  It's a wholly reasonable bar to set as a means of determining whether opinion is moving in a particular direction.  It's not one that I see much hope of them crossing though.

More of the same

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Under the curious hotchpotch which passes for a constitution in the UK, we do not elect the leader of the executive branch of government; we only elect members of the legislative branch, despite the increasingly presidential nature of the election campaigns themselves.  But at least when it comes to an election, we all know who the leaders of the parties are, and we all know that the leader of whichever party can put together a majority of seats in the legislature will become head of the executive branch.  From that perspective, it really is entirely a matter for the individual parties to decide who to elect as their leader and how to run that election, because the electorate decide on the basis of knowing the consequences of their votes.

There is a problem, though, when that leader falls by the wayside, for whatever reason, during the term of office of the legislature.  At that point, the leader being elected by the members of a party also becomes the leader of the executive, and who and how that leader is selected becomes a proper matter for debate by the wider electorate, especially given the constitutional fact that there is no requirement for the newly-appointed leader to face a general election.  In that context, the Labour Party’s electoral college system for selecting its leader in Wales is an entirely legitimate subject for debate.

The Western Mail reported on Saturday that “…critics of a change within Welsh Labour fear that moving to one member, one vote could increase the likelihood of a more radical, left-wing candidate winning the leadership”.  Stop and think about that for just a moment: the argument here is that the party needs a complex three part electoral college in order to place a deliberate constraint on who can be elected.  And underpinning that is an assumption that the trade unions and affiliated bodies and the party’s elected MPs, AMs, and MEPs will always and necessarily be more ‘conservative’ in outlook than the ordinary members.

It’s hard to know whether or not that’s true of trade union members, given that their leaders often support nominations on behalf of the members without consulting them, and then give them a very strong steer on who they should support.  What we do know is that many of those who are members of trade unions and/or affiliated bodies effectively get to vote more than once in a leadership election, since if they are also individual members of the party, they also vote in the membership section of the college.  Giving multiple votes in the same election to selected electors is a strange definition of democracy.

What we also know is that the assessment of elected members (i.e. that they are more ‘conservative’ than the rank and file membership) is broadly correct.  There is an argument that allowing the election of a leader who does not enjoy the full confidence of his or her fellow elected members can create problems, and that is a reason for giving those elected members more influence in the process.  That is part of the problem being faced by Corbyn – and I know that he isn’t the first or only party leader to find the wider membership more supportive than the parliamentary group.  The question that the Labour Party should be asking, though, is not ‘how do we ensure that the membership can’t elect a leader who does not enjoy the confidence of the group?’, but ‘why is there such a disconnect between the views of the elected members and those of the wider party membership?’

And actually, that isn’t only a question for Labour.  When I look at other parties I see a similar trend; those party members elected to legislatures, at Welsh and UK level, often seem to be more ‘establishment’ and ‘centrist’ than the wider membership.  Whether it’s the result of being elected and getting sucked into the system, or whether it tells us something about the selection processes being used is an unanswered question.  In a large enough elected body, such as the UK House of Commons, there are some who somehow get through both of those processes whilst retaining a bit more of an edge to their politics; people like Corbyn.  In a small legislature such as the National Assembly, however, the scope for that is more limited, and we see fewer ‘wild cards’.

The result, to answer those anonymous Labour critics referred to by the Western Mail, is that the Labour Party has generally managed to weed out the “more radical, left-wing” candidates before they even get to the Assembly.  It doesn’t matter which method they use to elect their new leader; the future looks like more of the same in any event.

Cutting the apron strings

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There is a great deal to welcome in this week’s joint report from the Wales Governance Centre and the Electoral Reform Society.  Its conclusions – an increase in the membership and a move to a single class of AM with a more proportional electoral system - are both things which I’ve supported for many years.  Having said that, I don’t agree with everything that they have to say, particularly when it comes to the proposed number of AMs – or rather, how that number has been arrived at.

When I first read the news reports, it struck me that 87 was such a precise number – most previous discussions have talked about round numbers such as 80 or 100.  The reason for arriving at 87 is clear enough; there are 29 Westminster constituencies, and if we allocate three AMs to each, we end up with 87.  The mathematics is clear – but how about the logic?  What, for instance, is magic about 3 members per constituency, when 4 would produce an even more proportional result?  Why do all constituencies have to be the same size and have the same number of AMs?  I understand the argument for equality of representation, but part of the beauty of multi-member constituencies is that they can have different numbers of representatives if they have different numbers of constituents.

