Reluctant as I am to agree, ever, with
anything which escapes the mouth of Nigel Farage, he does occasionally come up
with half a good point. There was an example last
week with his suggestion that it ought to be possible to appoint
non-politicians to positions as government ministers if they have particularly
relevant experience and knowledge, along with the corollary that the act of
being elected to the House of Commons doesn’t magically confer relevant
knowledge, experience, or even basic ability on those elected to the extent
that they suddenly become capable of running a government department.
There are at least three reasons why it’s
only half a good point, though. The first is that, if being an elected member
of parliament for the majority party does not confer the necessary
qualifications for becoming a minister, then being the leader of such a party
doesn’t confer the necessary qualifications for becoming prime minister either – he is
hoist by his own argument, which ends up sounding like an argument against
democracy. The second is that governments can already appoint non-elected
politicians to become ministers by the simple expedient of giving them a
peerage. And the third is his counter assumption that being a successful
business person somehow does confer the necessary attributes for becoming a
minister. That overlooks the fact that there’s a huge difference between
supplying goods or services to make a profit and supplying goods and services
to meet identified social needs.
One of the theoretical strengths of the US
system (although, as we are seeing currently, it’s more theoretical than actual)
is the clear separation between the three branches of government – the
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. It’s a distinction which the
vague and not fully codified constitution of the UK fudges, leaving us with a
legislature full of people most of whom are, have been, or want to be part of
the executive. It’s prejudicial to them delivering critical scrutiny. A clearer
separation might well lead to better scrutiny and accountability – the idea
that people have to sit in the legislature in order to be scrutinised and held
to account might be familiar, but it is a strange one when analysed more
carefully. And a legislature which focussed more clearly on its key role of
legislating might do a better job of it than one where threats and
blandishments ‘encourage’ people to toe the government line. Electing the
executive and the legislature separately clearly has some advantages.
But, but, but… Holding a separate election
for the head of the executive and then allowing him or her to select the
best-qualified people to serve as cabinet ministers only works if the elected
head of the executive him or herself has the necessary attributes for the job,
including the ability to select the right people for other jobs. As the US is so
amply demonstrating at present, electing a narcissistic criminal sociopath to
the role can easily make things worse. If the head of the executive then puts
total loyalty to him or herself as the main – or only – required attribute, it’s
an understatement to say that it doesn’t necessarily lead to an adequate and
able cabinet.
The basic point which Farage made – that
governments should be able to choose people from outside parliament to run
ministries – has a great deal of merit, especially where the legislature is
small, such as in Wales (a Senedd where the number of members from the party or
parties forming the government is unlikely ever to exceed 50 by very much, and
where all of those have been selected on the basis of an internal party
popularity contest, doesn’t exactly provide a large pool from which to recruit
ministers; and the more powers the Senedd gains over time, the more obvious
that will become). All the objections about scrutiny and accountability of
people outside parliament can be overcome if the will is there – partly perhaps
by giving the legislature a strong role in confirming appointments and the
right to dismiss ministers as the ultimate sanction. The problem with Farage’s
proposal, however, is that it doesn’t really overcome the perceived problem of appointing
people not up to the job, because it doesn’t address the key questions, namely
who decides who is suitable for the job, and what criteria do they use? It
would be a mistake to completely dismiss the point which Farage has raised; but
as it stands it’s over-simplistic, with little sign of any intention to fill in
the gaps. But then, over-simplifying complex issues is something of a stock-in-trade
for him.
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1 comment:
I do not agree with Mr Farage on this point , although there are some other issues where he agrees with me.
In Wales when I was in school , you could take an ‘O’ level in Constitutional History – I passed!!!
Looking back, it was an interesting exercise in the study of power and the management of power, which I found valuable in my business life
The English Constitution is a great construct , but over the last hundred years both main parties have a personal stake in nullifying it for their own advantage and actively allowing ignorance to spread about it. So, the first thing to say is that ministers are appointed by the Crown and in my lifetime those that resigned sent their letter to the monarch. Ministers are called to account in person in the Commons ,where the question put should be about the validity of their actions regarding the Royal Prerogative and is the Bill constitutionally sound.
On this basis all members of the Commons should hold all Minsters ‘feet to the fire,’ but this has broken down when Question Time has become a match where one side or the another tells the world they are the best . You and I will never see the time when a member of HMG answers a question by saying that what has been pointed out is true and they have made a mistake. I could make the case that if an administration has a working majority , the debate about policy is futile, as that debate should have been undertaken in the election process. So, the machinery of checks and balances is completely skewed to the advantage of the administration in power.
In Caerdydd their a massive deficiency in accountability and with no revising chamber or having weekly meetings with the monarch who again is there ( under the Coronation Oath) to ask the questions of HMG and still has the power to ‘withhold his confidence in his government.’ Caerdydd was clearly built around the County Council model , rather than a national body of law making.
So, let us get back to get our representatives to submit HMG to rigorous checks and ensure that bad Bills do not see the light of day .
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