The dying months of
the Sunak administration were a curious time. In the lead-up to his first (and
last) party conference as leader, I recall that he told us he was going to make
a speech in Manchester and asked us if there was a major Manchester-specific
announcement that he could make. Somewhat tongue in cheek, I suggested that it
would be a very brave decision to say that he was going to cancel the new railway
line to Manchester. To our utter amazement, he seemed truly delighted.
The PM wondered
aloud whether there was anything he could announce as an alternative which
might please the audience, so I proposed that he could make a bold
announcement by packaging up a series of announcements which we’d previously
made and already put into long term budgets for road and rail improvements across the
country, brand them as ‘Network North’, and claim that they were being funded
by the £36 billion previously allocated to the railway line, thus giving him a
£36 billion saving in the process. It would never actually have been £36
billion, of course – the estimates for all those schemes were drawn up by the
same people who’d prepared the estimates for the railway line, and there was no
chance of delivering them at that price. I explained to him that the budgetary
process was such that they were really just lines in a spreadsheet the main
purpose of which was to deter the Chancellor from making tax cuts, but he was so
enthusiastic that I think he’d stopped listening. Bernard pointed out to him
that the package included schemes in places like London and Exeter, which not
everyone might agree were in ‘the North’, but after a momentary doubt he was
reassured when I explained to him that, in Civil Service speak, ‘the North’ is
a concept, not a place.
I fear that the alacrity
with which the PM accepted this explanation served only to encourage Bernard,
and when the PM asked what he could do to confirm his reputation for taking
long term decisions, Bernard told him that whilst the cancellation of the biggest
long term project which we were undertaking would help, if he wanted to add to
that, he could promise to establish a fund to repair potholes in roads. As
Bernard explained to me later when I spoke to him privately, he was being
entirely honest – it would indeed ‘confirm’ the PM’s reputation in relation to long term decision-making,
which is exactly what he had asked us to do.
Shortly after the
decision to axe the railway line was leaked, the PM asked us how he could best
demonstrate his decisive nature. Bernard, by now carried away by his own
enthusiasm, suggested that the PM should deny that a decision had been taken and say that he didn’t know when he would take the decision, adding that he would take
all the time he needed to think about the matter very carefully. Then, when he
did stand up and make the announcement only a couple of weeks later, he would
look very decisive indeed. As Bernard explained to me later, a few short weeks
of prevarication is what decisive looks like in the Civil Service.
It all turned out to
be a great success. We got a railway project which no-one in Whitehall had ever
wanted cancelled, and replaced by a whole series of alternative projects all of
which could be (and were) quietly cancelled later. As for the PM – well, PMs
come and PMs go. Only the Civil Service goes on for ever.
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