The problem that I have with this report is that the outcome is driven by the rather axiomatic assumption that coterminosity is a good thing; in this case, that Assembly constituencies should match Westminster constituencies.  I’m not convinced about that at all; and the report itself notes that “there is little detailed published research of which we are aware on public attitudes to coterminosity”.  I certainly understand why the political parties would prefer consistent boundaries; years of experience of the complications of constituency boundaries not being the same as local authority boundaries means that I am well aware of the difficulties for parties in trying to organise themselves to fight elections across different boundaries.  And were I still a party functionary, I’m sure that I’d be arguing for coterminosity. 

But does it matter to the public?  I’m not aware of any strong evidence of that; indeed, given the recent research on people’s knowledge of the names of their representatives, I’m not sure that it matters much at all.  Insofar as there is a potential for confusion, it’s most likely to arise if multiple elections are held on the same day, it seems to me.  And in Scotland, there is already a disconnect between the constituency boundaries for Westminster and Holyrood – I’m not aware of any evidence that that has led to the public being seriously confused.

If it doesn’t matter to the public, why don’t we start by thinking about what we would ideally do for Wales if we started with a clean sheet of paper?  That will, of course, be a matter of opinion, but given the strong criticism of the new Westminster boundaries for ignoring historic identities and communities, why should we simply follow suit?  What’s wrong, for instance, with having a single constituency for Cardiff (or Swansea, or Newport) and adjusting the number of members upwards?  What’s the problem, for our new Welsh democracy, with recognising rurality by having greater variation in the size of constituencies than is permitted under the new Westminster rules (after all, many politicians in Wales have already argued for precisely that in relation to those new Westminster rules)?  Or more generally, why do we start from the implicit presumption that what happens for Westminster is ‘right’, and everything else has to be built on that foundation?

Now I know that the report’s authors have held discussions with representatives of all the parties before publishing their conclusions.  I don’t know what was said in those discussions, of course; but it may well be that the authors concluded that coterminosity was an essential requirement for there to be any chance of cross-party agreement on the changes; that coterminosity is, in other words, a price worth paying in order to get the two greater prizes of an increase in numbers and a change to the voting system.  And actually, if that were the basis of their conclusion, I’d agree with them.  But that’s a pragmatic argument rather than the one of principle as which it’s being presented.

Pragmatism may have to suffice in the short term, but in the longer term, we really need to free ourselves from the assumption that we have to follow what happens for and at Westminster.

What a stroke of luck

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I find it hard to imagine that any sovereign parliament, anywhere in the world, would allow someone who doesn’t live in the country, and who has no intention of moving to live there, to be elected as a member, to draw a salary of £84,000 a year for the privilege, and to appoint his spouse to run his office on another generous salary.  Aren’t we lucky in Wales that those nasty nationalists haven’t succeeded in making the Assembly a sovereign parliament?

Poorer dabs

Tweet When poor old Malcolm Rifkind recently suggested that he was struggling to survive on an MP’s salary, I pointed out that MPs are actually paid more than 94% of the population.  Using the same chart (available here), we can see that our AMs, on their current pittance of £54,390, are only in the 92^nd percentile for salaries in the UK.  The proposals of the review board would raise them up to the 94^th, making them more highly rewarded than 93% of the UK population.

I’ve been unable to find a comparable table for salaries in Wales alone.  But given that we know salaries in Wales are lower on average than those across the UK as a whole, I think we can conclude that they might actually be in about the 92^nd or 93^rd percentile now, and that the proposals put forward last week would take them up to the 95^th or 96^th, if we restrict our comparison to Wales.  The question which follows will be a very simple one for most people: do we believe that AMs need to be paid more than 95% of the population of Wales?

The reaction of the political parties and politicians has been cautious; another way of saying that they haven’t ruled it out.  There have been some statements prefaced with weasel words along the lines of “at a time of austerity, it’s a bad idea”.  That is of course just a coded way of saying “this is a jolly good idea, but the timing is all wrong”.

