Showing posts with label Armed Forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Armed Forces. Show all posts

Wednesday, 1 August 2018

Finding the right starting point


I don’t know whether using the army to distribute essential supplies is or isn’t part of the government’s contingency planning for Brexit.  The Sunday Times (paywall) claimed that it is, but the government denies it forcefully.  Given that the ultimate fall-back position for just about any crisis is to use the armed forces, I’d be surprised if the question has not been discussed at all, and the current government doesn’t exactly have a solid track record of honesty and transparency on anything associated with Brexit.  On reflection, perhaps I shouldn’t have included the words ‘associated with Brexit’ in the last sentence; any and every statement is subject to revision when someone lets slip the truth.  “Oh, you mean that army – we thought you meant another one.”
It was the Brexiteers who originally demanded that the government publish more detail about its contingency plans for a ‘no-deal’, in order to show M. Barnier and the EU27 that the UK means business.  It seems, though, that the civil servants tasked with preparing the plans misunderstood the request; the plans weren’t supposed to reveal what might happen in case that scared people; they were only supposed to show how wonderfully the UK would cope and that there would be no problems at all, ever.  In their naivety and driven by a complete lack of patriotism, those damned experts tried to sit down and look at what might really happen, instead of assuming the best.  For most of us, it’s a very strange type of contingency planning which starts from the assumption that all will be for the best, but it’s the sort of ‘planning’ which has underpinned the whole Brexit vision from the outset.
There was one aspect of the Sunday Times report about the use of the military which particularly caught my attention, which was that “Helicopters and army trucks would be used to ferry supplies to vulnerable people outside the southeast who were struggling to obtain the medicines they needed.”  Given the utter improbability that the London-based government would uniquely deny medicines to the vulnerable in the southeast, what is it about a potential shortage of medicines which affects everyone except those who live in the southeast?  Because the implication here is that those in the southeast will somehow find it easy to obtain supplies whilst the rest of us won’t. 
I for one would like to know what assumptions are underlying a contingency plan which can make such a distinction.  Perhaps the answer is to be found in the cock-up theory of history rather than the conspiracy theory.  The Sunday Times referred to existing contingency plans being ‘dusted down’ rather than new ones being written.  Perhaps they’ve picked up the one marked blizzard to use as the template.  Blizzard, Brexit – both have two syllables, start with a ‘b’ and will cause chaos.  It’s as good a place as any to start.

Tuesday, 3 July 2018

Defining identity in military terms


There’s a lot of lobbying going on within the hopelessly divided UK Government at present, with various cabinet ministers engaged in fairly public dissent about a whole range of issues, not simply Brexit.  One of the issues concerns the amount of money being spent on the armed forces, with military chiefs demanding more money.  According to the Sunday Times (paywall), they are also trying to enlist the support of the royal family for their campaign to increase spending.
What particularly struck me was the argument of one unnamed ‘senior source’ who said that “The prime minister needs to recognise that our standing on the international stage is linked to our national identity, which is linked to our strong defence”.  This reinforces a point which I’ve made before on this blog – for Anglo-British nationalists, the armed forces and the glorious (as they seem to see them) victories of the past are a key – perhaps the single most important – element in their whole definition of their own identity.  They’re not the only nation in the world to take an excessive degree of pride in the armed forces and their exploits, but how many other nations actually define themselves in those terms?
It helps to explain why there is such a huge gulf in understanding between the UK and the rest of the EU about the purpose and objective of the EU.  Whilst most European countries regard the wars which have ravaged the continent in the past as unfortunate events which must never be repeated, and therefore want to lock themselves together to prevent any such repeat, the Anglo-British nationalists see those same wars as part of the UK’s past triumphs and want to retain an independent capacity to fight such wars again.
But what sort of national identity is it that depends so heavily on the ability to wage war against its neighbours, and prefers to dwell on the outcome of past wars and prepare for future ones than work with others for a peaceful future?  This is truly the sign of a national identity which has lost its way in the world.

Thursday, 22 September 2016

Ready for what?

During the campaign for the Scottish Independence referendum two years ago, one of the arguments used by opponents of independence was that Scotland would be ‘too small’ to defend itself against any aggressor intent on seizing its territory.  The way it was presented, there were enemies out there (usually assumed to be Russia) who were just waiting for such a sign of weakness in order to invade.  One of the problems with that argument is that almost exactly the same could be said for the UK. 
As a retired general told us at the weekend, the UK’s armed forces “are ill-prepared to defend the UK against a serious military attack”.  But if the test of any defence capability is the ability to withstand an all-out attack from Russia, then the chances of the UK ever being able to afford an adequate level of armed forces are close to, if not actually, zero.  The logic of the general’s argument is surely that the countries of the EU would need to combine their armed forces in to a single organisation (as indeed, some in the EU seem to want).  I somehow doubt, however, that that was what the general had in mind.
The underlying question is about how realistic it is to assume that there are enemies out there just waiting for an opportunity to invade and occupy the UK.  It seems to be axiomatic for the military that such is the case, but is it really?  The point is that any government has to decide on the probability of a particular scenario before deciding how much to invest in preparing for it. 
The old saying that “Generals are always preparing to fight the last war” seems relevant here; although in this case, the general’s view seems to overlook the last half dozen or so military adventures which have been of an altogether different type.  Perhaps they just don’t count as ‘real’ wars between proper armies, of the sort that the military mind can more easily comprehend.  But it’s a strange world indeed where stating that “Counter-terrorism is the limit of up-to-date plans and preparations to secure our airspace, waters and territory" is seen as a criticism that the government is unprepared, when for most of us it might look as though there is actually a degree of refocussing on what are the greater current threats.
Insofar as there is a logic to the demand that we should always be prepared for another major European war, it is based on an assumption that some or all other states are inherently aggressive and seeking to expand their territories, and an assumption that the best way to avoid such a war is to be always prepared to fight it.  That’s one reading of history; but there is an alternative reading which is that when enough states prepare for war against each other for long enough, such a war is ultimately more likely to happen.
My bigger concern is not that the UK is not ready to engage in a defensive conventional war against largely imagined enemies; it is that the UK is far too ready to engage in offensive wars, and too unwilling to engage in sensible disarmament processes.  

Tuesday, 15 May 2012

Green armies

If there’s one aspect of human activity which I’d never describe as being in any way environmentally sound, it has to be warfare.  Using the earth’s resources to build weapons to kill, maim, and destroy is never going to be on anyone’s top ten list of sustainable activities.  So I was fascinated to read at the weekend that the army is ‘going green’.
It seems that they’re planning to install solar panels and wind turbines at bases in Afghanistan, and have been testing such an installation in Cyprus.  The plan is to deploy the new equipment later this year, and that it will slash fuel consumption by 45%.
However, lest anyone should think that the army is going soft, a member of the test team made it clear that this plan was all about saving lives, and had nothing to do with “tree hugging”.  The problem to which this is a response is really nothing to do with the environment at all – it’s just that the efforts to pacify that country have been so unsuccessful that fuel convoys are being regularly attacked by the Taliban.  The equation is a simple one: fewer convoys = fewer attacks = fewer deaths.
Now of course we should commend the army for reducing fuel usage, and for doing anything and everything it can to cut the loss of life in Afghanistan.  But we should not pretend that it has anything to do with environmentalism.  The only ‘green’ warfare is no warfare.