In the latter case
the expectation was that instead of each examination board having a monopoly within
its own geographical area as was previously the case, they would compete for ‘customers’
(or ‘schools’, as they are more usually known).
It was always understood that the probable result would be fewer boards each
having more customers; but the aim was that the overall cost would be less.
I’m not in a
position to state definitively whether it worked; but I suspect that it did -
in that narrow economic sense at least.
There are two problems though.
The first is that
whilst the purists regard the way in which costs are reduced and efficiency
increased as irrelevant as long as it actually happens, it is far from being irrelevant
in terms of its other effects.
And the second – as
could and should have easily been foreseen – is that marketplace competition
doesn’t operate solely on price. Once
they’ve done all they can to reduce costs, competing organisations start
looking for other differentiating factors.
In the case of the
examination boards, the obvious differentiating factor was always going to be
pass rates. When the schools are being
judged on league tables of exam results, then choosing the exam board most
likely to help them climb the rankings becomes more important then the cost
comparison.
At first sight, the
surprise is not so much that that system is now unravelling, but that it’s
taken so long to reach that point. But
if we consider the motivations of all the different stakeholders, it’s no
surprise at all.
Governments, of
all parties, want to demonstrate that their policies are working. What better way to do that than regular
increases in pass rates?
Schools want to
demonstrate that they are improving their performance and climbing the league
tables. What better way to do that than
regular increases in pass rates?
The examination
boards want to grow their ‘business’ and attract more ‘customers’. What better way to do that than regular
increases in pass rates?
Pupils, of
course, always wanted to get the best results possible, and their parents
(otherwise known as ‘voters’) want the same thing as well. What better way to demonstrate that than
regular increases in pass rates?
‘Teaching to the
exams’ is nothing particularly new, but all the incentives have been for
schools to do more of it.
Effectively,
there’s been a collusion by consensus in which all of those stakeholders’ aspirations
have apparently been met, with no stakeholder having any real incentive to ask
too loudly the difficult questions about whether the inexorable rise in results
actually reflected any real underlying improvement in knowledge and skill.
In principle, it is
surely right - indeed overdue - for the UK Education Minister to challenge this
process. And recognising what he called
the ‘malign’ impact of Thatcher’s reforms is equally overdue. But changing the rules part way through an
examination cycle was a spectacularly cackhanded way of trying to address the
issue, and incredibly unjust on those pupils in England who don’t have a Welsh Government
to reverse the decision.
It now looks
inevitable that Wales and England will be
taking different examination routes in future.
Doing that in a rush as a result of a spat doesn’t seem the right basis for
such a major decision, but we are, as they say, where we are.
What I hope will
not get lost – but greatly fear will indeed get lost – in this debate is more
detailed consideration of that issue about ‘teaching to the exams’. There still seems to be far too much emphasis
being placed on the rigour of the exams, and far too little on whether and to
what extent examination results tell us very much about the knowledge and
skills of the examinees.
And in so far as
employers and others are complaining about the output of the education system,
it is surely about knowledge and skills, not the number of passes in ologies.