Two reasons in particular have been advanced in support of the proposed increase, neatly summed up by the Chair of the Remuneration Board in point 1 of his article for the IWA, where he described the decision as “Setting a salary which reflects the responsibilities on AMs in the Fifth Assembly and which encourages the best candidates to put themselves forward for selection (by the parties) and election (by the public)”.

Taking the first part of that, about reflecting the “responsibilities on AMs”, the implication of needing to pay them more than 95% of the rest of us is that they must be carrying more responsibility than 95% of the population.  Leaving aside the ministers (who are actually responsible for running things and taking decisions), what direct responsibility for anything do AMs actually carry?  And how has that responsibility been measured, assessed, and compared to others in order to get to such a result?

As for the second part, who decides who are the “best candidates”, and on what basis?  Is it really true that only those who won’t even apply unless they are paid more than 95% of the rest of us are of the necessary calibre to do the job?  And what is the quality control process which ensures that salaries paid to attract the best candidates don’t end up merely rewarding the indolent and greedy?  Only a tiny proportion of the electorate make any attempt to assess the ‘ability’ of the candidates placed before them when they’re deciding how to vote.  Most simply vote for the party label.  That isn’t going to change any time soon.

The words ‘responsibility’ and ‘ability’ are easy to bandy about, but a great deal harder to define, either in absolute terms or in relative terms.  But they’re used in ways which suggest that everyone knows and understands what is being discussed.  That avoids asking the difficult questions.

Ultimately, there are two ideological constructs at work here, which have been inadequately challenged or considered in arriving at a conclusion, even if we could define responsibility and ability to everyone’s satisfaction.  They are:

1.    That people ought to be paid according to the level of responsibility that they hold, and

2.    That people are driven in their choices by personal financial gain, and won’t apply their ability to any task unless the rewards are high enough.

But the first really isn’t the only possible way of organising rewards, and the second really isn’t the only conceivable motivation to drive people.  If we want a paradigm shift in the way our society is run (and I certainly do), then accepting the ideological constructs of the current paradigm and applying them to those charged with making legislative changes is a spectacularly poor way to set about it.

Right conclusion, shame about the arguments

Tweet Sometimes I find myself agreeing with much of what someone else says but completely failing to understand how they reached the conclusion which they reached as a result.  At other times I find myself agreeing with the conclusion whilst rejecting just about every step in the logic used to get to that conclusion.  It was the second feeling that I got when I read Kirsty Williams’s comments this week about an increase in the number of AMs.  I agree that 80 - 100 would be better, but disagree with much of what she said in support.

She started by saying that “any increase in the number of AMs must be cost neutral”.  I asked myself why.  I can understand that politicians have made themselves so unpopular that they’re afraid to make the argument for an increase in numbers, but if doing any job properly requires more resources, than an increase in cost is inevitable.  Linking that increase to an arbitrary reduction in something completely different is about presentation rather than logic.

“Wales”, she argues, “...has the highest proportion of councillors compared to residents in the UK”.  As a statement of fact, it’s inarguable.  But as a reason for reduction, it’s weak.  I’m not particularly committed to either the current number of councils or of councillors in Wales, but merely saying that we should cut the number because it’s lower elsewhere is a complete non sequitur.  There are a whole series of judgements to be made about what powers local government in Wales should have and how local communities should best be represented when decisions are taken.  Stating simply that England has fewer councillors for each thousand voters avoids rather than addresses those questions.

“... too many laws are being poorly drafted”, she says.  Again I tend to agree; but I’m not convinced that there is any relationship between that issue and the number of Assembly Members.  It might simply mean that we need more – or better – people in the drafting office; or that the government should not be so hasty in legislating.  Having more people being told to hold how to vote on the content of laws doesn’t immediately strike me as the solution to that particular deficiency.

“We can’t let the lack of capacity in our Assembly be given as a reason for us not to have the appropriate powers to help build a stronger economy and a fairer society”.  I’m not sure who exactly is arguing that the lack of numbers in the Assembly is a reason for not giving the Assembly more powers.  This looks like a convenient fiction, invented to be easily knocked down.  I’ve certainly seen it argued that the lack of skills, experience, and ability is a barrier to giving the Assembly more powers, but I’m not sure how increasing the numbers necessarily deals with any of those issues.

