Circular arguments

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The Secretary of State for Defence has told us this week that the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea justifies the UK’s possession of such weapons.  Unfortunately, he does not set out the logical process he’s used to get from the premise to the conclusion. 

Insofar as there is a degree of logic there, I can understand why a state which fears that another nuclear weapons state might attack it could convince itself that it therefore needs to have its own nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent to a potential attacker.  But isn’t that precisely the logic which has driven Kim Jong-Un to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place?  In essence, Fallon’s argument seems to be that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons to counter what it sees as a threat from us, so we need nuclear weapons to counter the threat that they will pose us as a result.  It’s a circular argument which leads inevitably in only one direction – nuclear proliferation.  If the existence of nuclear weapons in one state justifies the retention or acquisition of such weapons by another, the solution has more to do with getting rid of them than with upgrading them. 

I can understand why Fallon might honestly believe that Kim is mad enough to use his weapons once they are ready, and I wouldn’t disagree with that assessment.  A closed dictatorial society where people are afraid to tell the supreme leader anything that he might not want to hear could well create the conditions for a nuclear conflict to break out, but that’s not much of an argument for threatening all-out retaliation; it just proves that ‘deterrence’ doesn’t work in those particular circumstances.  The whole concept of deterrence is based on an assumption that possessors of nuclear weapons will carry out a careful assessment of the likely retaliatory damage to their own side before using them.  It also assumes both that those involved will make a rational assessment, and that weighing up the probable millions of deaths on both sides to decide who wins is in some way a rational act.

The real reason that the UK insists on retaining and upgrading its nuclear weapons – despite treaty obligations forbidding it from doing so – is to maintain the fiction that the UK is one of the world’s great powers and keep hold of its seat on the UN Security Council.  It’s one of the most expensive seats in the world.

Drawing the wrong conclusion

Tweet During his visit to the Trident base in Scotland last week, David Cameron referred to the situation in North Korea (and Iran) as justification for the U.K.’s retention of nuclear weapons, and the government’s plans to upgrade those weapons.

It’s impossible to disagree with his assessment of the dangers of a nuclear armed North Korea (or Iran come to that), but to use that as a justification for maintaining a nuclear deterrent is a complete non sequitur.  It’s true that the world is probably closer to the military use of nuclear weapons than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War, but what is notable is surely that possession of  a ’deterrent’ by other countries is actually failing to deter.  If anything, the situation in North Korea proves the opposite - the deterrent not only does not deter, it actually acts as a spur for other countries to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

The whole principle of a “deterrent” rests on two major assumptions, neither of which appears to have any validity when dealing with a state like North Korea.

• Firstly it assumes that the leaders of the “deterred” state will calculate the benefits, risks and consequences of actions in the same way as the “deterring” state.  It’s tempting to say “on a rational basis” but it has never seemed to me that there’s anything particularly rational about the concept of mutual assured destruction; and rationality is itself relative.  Kim Jong Un is behaving perfectly rationally within his own paradigm; it’s just not the same paradigm as that of most of the rest of the world.
• Secondly, it assumes that the deterring state really would press the button; and again in the case of a state such as North Korea that is simply not credible.  If by some fluke, the North Korean military really did succeed in detonating a nuclear device on UK or US territory, does anyone really believe that Cameron or Obama would retaliate by ordering the mass killing of millions of Koreans?  I don’t have enormous faith in the underlying humanity of either man, but even I don’t believe that either of them could or would do that; most of the North Korean people are as much victims of the regime as would be those killed by that regime.

So if nuclear weapons don’t deter those whom they are supposed to deter; and if we don’t believe that the government would ever actually use them, what are they really for?  Why are all three UK parties so keen on retaining nuclear weapons, even if one of those parties wants to retain them on the cheap and in a less effective form?

The answer has more to do with an outdated concept of the U.K.’s place in the world than with any actual potential military use.  There is a residual belief that the UK is one of the world’s great powers, and that nuclear weapons cement that fact in reality.  It’s a very expensive way of trying to maintain a fiction.