History – or rather, the way history is
interpreted – has a lot to answer for. And most especially, the choice of when ‘history’
starts. His own interpretation of history is at the heart of Putin’s claims that Ukraine is historically part of Russia and that Russia and Ukraine are a
single people and a single country, artificially separated by their common
enemy. The Chinese interpretation of history is at the heart of China’s claim that
the island of Taiwan is a province of China, sovereignty over which the mainland
has an absolute right to regain, by force if necessary. There was an interesting
analysis
of that latter claim on the Guardian’s website yesterday. Neither the Russian
claim nor the Chinese claim are entirely without merit, given the understanding
of history on which they are based, but both are based on a nationalist interpretation
and are selective about which parts of history count. And, as the writer puts it:
“Nationalist renderings of history are always suspect”. It’s something
of an understatement: as the war in Ukraine and the military forces being
deployed by China tell us, a selective view of history deployed in the
interests of a particular political position is not only suspect, it’s
positively dangerous.
We’re not exactly immune to the same
considerations closer to home. Whilst many independentistas in both
Wales and Scotland deploy their own interpretation of history, which stresses
that which went before the establishment of the UK, the Anglo-British
nationalists argue that history effectively started in 1707 with the Act of
Union, under which the previous kingdoms of England (already incorporating the territory
which we now know as Wales) and Scotland were abolished (‘for ever’ according
to them) to be replaced by a new United Kingdom of Great Britain (Liz Truss’s ‘single
country’). In truth, neither tell the full story, which is about movements of
people and conquests of territory dating back to before there is any recorded
history to tell us what happened, let alone any concept of nationhood or even
country. For nationalists, there has to be a starting point: a date of some
sort which is regarded as the foundation of the ‘country’, before which ‘history’
doesn’t count and after which there is only one ‘right’ way of ordering states.
It’s just that different nationalists choose different starting points. But those
are all essentially arbitrary.
The above-referenced article on Taiwan
poses a very pertinent question: “One has to wonder why ancient, pre-modern
history seems to trump the contemporary will of the Taiwanese people for
self-determination…”. It’s posed in a way which is specific to Taiwan, but
the question it raises is of much more general application. Welsh and Scottish independentistas
and Anglo-British nationalists alike seek to use history to define nations and
borders, starting from the assumption that whether the people in a given
territory are, or are not, considered to be a nation is the determinant of
their right to self-determination. Certainly, feelings of nationhood may be a
factor in deciding whether or not they want self-determination, but
ultimately why should a selective view of history (and all views of history are
ultimately selective) ever trump contemporary will? It is, of course, useful –
to say the least – if the people in any territory share a common interpretation
of their history, a common sense of nationality, or even a common language –
but none of those are necessary prerequisites to self-determination. If sovereignty
belongs to the people, and the people in Ukraine, Taiwan, Wales, Scotland or
even Ynys Môn want to establish an independent state covering their territory,
on what moral basis should that ever be denied?
2 comments:
Here goes (for the couple of large islands off the coast of mainland Europe)
Moral basis for denial- change in the proportion of nationalities self identified by the population in the defined area due to deliberate policies, facilitation or laissez faire attitudes emanating or encouraged by those from outside of the defined area.
Formosa is not a de facto part of China and commands the material means to conduct a highly effective territorial defence. They comfortably clear the most basic westphalian test without the benefit of a single formal military alliance - and so far without resorting to their indisputable technical capability to manufacture thermonuclear weapons.
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