And then there’s the headline about ‘more AMs needed for a stronger economy and fairer society’.  Surely both of those things are actually down to the policies being pursued by the government, not the number of Assembly Members?  How precisely does increasing the number of AMs change that?

Despite all of that I actually agree with her that we should have more members in the Assembly.  It is after all the conclusion of two commissions set up to consider the matter in depth.  But my reasons would be rather different.

Firstly the small number of members leads to a small talent pool from which to select ministers and committee chairs.  That is reflected in the fact that successive reshuffles make little difference to the overall appearance of the government – the same people simply swap posts.  Secondly, the “payroll vote” is too large a proportion of the total.  That leaves little scope for independent thinking.  And thirdly, AMs are obliged to be generalists; there is inadequate scope for them to specialise in particular issues and causes.

Having said all that, they could help themselves more as well.  Squealing about not having the time to do the job properly when some of them have outside paid interests as well doesn’t sound like much of an argument, and it sometimes seems that a number of them consider ‘scrutiny’ to be the same thing as reading out the political points written down for them by their researchers rather than understanding the legislation and responding to it.

It may well be brave of any politician to suggest an increase in their numbers, but if these are the best arguments that they can find, it’s an issue which isn’t going to be resolved any time soon.

Please sir...

Tweet Sometimes, the people with the grandest job titles turn out to have the least power and influence.  It’s almost as though those bestowing the titles feel that those receiving them can be bought off with a fine-sounding name as a substitute for money or power.

I’m not aware of many cases, however, where the original request was for a grand title instead of money or power.  The question of the name given to our National Assembly seems to be one of those rare exceptions. 

Last week, it was reported that Plaid are submitting an amendment to the Wales Bill currently wending its way through the House of Commons, seeking a change in the name of the National Assembly to the “National Parliament of Wales, or Senedd Genedlaethol Cymru”.  The desire for a name change isn’t restricted to Plaid of course; the (Labour) Presiding Officer has expressed a similar view in a personal capacity, and the leader of the Conservative group has put forward the same suggestion on behalf of his group (although, as we have learned recently, everything that he and his group say is purely a personal opinion unless it’s been agreed by the Secretary of State in advance).

Clearly, it’s important for any nationalist that Wales has a ‘proper’ parliament; but when I talk about a ‘proper’ parliament, I mean one with proper powers, not just a proper name.  The name is ultimately an irrelevance; what matters is what it can do, and the very fact that we have Welsh politicians beseeching London politicians to change the name merely serves to underline that lack of power.  I rather suspect that, if and when the Assembly has the power to decide for itself what it should be called as part of a more wholesale transfer of power, the name would be seen as the irrelevance which it is.

Besides, there’s nothing wrong with ‘National Assembly’.  A quick look at the names given to national legislatures across the world reveals that it’s actually a very common name.  Only a blinkered UK-centric view would lead anyone to the conclusion that there is any significant difference between a parliament and an assembly.

But, when the Assembly can decide for itself what it should be called, and if the politicians still think that it’s of any great import, then the aspect of a name change which is of greatest psychological importance isn’t the difference between an Assembly or a Parliament – it’s whether the name of the country needs to be included at all.  Most nations don’t feel the need to include the name of their country in the name of their legislature – why should we?  There’s something very insecure about feeling that to be necessary.

Heat, light, power, and oppositionalism

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In response to Wednesday’s post, one anonymous commenter said that (s)he was disappointed that I was so dismissive of the no confidence motion, and wrote “What other form of censure have they got?  How else can they hold the Government to account and ensure that they cannot continue to mislead the electorate?  If the opposition parties were not to go ahead with the vote of no confidence, then the minister would justify centralisation by claiming that it was an independent report”.

There are a number of interesting points there.  Let’s start with this business of ‘holding the government to account’.  It's a phrase which often trips off the tongues of opposition politicians – whether in Cardiff or in London – and it’s one of those phrases whose meaning seems obvious.  But what does it really mean?

Clearly, no opposition can actually sack, or even censure, a government unless that opposition has a majority in the relevant chamber, whether a ‘natural’ majority or else a majority based either on government rebellion or differential absenteeism.  It’s why no confidence motions are so rare in most legislatures; unless the opposition thinks it can win one, there is little point holding one, since the failure of a ‘no confidence’ motion effectively confirms the opposite, i.e. ‘confidence’.

