The war in Ukraine is highly challenging
for those of us with a long-standing commitment to the belief that disputes
between states should always be resolved peacefully; that the phrase ‘war crime’
is tautologous; and that dividing the world into opposing armed blocs is a
denial of the essential truth that this planet is all we have and we need to
learn to share it effectively. Seeing two countries which have pursued a path of studied and long-term
neutrality – albeit not quite as absolute as some might think, given their
long-standing joint exercises with NATO – seeking membership of one of those
armed blocs has been a particularly depressing development.
Whether Putin was right to claim that the
eastward expansion of NATO threatened the security of Russia, and that the
stated intention of Ukraine to seek membership of NATO intensified that threat, is something over which historians will argue for generations to come. One of
the problems with understanding and interpreting history is that we don’t get
to change a parameter or two and then re-run events to see what changes. The
result is that there is always scope for alternative narratives, not about
events themselves, but about their causes and significance. Perhaps in a
century or so historians will have access to classified Russian archives and be
able to assess whether this was actually the way Putin saw things, or whether
it was a convenient excuse for doing what he always intended to do anyway. Had
the Eastern European states formerly part of the Soviet bloc not joined NATO
and the EU, would Russia have left them in peace, preferring some form of
economic domination, or would it have attacked them all, possibly even sooner,
in an attempt to rebuild the Soviet Empire to which Putin seems to be very
attached? Put another way, has NATO acted as a deterrent which has delayed war,
or a provocation? It's not as easy a question to answer as many seem to think.
There seems to be no justification for
Putin’s claim that Ukraine was conducting some sort of genocide in Donbas,
although there has been some reluctance in Ukraine to recognise
the fact that the majority of the population there were Russian speakers. That doesn’t
automatically make them Russians, although we know that there were at least
some who considered themselves such and wanted to be part of Russia rather than
Ukraine. Whether they were a majority or not is another question. It certainly
wasn’t obviously so at the time of the vote for Ukrainian independence, but
opinions can change. The only way to find out whether the people of that area
would prefer to be in Russia or Ukraine is to ask them, but that’s now a task
made impossible by a combination of killing people, driving others out of their
homes and deporting others to Russia. A simple majority of those remaining,
conducted under the rule of an occupying power, is hardly a basis for any sort
of democratic decision.
The first question is how the war can be
brought to an end. The demand for complete ‘territorial integrity’ being made by the
Ukrainian Government is a recipe for a long, grinding war of attrition during
which many more will die. The alternative suggestion of negotiating the cession
of some territory to Russia in exchange for peace involves allowing the aggressor
to ‘win’ (although what, exactly, they will have won looking at the destruction
they have caused is another question), and can provide no certainty that, after
a suitable breathing space, Russia won’t simply try again. It’s too easy to tell Ukrainians,
as the UK
seems to be doing, that they should fight to the last Ukrainian to recover
all the lands within what is, like all other boundaries in the world, an
arbitrary line on a map. It’s also too easy to tell them that they must give up
part of their territory in exchange for a negotiated settlement. Neither response is satisfactory. But if we accept the unlikelihood that Ukraine can defeat Russia
comprehensively without massive further casualties and a huge increase in the scale and nature of its weaponry, then there will have to be
a negotiation eventually. And lines on maps will inevitably be part of that, as they have been in just about all past peace treaties.
The second – and ultimately bigger –
question is how we build a world order which prevents the biggest and
best-armed countries from simply imposing their will on others, an issue which
applies to other countries, including the US, as well as Russia. Recruiting
more countries to NATO and increasing expenditure on armaments isn’t the only
possible answer, despite what UK and other politicians would have us believe. Challenging
that approach is not doing Putin’s work for him, as those – such as the leader
of the Labour Party – demanding absolute loyalty to NATO have suggested;
indeed if the current so-called ‘security structure’ in Europe has been shown
not to work, blindly doubling down on it is never going to be the best response.
A United Nations in which those with the biggest clout can simply veto
international action against those transgressing its rules has been shown to be
a failure. Many had thought that increasing trade was the answer – in this
case, that plugging Russia into an interdependent world economy would prevent
aggression. In practice, it just made it harder to impose immediate crippling
sanctions on the transgressor. It’s not a simple question, but continuing with
a world order based on the idea that ‘might is right’ is not a sustainable
future for humanity. There’s nothing cowardly or unpatriotic about seeking a
better alternative than more guns and bombs.