So, if they can't be sacked or censured, ‘holding a government to account’ can really mean little more than forcing them to answer difficult questions, and making sure that the answers are given the widest possible airing.  A motion of censure or no confidence which you know you can’t win, and which, even if you did win, has no effect, doesn’t strike me as a particularly effective way of doing that.  Even more so if it’s held on an issue of process rather than an issue of substance.

Could it be, though, as the anonymous comment seems to suggest (“How else can they…”) that it was actually born, at least in part, out of frustration and impotence, as a result of a lack of any alternative options?  Possibly, but attempting to press the nuclear button because there’s no non-nuclear option isn’t a line of reasoning which appeals to me.

Is it even true that there are no other options, though?  Are the scrutiny processes in the National Assembly so weak and inadequate that tabling a certain-to-fail motion of no confidence is the only option open to opposition parties?  I would hope not; and I don’t believe it’s so either.

If we look at the Westminster model, on which AMs often seem so keen, some parliamentary select committees actually do quite a good job of exposing government failings.  That isn’t to say, however, that all MPs are good at the job.  An observation that I’d make is that some MPs go into those committees with the intention of scoring points and grabbing sound bites, whilst others develop a depth of expertise in their subject and go in well-briefed, with a mastery of the subject, ready for a forensic examination of witnesses.  The first category get the headlines; but it’s the second category which are most effective in ‘holding the government to account’.

Westminster has one obvious advantage over the Assembly in this regard.  The sheer number of MPs, and the corresponding lack of numbers in the Assembly, allows a degree of specialisation and expertise.  It also allows more backbench freedom, on both government and opposition benches, for individual MPs to follow a particular hobby horse without endangering the government’s majority.

Are there, nevertheless, any valid comparisons with the Assembly in Cardiff?  I think there are.  The most effective harrying and scrutiny of government which I can recall in the entire period since the Assembly was created was the work which Dr Phil did over European funding and Barnett.  He mastered the subject better than any minister, was always well-prepared, and challenged the government time and time again.  There weren’t many sound bites, but the centre ground on those issues moved, in large part, I am convinced, as a result of his work.  Policy changed.

It’s an example of the second type of MP to which I referred earlier.  But much of what passes for scrutiny in the Assembly seems to be of the first type.  I don’t know what actually happens, but the impression often given is of opposition AMs who have been given a briefing note, ten minutes before going into a committee, of a few key points, rather than of most AMs having any real mastery of the subject.

And that brings me back to the point raised by Anon.  ‘Holding the government to account’ needs to be about more than scoring points and grabbing headlines.  It may be easier to generate heat than it is to generate light, but generating light will achieve more in the end.

Legal Obligations and Sustainability

Tweet I’ve seen a few references recently to the fact that the National Assembly has a legal obligation to put sustainability at the heart of its work.  Indeed, it seems to be the only legislature in the world which has such an obligation, and the inference is that it’s therefore something to treasure and take pride in.  I’m not so sure.

I don’t disagree with the idea that putting sustainability at the heart of our government’s work is a good thing.  Nor am I arguing for a moment that the government should change this policy.  On the contrary, it’s something on which I’m delighted to see Wales taking a lead.  But it’s the legal obligation part which concerns me.

Had the government and Assembly freely chosen to make sustainability central to its work, I’d have been entirely supportive.  Indeed, I’d even have been prepared to lobby and campaign for such a decision to be taken.

But the legal obligation is contained in the legislation setting up the Assembly, and as such, it underlines the subordinate nature of our legislature.  Its central guiding principle has not been defined by the Assembly itself, nor by the elected government of Wales, but by the UK Parliament which has placed an obligation on Wales which it has not been prepared to place on itself or on the UK Government.

I’m happy to take a degree of pride in the principle itself; but not in its provenance.  I’m uncomfortable with the idea that any government should have its central guiding principle handed down to it by another government, and with no ability to change it.  I’d be much prouder if the Assembly had adopted the principle for itself – or even been handed the power to change it and then decided not to.

Crisis, what crisis?

Tweet It's another of those famous phrases which the person to which it is widely attributed (in this case, Jim Callaghan) never actually said. It came to mind today when two different journalists telephoned me to ask whether Plaid is going through a crisis, following a series of press stories over the last couple of weeks.

Well, it is the 'silly season' of course; a time when there is a dearth of hard political news. That, in turn, means that some recent events have received rather more attention than they would have received in other times, or than they merit. And in a way, I suppose that I contributed ever so slightly by stepping down as Chair.

But there really is no crisis. There is a debate to be had about Plaid's future direction, and we are having it. Some of it will inevitably be held in the public arena, but some details of party strategy are always best discussed internally, and I hope that members will try and remember that.

For my part, I will be taking part as a candidate in the hustings meetings to select the party's nominees for the Mid and West Region, and I have every intention of using the opportunity to talk to members across the Region about where the party is going and what we should be doing next. That is a healthy debate to be having; and it's one of the right places to be having it - with the party's members and activists.

Elements of that discussion will no doubt spill over into the public domain, whether accidentally or deliberately. But debate is not the same as division. Intelligent and sensible debate is something Plaid used to be very good at, and it's a skill we need to relearn.

Now for Westminster...

Tweet The report by Sir Roger Jones and his panel on the pay and expenses of AMs contains a large number of recommendations. In other circumstances, there are one or two points of detail (mostly minor) which I suspect ought to be subject to a little more debate; but in the current climate, I don't see how any of the parties can do other than accept the report in full, and that's what I expect to happen.

I don't doubt that there will be some AMs in all parties who might harbour reservations about aspects of the proposals; but it would be a career-limiting move to start expressing those reservations, let alone rejecting any of the recommendations.

Westminster has already launched its own review of the system of expenses, which will report later this year. Whilst there may be some minor differences as a result of the different nature of the two institutions, they are likely to struggle to justify any significant differences of principle, and I expect Westminster to follow the lead set by the Assembly.

Could they? Would they?

Tweet David Davies is an outspoken MP, who says what he thinks regardless of whether it's what he's supposed to be saying. In that context, it can be a mistake to vest too much credence in his utterances.

Having said that, his views on Wales and the National Assembly are very much a reflection of the views of the ordinary members of the Conservatives in Wales - much more so than the statements that issue from some of the Tory AMs.

So when he says that he supports the idea that London should take back the Assembly's powers over higher education and over 'aspects' of the NHS, there are probably many members of his party all across Wales cheering him on. Coupled with the willingness of the Tories' spokesperson on Wales to raise the issue in the first place, it's an indicator as to which way the wind is blowing inside that party.

Whilst I find it entirely credible that Gillan would not have considered it necessary to consult, or even inform, her party's leader in the Assembly, I am much less sure that she would start to float that idea without discussing with at least some of her shadow cabinet colleagues – and possibly even the boss.

It seems almost inevitable now that there will be a Tory government in the UK after the next election. That government is likely to have a massive mandate from England, whilst being resoundingly rejected in Wales. For all their talking up of their chances, they're unlikely to win more than around half a dozen seats in Wales, out of the 40 available.

In terms of the UK constitution, unwritten as it is, there is no problem if a government with a clear mandate at UK level seeks to impose its will on a Wales where it has no mandate. However, the establishment of the Assembly in 1999 changed the context, if not the rules. It would be a foolish government that tried it.

Did she or didn't she?

Tweet I don't know for certain whether Cheryl Gillan did, or did not, float the idea of undevolving higher education from the Assembly. The truth will out in time, I'm sure; but whether it's true or not, there is a general acceptance that the story is entirely credible.

The Tories' membership, leadership, and MPs are overwhelmingly opposed to the very existence of the National Assembly. A minority of their AMs (and one honourable exception amongst their parliamentary candidates) take a different view, but they are unlikely to even be consulted – let alone have any real influence – on the policies pursued by their party should they win the general election.

The Tories' plans to reduce the number of MPs by 10% as well as harmonising the size of constituencies will reduce the number of MPs in Wales from 40 to 30. It will also reduce the size of the National Assembly from 60 to 45 members, as a commenter on a previous post pointed out, because of the statutory relationship between the numbers of AMs and MPs. (Unless, of course, they are planning new primary legislation on the nature of the National Assembly. I doubt that they've actually thought that through.)

Given that many believe that the current membership of 60 is inadequate for the task, the logic of reducing the scope of the Assembly's authority to match its slimmed down membership is inescapable - which only adds to the credibility of the idea that they will be seeking to undevolve some powers.